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"They fancied themselves free, and no one will ever be free so long as there are pestilences. " 
A. Camus, The Plague. 
Introduction 
1 
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The threat of communicable diseases in perspective 
Outbreaks of communicable diseases have occurred since the early days of mankind and 
have always been feared by people throughout history. The first report of a plague 
epidemic, for instance, goes all the way back to the year 3120 BC (Old Testament, I 
Samuel V;1·2) while the clinical picture of anthrax was described as early as 1491 BC in 
Egypt3. For many other communicable diseases, early descriptions of the clinical course 
and devastating consequences they had at population level can be found in publications 
on ancient medicine.4·'' Long before the recognition of micro-organisms as etiological 
agents of disease and the isolation of various pathogens, man was able to develop 
strategies to fight communicable diseases by separating infected people from the healthy 
(Avicenna, Canon Medicinae) and instituting quarantine measures.6 Following a period 
of gradual progress in understanding mechanisms of transmission and pathogenesis, 
unprecedented accomplishments in the control of communicable diseases took place in 
the 19th and early 20th centuries such as: sanitation, introduction of the basic principles 
of hygiene and disinfection, the practice of immunization and, finally, the discovery of 
antibiotics. These measures introduced an optimistic view - basically that infectious 
disease would be "virtually eliminated as an important factor in social life by the middle 
of the 20th century".7 Moreover, by the nineteen-sixties, according to the Surgeon General 
W. Stuart (who was in office 1965-69 in the US) it was "time to close the book on 
infectious diseases and declare the war against pestilence won"."'' This optimistic (and 
somewhat naïve) perspective was sustained by the rapid pace in which new classes of 
antibiotics appeared on the market raising the expectation that for every pathogen, 
adequate treatment would be available. 
However, the recent decades with their emerging public health crises have proven 
otherwise1" and it is hard to imagine a near future without considerable threats from 
infectious diseases. The lessons of the past have shown that previously unknown micro-
organisms can emerge from hidden reservoirs and adapt to sustained human-to-human 
transmission (as seems to have been the case with both HIV and the SARS-coronavirus.1"' 
Sudden and sometimes to some extent predictable mutations leading to resistance or 
acquisition of resistance mechanisms by an increasing number of micro-organisms such 
as: the methicilline-resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA)17, multidrug-resistant 
enterococci18, multidrug-resistant tuberculosis (MDR-TB), extensively drug-resistant 
tuberculosis (XDR-TB)19, Extended Spectrum Beta-Lactamase producing (ESBL) gram-
negative pathogens2", carbapenemase producing gram-negative pathogens21, have 
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decreased their susceptibility to most antibiotics and increased the potential for outbreaks 
of resistant bacteria. Equally, the development of resistance to antiviral drugs in viruses 
that have the capacity to cause major epidemics (like the influenza virus) is an upcoming 
challenge for public health worldwide.22 " 
Furthermore, factors related to modern society have been influencing the risk of 
importation and further transmission of micro-organisms.2627 Increased urbanization as 
well as the increased intensity of agriculture and animal farming have led to the 
emergence of Q fever and avian influenza as major threats in some parts of the world 2s:i5, 
while the increase in international trade and shipping of goods is associated with the risk 
of introducing exotic vectors (for instance, the mosquito Aedes albopictus), able to transmit 
exotic diseases like dengue fever and Chikungunya.3''A0 Each year an increasing number 
of people travel to exotic tourist attractions and adventurous destinations where there is a 
risk of acquiring diseases previously unknown to the western world - like the viral 
hemorrhagic fevers.^1 i2 One example of recent emerging threats worldwide is that of the 
pandemic spread of the new influenza A/H1N1 virus and in many countries decisions 
have been made on essential control strategies such as: the use of antivirals, the 
applicability of non-medical interventions and the need to prioritize risk groups for 
vaccination. And then there is the case of the complex emergencies in some parts of the 
world in which outbreaks of communicable diseases occur in combination with famine, 
mass population displacement, poor sanitation facilities and overcrowding and 
consequently lead to disruption at population level41. Altogether, one can acknowledge 
enough reasons to explain the high profile crises arising from communicable diseases that 
are on the scientific and political agendas nowadays.'1'1'1'1 (Table 1 ) 
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Table 1. Factors involved in infectious disease emergence44 
Panel Factors involved in infectious disease emergence 
Often differing for newly emerging, re-emerging, and deliberately emerging diseases, these selected factors 
include genetic, biological, social, political, and economic determinants 
1 International trade and commerce 
2 Human demographics and behaviour 
3 Human susceptibility to infection 
4 Poverty and social inequality 
5 War and famine 
6 Breakdown of public-health measures 
7 Technology and industry 
8 Changing ecosystems 
9 Climate and weather 
10 Intent to harm 
11 Lack of political will 
12 Microbial adaptation and change 
13 Economic development and land use 
Reprinted with permission from Elsevier 
Crises trigger response, both at the societal and individual levels. The magnitude of 
the response depends on the circumstances and on the cultural context in which the crisis 
occurs. Extensive, repetitive media coverage mainly focusing on the novelty of threats 
and, most recently, unbalanced and biased information exchange through social 
networking sites, increases people's perception of their own vulnerability from unknown 
diseases.46i7 Subject to debate currently taking place, is the question of whether, in 
response to the increased perception of risks, healthcare professionals and policy makers 
are sometimes inclined to take excessive measures that are not always supported by 
evidence. J8W In all crises, outbreak control procedures require balanced and well 
developed scientific advice as a basis for policy decisions. This thesis focuses on the 
quality requirements for the development of scientific advice by expert advisory bodies 
and for translating that into actions in the field, in order to make crisis guidelines work. 
Crises emerge, unfold and remit according to complex patterns. Although every crisis is 
unique, there are common features that characterize the context in general, which need to 
be understood and which will be given further attention in this introduction. 
Characteristics of the scientific advice in a crisis: uncertainties, complexity, 
time pressure and perceptions 
Outbreaks of communicable disease can, in theory, be caused by an unlimited number of 
micro-organisms, which differ from each other with respect to transmission patterns, 
duration of the incubation period, the minimal infectious dose and pathogenicity. Some 
of them have the potential to progress into crises. Sometimes, as the crisis unfolds, the 
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etiological agent and its transmission mechanism are still unknown and control measures 
have to be taken in complete uncertainty.50 
Outbreaks often develop gradually into national or international crises and their 
magnitude is unpredictable at the very beginning. They develop with certain rapidity 
over time (depending on the basis reproduction number Ro), space and population (risk 
groups, entire population). The clinical picture in infected persons can vary from mild to 
very severe and laboratory diagnosis and confirmation are not always possible. In some 
crises there is no treatment or prophylaxis available. In conclusion, there are many 
unknown factors that add to the complexity of crises. 
Besides uncertainties, crisis situations require medical professionals and policy makers 
from different fields of expertise to work together coherently. Often there is more than 
just one country involved in a crisis or there are cross-border issues in neighboring 
countries51-52, which makes international collaboration of experts and policy makers 
essential for a coordinated approach. This does, however, put extra pressure on the 
national response.51 ™M Furthermore, in crises, decisions on how to control an outbreak 
have to be taken against the clock in order to timely identify and treat those people who 
are infected, prevent further transmission and protect others who are at risk. 
Finally, risk perceptions and risk acceptance regarding communicable disease have 
changed in recent decades. In controlling crises, the principle of managing the increased 
risk (or excess risk) has dominated the way in which healthcare and public health 
professionals traditionally guide outbreak control. Yet, in the public mind and in the 
media, the principle of "zero risk" or the "precautionary principle" has gradually 
acquired an important position. This principle requires preventive and control measures 
to eliminate all possible risks.5557 In doing so, the government is primarily supposed to 
take responsibility. 
Countries all over the world have put their own systems in place to respond to crises 
by developing and implementing guidelines for outbreak control. As from June 15, 2007, 
the International Health Regulations (IHR) of the WHO have required countries to 
designate focal points for communicable diseases and to report threats of international 
concern.58 In such cases, the WHO coordinates global surveillance and assesses significant 
public health risks, disseminates public health information to member states and assists, 
if needed, with technical advice. The European Centre for Disease Control and 
Prevention (ECDC) established in 2005 has been given the responsibility to strengthen the 
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capacity of the European Union member states to identify, assess and communicate 
current and emerging threats to human health posed by infectious diseases.'9 
Following the evaluation of the response to the poliomyelitis outbreak in 1992-199360 
which showed a lack of coordination at regional and national levels, in 1995, a crisis 
structure was set up in the Netherlands, to assess national and international threats and 
to formulate the crisis response. The scientific advice (including the threat assessment 
and the crisis control guidelines) is issued by the Outbreak Management Team (OMT) 
which consists of a permanent group of experts from various fields of communicable 
diseases, to which specific experts are added depending on the type of crisis (for 
example: veterinarians, pediatricians, occupational health officers). The scientific advice 
is subsequently submitted to the Board of policy makers (BAO), in order to judge its 
feasibility and applicability in practice.^5 Following endorsement by policy makers, the 
crisis control guidelines are disseminated to public health services, general practitioners 
and clinicians in order to implement the measures and contain transmission. As the 
context of crises changes rapidly, re-evaluation or re-adjustment of the control guidelines 
by the experts in the outbreak management team is often needed. Throughout the past 15 
years, international and national crises have been systematically assessed and crisis 
control guidelines have been issued according to this model. (Table 2) 
Table 2. Overview of threats or outbreak that required urgent scientific advice by the Outbreak 
Management Team in the Netherlands, 1995-2010 
Year Outbreak/threat 
1995 Threat of imported cases during the pest outbreak in India 
1995 C/yptospondJum-outbreak in the province of Zeeland, The Netherlands 
1995 Threat of imported cases during the outbreak of Ebola Hemorrhagic Fever in Congo 
1995 A patient with difteria in Dordrecht, The Netherlands 
1996 A patient with rabies in Alkmaar, The Netherlands 
1996 Pertussis epidemic in the Netherlands 
1997 Cluster of meningococcal C disease in Putten, The Netherlands 
1997 Threat of introduction of avian influenza during the A/H5N1-virus outbreak in Hong Kong 
1999 Outbreak of legionnaires' disease in Bovenkarspel, The Netherlands 
1999 Outbreak of measles in the Netherlands 
2000 Outbreak of meningococcal W 135 disease (international and in the Netherlands) 
2000 Threat of imported cases during the outbreak of poliomyelitis in Cape Verde 
2001 Cluster of meningococcal C disease in West-Brabant, The Netherlands 
2001 Threat of bioterronsm through anthrax letters, USA 
2002 Increase in the incidence of meningococcal C disease in The Netherlands 
2003 Outbreak of avian influenza due to the A/H7N7-virus in Gelderland and Brabant, the 
Netherlands 
2003 International SARS outbreak 
2004 Threat of introduction of avian influenza (A/H5N1 ) during the outbreak in South East Asia 
2004 Outbreak of lymfogranuloma venereum, LGV, in the Netherlands and international 
Introduction 13 
Year Outbreak/threat 
2004 Outbreak of rubella in the Netherlands, with transmission to Canada 
2005 The first patient with variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob in the Netherlands 
2005 Outbreaks of C difficile nbotype 0127 - CPAP, international and in The Netherlands 
2006 Outbreaks of NT-MRSA, in pig farms, with transmission to humans, Brabant, The Netherlands 
2006 Suspicion of infection with the A/H5N1 virus in owls, Rotterdam, The Netherlands 
2006 Assessment of the incidence of serious adverse events after the seasonal flu vaccination, 
following an alert from Israel 
2007 Outbreak of Q fever in Herpen, the Netherlands 
2008 A patient with Marburg hemorrhagic fever in the Netherlands 
2008 Outbreak of Q fever, province of Brabant, The Netherlands 
2009 Influenza pandemic due to the Novel Influenza Virus, A/H1 NI 
2009 Ongoing Q fever outbreak in The Netherlands 
2010 
Source LCI-RIVM 
What is known about the development and implementation of guidelines? 
The quality of the response to a crisis or threat depends on the quality of the control 
guidelines and their level of implementation in the field by healthcare and public health 
professionals. As little is known on crisis guidelines, the scientific knowledge acquired 
throughout the past decades on clinical guidelines can serve as a proxy in order to 
discuss quality and implementation. Although the main principles for the development 
of clinical guidelines have been thoroughly defined ^ 6\ systematic appraisal revealed 
that quality is still difficult to achieved^ A major problem lies with the definition of 
"good" quality. According to the AGREE collaboration (www.agreecollaboration.org), a 
good quality guideline is "scientifically valid, usable, and reliable" and "leads to 
improved patient outcome". In order to meet the need for widely accepted criteria in the 
development and assessment of clinical guidelines, the AGREE instrument was 
developed within an international collaboration and has been adopted by many guideline 
programs66. This instrument contains 23 items divided among five domains: scope and 
purpose, stakeholder involvement, rigor of development, clarity of presentation and 
applicability. 
But, m order to develop sound clinical guidelines, this process requires comprehensive 
literature searches and analysis of evidence followed by exhaustive external reviews and 
public conferences which altogether might take up to 18 months67 and cost up to €100 000 
- €200 0006". In contrast, in crisis situations the best possible outbreak control guidance -
based on scarce knowledge - has to be provided within a very short time and 
implemented both immediately and uniformly and this requires crisis-specific systems 
and instruments. So far, there has been no consensus on the essential components of 
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scientific guidance in crises. Criteria for scientific advice would be helpful to generate 
high quality, transparent and sustainable outbreak control measures. 
Finally, to be effective in improving patient outcomes or preventing disease, 
guidelines based on this scientific advice need to be implemented in practice. 
For the successful implementation of guidelines and again drawing from the experiences 
with clinical guidelines which have been studied in detail, insight needs to be gained 
both in the applicability in practice and in the factors that determine success and failure. 
Based on this information, implementation activities can then be developed and 
executed. To begin, the magnitude of the problem has been quantified by McGlynn et al. 
who showed that in the United States, guidelines are, on average, used in only 50-70% of 
day to day decisions and that variation in performance is large.69 Many factors have been 
associated with success or failure in bringing guidelines into routine practice70. Most 
research has concentrated on the professionals' barriers that hinder adherence.7174 They 
have been categorized by Cabana et al. into: internal barriers with a cognitive (awareness 
or knowledge) or affective (attitude or motivation) component and external barriers 
related to the guidelines (their content and target patient population) and the 
environment (organization, social setting)7\ However, every recommendation meets its 
own barriers and there is an impressive variety of barriers that influence professional 
behavior. Another important finding is that barriers that are present in one setting may 
not be present in another, which makes it difficult to compare interventions for 
improving adherence. Nevertheless, awareness of the possible barriers remains the first 
step in understanding imperfect implementation. 
As far as barriers to crisis guidelines are concerned, very little is known.7677 In contrast 
to the clinical care setting, crises require health professionals to adopt guidelines 
immediately and respond with prompt decisions, uniformity of action, and quick 
integration of new knowledge and skills. Furthermore, the context of crisis situations is 
complex, requiring optimal communication and co-operation between public health 
services and hospitals. Subsequently, this demands different approaches to 
implementation, compared with those for clinical guidelines. 
In conclusion, a set of criteria tailored for outbreak management in crises is lacking. In 
order to develop such criteria, scientific knowledge on clinical guidelines needs to be 
integrated with new knowledge generated by crisis specific research questions. More 
knowledge is required on how outbreak management is performed in crises, together 
with knowledge on how to design and implement good quality advice in a complex. 
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unsettled context, taking into account the factors that influence adherence from the 
perspective of the professionals and the patients 
Aims of the studies in this thesis 
The idea for this thesis came from the critical evaluations of the response to two, major 
crises in the Netherlands in 2003 These crises occurred in spite of the aforementioned 
efforts to harmonize crisis control by setting up a new crisis structure following the 1992 
poliomyelitis outbreak The first crisis concerns the outbreak of avian influenza caused by 
A/H7N7 virus in poultry and humans in 2003 ^ ^ The reports of this outbreak showed 
variation m the local crisis response and insufficient implementation of the crisis 
guidelines In line with the findings from this report, the Health Inspectorate of the 
Netherlands concluded that the same was true for the implementation in daily practice of 
the guidelines on SARS control"" 
The aim of the first (explorative) part of this thesis is to gain insight into the response 
to a selected number of crises in the Netherlands and Europe By looking into the 
development and effects of the crisis control guidelines, priorities for improvement can 
be formulated In the first part we also provide an actual overview of lessons that can be 
drawn from the literature on outbreak management In the second part, we present 
original research into the quality requirements for the development and implementation 
of good crisis guidelines, taking into account the experiences of professionals who have 
to work with the guidelines and of patients to whom the measures apply 
I. Exploration of the response to a crisis situation 
To highlight problems related to the development and implementation of scientific 
advice on outbreak control measures, three case studies were undertaken In chapter 2, 
we explore the control guidelines issued by the Outbreak Management Team in the 
Netherlands during the SARS crisis in 2003 and focus on the formulation and 
implementation of the case definitions and of the control measures As SARS was the first 
major worldwide crisis to occur for a few decades and was caused by a completely 
unexpected and unknown pathogen with the potential to cause serious clinical disease, 
the lack of clarity on how to classify and manage patients was not confined to the 
Netherlands alone The emergence of SARS challenged institutions in charge of outbreak 
management and politicians in various countries to balance, on the one hand the need to 
respond through adequate, feasible and effective measures and, on the other hand the 
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request to comply with the international guidelines issued by the WHO, which were not 
legally binding. The International Health Regulations in force at that time had a very 
narrow scope and international cooperation in other crises relied mostly on the World 
Health Assembly Resolution WHA 54.14 in which the WHO was called upon to support 
member states in strengthening their response capacity.81·82 We analyzed the case 
definitions used in the Netherlands and their effect on the classification of patients. As 
the crisis progressed, the case definitions were changed periodically. Subsequently, 
confusion arose among general practitioners, public health specialists and clinicians 
regarding the reporting and management of cases. We investigated the underlying 
reasons for periodically changing case definitions and highlighted the consequences of 
deviating from the WHO guidelines for the reporting behavior, patient management and 
evaluation of public health interventions. 
In July 2008, an imported case of Marburg hemorrhagic fever (MHF) was diagnosed in 
the Netherlands. Because of the severity of the disease and the risk of further 
transmission of the virus, a public health investigation was carried out to identify persons 
at risk of contracting MHF because of prior or ongoing contact with the patient. This was 
the first case of MHF diagnosed outside the African continent since the discovery of the 
virus in 1967. Although incidentally, cases of hemorrhagic fever caused by other viruses 
have been imported in Europe, there was no previous experience on how to manage 
public health risks and instill confidence in the public in this case. Major questions were 
raised on how to classify contacts exposed to the patients, how to organize the follow-up 
of persons developing clinical complaints suggestive for MHF, and how to ensure 
optimal collaboration between the hospitals, public health services and laboratories 
involved. Moreover, there was also a need to collaborate with the WHO, the ECDC and 
other countries worldwide in order to ensure optimal contact tracing and proper 
measures. The outbreak management team issued response guidelines, with an emphasis 
on the classification and management of contacts, prevention of nosocomial transmission 
and communication to professionals and the public. 
In chapter 3 we describe the public health response including the guidelines for the 
management and evaluation of the risk of transmission in 130 contacts and focus on the 
lessons learned and key factors that prevented overreaction during an event with a high 
public health impact. 
When germs do not respect country borders and international crises occur, uniformity 
in action and coordination of the response are needed to ensure that the people at risk 
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have equal access to public health interventions and that further transmission of the 
disease is prevented. In chapter 4, the differences in the response of various European 
countries during an international outbreak caused by lymphogranuloma venereum 
(LGV) are revealed. Systems for surveillance and outbreak management differ among 
European countries, as well as health policies and guidelines. This might result in 
delayed recognition of cases and sub-optimal outbreak management, with prolonged 
transmission as the final consequence. We investigated whether these differences could 
lead to different outbreak control measures. We assessed the similarities and differences 
in how various countries managed the reemergence of LGV among men who have sex 
with men (MSM) in Europe from January 2004 to February 2006, to identify common 
practices and to formulate criteria for improving the response to international outbreaks. 
As stated already, outbreaks and threats often reach far beyond one country's borders. 
Professionals and policy makers need to take complex decisions in situations in which 
scientific knowledge is scarce, time pressure is high and historical experience from which 
to draw is lacking. A generic frame of proven strategies that work to improve 
effectiveness of outbreak management is needed. One question that arises here is on the 
extent to which we can draw lessons from research on the effectiveness and practical 
experience with various approaches to outbreak management. In the fifth chapter, we 
therefore provide an actual overview of the research and experience with outbreak 
management in order to summarize generic lessons for public health professionals and 
policy makers. 
II. Developing and implementing good scientific advice for responding 
during crises: the perspectives of experts, healthcare workers and patients 
One of the problems related to outbreaks is that they often do not present themselves as 
potential crises, but develop as such over time. Therefore, criteria for early recognition 
are needed, so that timely and proper guidelines for managing the outbreak can be 
issued. There are no well established, widely accepted criteria that define the context of 
crises for which scientific guidance is needed. Equally, there is no consensus on the 
essential components of such scientific guidance. In order to be effective, guidance on 
control measures must be comprehensive and detailed enough to enable it to be 
implemented in practice. In reality, however, expert committees in charge of scientific 
guidance are not always directly involved in its practical implementation in the field -
where the patients are seen and the outbreak needs to be dealt with. In chapter 6 we 
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address the definition of crises and the quality criteria needed to ensure optimal 
development and implementation of scientific guidelines in the field and present the 
results of an international expert consensus. By subsequently applying this consensus 
instrument in crises, professionals and policy makers can make sure that no essential 
steps are overlooked and that the control guidelines are developed by integrating 
evidence and practical experience. 
Optimal performance of the guidelines, with timely and adequate outbreak control as 
the final outcome, requires good adherence by health professionals. Unfortunately, 
guideline adherence is often not optimal. Crisis situations differ significantly from 
routine communicable disease control because health professionals must respond with 
prompt decisions, uniformity of action, and quick integration of new knowledge and 
skills. Furthermore, the context of crisis situations is complex, requiring optimal 
communication and co-operation between public health services and hospitals. An 
understanding of the reasons for the non-adherence of healthcare professionals in crises 
situations is needed to improve crisis management. However, we do not know what 
drives healthcare professionals to follow or ignore guidelines in crises. Therefore, being 
able to identify the generic and profession-specific barriers may lead to customized 
strategies designed to make guidelines work. In chapter 7 we assessed the reasons for 
non-adherence (barriers) among the following key professionals in outbreak control in 
crisis situations: consultant microbiologists, infection preventionists, public health 
physicians, and public health nurses, and identified generic and profession-specific 
priorities to improve adherence to outbreak control guidelines. 
In crisis situations, guidelines on outbreak control often include drastic measures to 
stop further transmission. These measures can have a major impact on a person's daily 
life which consequently hampers adherence. The impact of and the compliance with such 
drastic (restrictive) measures (as travel restriction, temperature monitoring, mandatory 
reporting to health authorities) have not been systematically evaluated. Moreover, how 
effective these measures are strongly depends on the compliance with them. The 
compliance might depend on factors related to the persons on whom the measures are 
imposed, the understanding of the measures and the availability of specific information 
and facilities for carrying them out. In chapter 8 we evaluated the impact of measures on 
a person's daily life and described the determinants and the level of compliance with the 
outbreak control measures among the contacts who were at risk of acquiring Marburg 
hemorrhagic fever in 2008. 
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Research questions 
1. What were the consequences of changing the SARS guidelines during the crisis of 2003 
in the Netherlands? Which lessons can be drawn for the management of crises in 
general? 
2. What were the key organizational factors in the response to the Marburg crisis in the 
Netherlands? 
3. How did European countries organize the response to the LGV-outbreak? Which 
practices need to be improved to harmonize international outbreak control? 
4. How can outbreak management be made to work? What can we learn from research 
and practical experiences with outbreak management? 
5. How can good crisis guidelines on outbreak control that can be implemented in 
practice, be developed? 
6. Which factors influence the reported compliance of professionals who have to follow 
crisis guidelines? 
7. Which factors (such as e.g., experienced difficulties and stress in persons who have 
been placed under restrictive control measures) influence compliance? How can 
advisory bodies consider these factors when issuing crisis guidelines? 
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Abstract 
This study analysed the consequences of deviation from the WHO case definition for the 
assessment of patients with suspected severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) in The 
Netherlands during 2003. 
Between 17 March and 7 July 2003, as a result of dilemmas in balancing sensitivity and 
specificity, five different case definitions were used. The patients referred for SARS 
assessment were analysed from a public health perspective. None of the patients referred 
had SARS, based on serological and virological criteria. Nevertheless, all 72 patients 
required thorough assessment and, depending on the results of the assessment, 
institution of appropriate prevention and control measures. Changing case definitions 
caused confusion in classifying cases. A centralised assessment of the reported cases by a 
team with clinical and public health expertise (epidemiological and geographical risk 
assessment) is a practical solution for addressing differences in applying case definitions. 
The burden of managing non-cases is an important issue when allocating public health 
resources, and should be taken into account during the preparation phase, rather than 
during an outbreak. This applies not only to SARS, but also to other public health threats, 
such as pandemic influenza or a bioterrorist episode. 
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Introduction 
Severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) confronted communicable disease 
professionals with new dilemmas concerning the assessment and management of suspect 
cases, because of an initial lack of knowledge of the pathogen, its transmission route, its 
incubation period and its clinical presentations The sense of urgency increased with 
evidence that the disease could spread easily and that the clinical course could be 
severe1-1 Following the WHO global alert on 12 March 2003 and the WHO travel 
advisory notice on 15 March 2003, countries worldwide started reporting cases ^ In May 
2003, the WHO revised the case definitions of SARS7, based on knowledge of the disease 
available at that time Early studies in 2003 showed a low sensitivity (26%) when using 
the WHO criteria for clinical assessment of patients before admission to a SARS clinic in a 
region with extensive local transmission 8 A comparable low sensitivity (27%) and a 
much lower positive predictive value were found when screening patients before 
admission to a general hospital in Singapore ^ In the designated screening centre for 
evaluation of possible SARS cases in Singapore, the WHO case definitions were found to 
be helpful at initial assessment, despite an under-tnage of 0 3% "' To address the low 
sensitivity of the WHO criteria, researchers from Hong Kong developed a clinical 
prediction rule for the emergency department n 
Case definitions are used for different purposes, i e , surveillance, clinical care, 
research and service provision l2 Their benefits and limitations in practice depend on 
their purpose, the context in which they are used, and the skills of the user When 
formulating a case definition, balancing sensitivity and specificity is crucial n The initial 
emergence and spread of SARS in the absence of specific diagnostic tests required that 
physicians and public health authorities worldwide formulate a set of criteria for 
separating suspected or probable cases from non-cases This report describes the 
background, and the choices made with respect to classification and management, of 
patients referred for SARS assessment in The Netherlands The consequences of the use 
of different case definitions for the reporting behaviour, patient management and 
evaluation of public health interventions are highlighted None of the cases met the 
criteria for reporting to the WHO according to the case definitions in force at the time in 
The Netherlands All cases were reevaluated on the basis of the latest case definition from 
the WHO (1 May 2003)7, and differences with important public health consequences were 
revealed 
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Materials and methods 
Case definitions for suspect and probable cases of SARS in The Netherlands 
On 15 March 2003, the WHO issued a case definition for SARS. The first Dutch case 
definition, dating from 17 March 2003 (Table 1), for surveillance purposes and 
comprehensive clinical assessment, required obligatory radiographical evidence of lung 
infiltrates consistent with pneumonia, and well-defined epidemiological criteria for 
exposure (i.e., close contact with an individual with severe respiratory disease in the 
affected areas during the previous 10 days). This more specific case definition was issued 
to avoid considering SARS in the differential diagnosis of the expected large number of 
patients with acute respiratory infections at a time when the incidence of mild (common) 
respiratory disease in travellers was high and the influenza season was ongoing. General 
practitioners and clinicians were asked to report suspect cases on a voluntary basis to the 
Dutch Public Health Services. On 1 April 2003, mandatory SARS notification was 
introduced. The Public Health Services were asked to consult the National Co-ordination 
Centre for Outbreak Management (LCI) for an assessment of SARS probability. In the 
following weeks, four subsequent case definitions followed in which, gradually, 
sensitivity increased (Table 1) at the expense of specificity. The criteria for case definitions 
and notification were evaluated on each occasion by members of the Outbreak 
Management Team, who were responsible for issuing scientific advice. 




1 (17 March) + 
2 (1 April) + 
3 (9 April) + 
4 (2 May) + 











patient with severe 
respiratory disease 


















evidence of lung 













+, obligatory criterion, - , not an obligatory criterion for SARS assessment and notification 
a Hong Kong, Guangdong, Hanoi (Vietnam) b Hong Kong, Guangdong, Hanoi (Vietnam) + China (Beijing, 
Shanxi), Taiwan, Singapore, Toronto and other affected areas with local transmission c In areas with local 
transmission, but without travel advice (Hong Kong and Guangdong thus not included) d Areas with a travel 
advice at that time 
Major factors in balancing sensitivity and specificity were the severity of the clinical 
course, the frequency of local transmission in affected areas, and the level of contact with 
potentially infected individuals. On 10 June 2003, the WHO case definition for a suspect 
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case (revised on 1 May 2003) was also adopted in The Netherlands for reporting patients 
for SARS assessment. 
Cases 
A retrospective descriptive analysis of the cases that were reported for SARS assessment 
in The Netherlands during the period 17 March to 7 July 2003 was conducted. Cases from 
two datasets were used. One dataset included the cases referred by regional public health 
physicians to the LCI. The second source was the dataset from the SARS reference 
laboratory in The Netherlands (Department of Virology, Erasmus MC Rotterdam), to 
which clinical specimens were sent. These cases were referred for SARS assessment on 
the basis of their clinical status, travel-associated risk and/or contact with 
suspect/probable SARS cases. The referral by the clinician/public physician was 
compared retrospectively with the assessment on the basis of the Dutch case definition at 
the time of submission, and with a reassessment on the basis of the WHO case definition 
issued on 1 May 2003. The risk ratio (RR) for being a suspect case was calculated by 
comparing the referral of the case by the clinician with the first assessment (RR1), the 
referral with the reassessment based on the WHO definition (1 May 2003) (RR2), and the 
first assessment with the reassessment (RR3). The data sources were compared using a 
capture-recapture method.14 The same classification of cases was used for both data 
sources. Cases common in both data sources were identified using date of birth, date of 
onset, gender and city of residence. 
Laboratory methods 
Bacteriological cultures were performed on respiratory specimens in the referring 
hospitals. In the reference laboratory, serological testing for antibodies against SARS-
coronavirus (SARS-CoV) was carried out, and virus culture was performed in a category 
3 biological safety laboratory facility, where the samples were also prepared for PCR 
testing. 
Serology 
Acute sera and, where possible, convalescent sera were tested for the presence of 
antibodies against SARS-CoV. The method used was an indirect immunofluorescence 
assay in which SARS-CoV-infected Vero 118 cells that had developed a cytopathic effect 
were used to coat microscope slides. Serum was diluted in serial two-fold steps from 1:10 
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to 1:40 in phosphate-buffered saline. After incubation with dilutions of the serum for 30 
min at 370C, the slides were washed with phosphate-buffered saline and incubated with 
rabbit antihuman IgG, IgA and IgM conjugated with fluorescein thiocyanate (Dako, 
Heverlee, Belgium). After washing and drying, the slides were examined with a 
fluorescence microscope.1''The titre was defined as the highest dilution giving a 1+ or 2+ 
reaction. 
Virus culture 
Nose, throat and sputum specimens were tested specifically for respiratory viruses, 
including influenza A and Β viruses, human respiratory syncytial virus, human 
parainfluenza virus types 1-4, adenovirus, human metapneumovirus and rhinovirus. 
Routine virological tests for respiratory pathogens were performed by a combination of 
virus isolation in cell cultures and immunofluorescence.16 Virus isolation procedures for 
SARS-CoV were performed following inoculation of specimens on Vero 118 cells, a sub­
clone from Vero 6 cells, human embryonic lung fibroblasts and tertiary monkey kidney 
cells. The presence of virus was confirmed by immunofluorescence, RT-PCR, or both. 
PCR testing 
Virus nucleic acid was purified using the Magna Pure LC automated nucleic acid 
isolation system (Roche Diagnostics, Mannheim, Germany). Swabs, bronchoalveolar 
lavages and sputum samples were processed with the Magna Pure LC Total nucleic acid 
serum plasma blood isolation kit. The presence of SARS-CoV RNA was assessed on an 
ABI Prism 7700 using the EZ rTtH RNA amplification kit (Applied Biosystems, 
Nieuwerkerk a/d IJssel, The Netherlands).1^ RT-PCR with primers and a probe specific for 
the nucleoprotein gene of SARS-CoV was used, as such an assay may be more sensitive 
than RT-PCRs based on the polymerase gene.1''17 Specimens from the respiratory tract 
were also monitored for influenza A and Β viruses, human respiratory syncytial viruses 
A and B, rhinoviruses, coronaviruses (OC43 and 229E) and human metapneumovirus, 
using essentially the same methods with specific primers.18 ]9 
Results 
Descriptive analysis 
Between 17 March and 7 July 2003, 72 patients (43 males and 29 females) were referred 
for further SARS assessment. The LCI was consulted for 51 patients (source A), and the 
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reference laboratory for 37 patients (source B). Sixteen patients were reported to both the 
LCI and the reference laboratory. Patients referred for SARS assessment to the LCI 
(source A) were referred mainly by public health officers (49/51), while clinicians referred 
suspect patients directly to the reference laboratory (35/37). 
The date of onset of illness was known for 55 patients. The time between onset and 
referral varied from 0 to 40 days, with a mean of 4.5 (median 3) days. Same or next-day 
referral occurred for one-third of the patients. Three patients were referred > 2 weeks 
after the onset of illness, with a maximum of 40 days (one case). The distributions of the 
clinical and epidemiological criteria for SARS among the referred patients are listed in 
Table 2. The patients with no history of travel to a SARS-affected area had travelled to 
other countries in south-east Asia. Six patients had no history of travel, but fulfilled, 
according to the physician, at least one clinical criterion for SARS, and had a risk of 
exposure in The Netherlands through close contact with travellers from affected areas. 
Table 2. Distribution of the criteria for the SARS case definition among cases referred for SARS 
assessment (n=72) 
Number (%) 
Criteria η =72 95% CI 
Respiratory illness 53(71) 619-83 3 
Fever 49 (68) 56-78 6 
Travel-associated risk 46 (64) 52 8-75 3 
Close contact with individuals from affected areas 17 (23) 13 2-37 7 
Pneumonia 11(19 3) 10-319 
Diarrhoea 4 (5 6) 1 5-13 6 
Fever and travel-associated risk 28 (38 8) 27 8-50 2 
Respiratory disease and travel-associated risk 29 (40 2) 28 9-51 5 
Respiratory disease and fever 42 (58 3) 46 9-69 9 
Respiratory disease, fever and travel-associated risk 25 (34) 23 3-45 2 
Assessment and reassessment of presentations by general practitioners and 
clinicians 
As presented, there were 52 (72.2%; 95% CI 60.4-82.1%) suspect cases and 20 (27.8%; 95% 
CI 17.9-39.6%) cases that were not suspect, but which had an indication for further 
assessment. The category 'not suspect with an indication for further assessment' included 
cases in which not all the criteria for classification as a SARS suspect case were met, but 
in which the reporting physician could not rule out SARS without further assessment. 
Suspect cases were divided equally between males and females. 
The assessment of the cases on the basis of the Dutch case definition in force at the 
time was compared with a retrospective reassessment on the basis of the WHO case 
32 Chapter 2 
definition of 1 May 2003 (Table 3). There was no significant difference between the risk of 
being a suspect/probable case at presentation vs. the risk following reassessment based 
on the WHO case definition (p 0.14), but there was a significant difference between the 
risk of being a suspect case at presentation and the risk in the first assessment based on 
the more precise case definition (RR1 1.46; ρ <0.05 by Fisher's exact test) used at that time 
in The Netherlands. The risk of being a suspect case was significantly higher in the 
reassessment than in the first assessment when the more specific case definition was used 
(RR3 = 4.5; ρ O.OOl by Fisher's exact test). 
Table 3. Comparison of cases on the basis of the first assessment (based on the current Dutch 





























Virological investigations were performed on 37 patients, who presented as 33 suspect 
and four not-suspect cases. The same cases were categorised at the first assessment as 
seven suspect and 30 not-suspect. According to the WHO case definition used in the 
retrospective reassessment, the cases would have been divided into 12 suspect, 24 not-
suspect and one probable. Antibodies to SARS-CoV were not detected in any of the acute 
sera. Convalescent sera from six patients were also tested for antibodies to SARS-CoV, 
but all were negative. Virus culture and RT-PCR testing for SARS on respiratory samples 
(16 patients) were also negative. Other viruses were detected in nine patients: influenza A 
in four, influenza Β in one, rhinovirus in two, adenovirus in one and cytomegalovirus in 
one. 
Case management 
Six patients were put in strict hospital isolation2" and seven were isolated at home until 
the laboratory results or the clinical course of the patient ruled out suspicion of SARS. 
Droplet and contact isolation precautions were advised for patients in home isolation. 
Unprotected carers and contacts of these patients were traced, and the intensity of their 
exposure was assessed. When necessary, body temperatures were monitored. For eight 
patients, restriction of contacts outside the household was advised in order to increase 
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their social distance (eg , by exclusion from work and social events), but isolation was 
not considered to be necessary All suspect cases were given advice on respiratory 
hygiene and contact precautions 
Discussion 
Mandatory notification of SARS was introduced in The Netherlands a few weeks after the 
worldwide alert, and proved to be a valuable instrument, since most (78 2%) of the 
suspect patients were reported within 5 days of the onset of respiratory disease 
Nevertheless, no date of onset was recorded for 17 of the patients, suggesting that data 
collection could be improved, especially as one of these patients was later reclassified as 
suspect During the worldwide SARS epidemic in 2003, five case definitions were 
subsequently used in The Netherlands The latest, used from 10 June onwards, was 
identical to that issued by the WHO on 1 May 2003 The three major criteria for SARS 
(ι e, respiratory disease, fever and travel-associated risk) were met in 25 (34%) cases Of 
these, two patients had spent just a few hours in an airport in an affected area, and 
another two patients became ill outside the incubation period Using the most sensitive 
case definition (WHO, 1 May 2003), 21 cases would have been considered as suspect, and 
two (2 8%) patients would have qualified as probable cases These cases were not 
reported to the WHO because, at the time of their assessment, they did not meet the 
criteria for probable cases according to the prevailing Dutch case definition 
With strict application of the specific case definitions issued in The Netherlands 
(before adopting the WHO version on 10 June 2003), only nine cases would have been 
defined as suspect cases requiring SARS assessment In reality, despite the case 
definitions used, 52 cases were considered to be suspect by the clinician or the local 
public health officer In the UK, over 400 cases were referred for assessment, among 
which four probable cases were identified 21 In France, 437 cases were notified, with 
seven being classified as probable cases, among which four were later confirmed as being 
infected with SARSCoV ^ 
The Netherlands was not a country affected by SARS, and there was no local 
transmission SARS was ruled out on the basis of the criteria in force at that time As soon 
as SARS-specific diagnostic tests became available, they were used on samples from 37 
patients Acute sera taken early in the course of the infection can result in false-negative 
serological results unless convalescent sera are also analysed at a later date Negative 
serology was not the only criterion for ruling out SARS, discharge from observation took 
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place only when the clinical course improved and/or an alternative diagnosis could fully 
explain the illness. 
Although inevitable following the gradual accumulation of knowledge during the 
SARS outbreak, the changes in case definitions during the epidemic caused confusion in 
the management of individual cases. Subsequently, greater knowledge of the disease has 
revealed that transmission occurred mainly within hospitals caring for seriously-ill 
patients. The severity of the disease (pneumonia or respiratory distress syndrome) is an 
important criterion for including patients in the suspect group, and for referring them for 
further assessment in countries considered to be at low risk according to the WHO 
classification.23 To increase the assessment specificity, the inclusion of significant travel 
exposure (i.e., contact with a person suffering from respiratory disease in areas with local 
transmission) or hospital exposure (i.e., the patient has been hospitalised or has been 
working in a risk area for SARS) should be obligatory when considering SARS in patients 
returning from abroad. Issartel et al.2J concluded that contact exposure seemed to be one 
of the best criteria for identifying cases of suspected SARS. 
A limitation of the present study is that, in the absence of confirmed SARS cases in The 
Netherlands, it is not possible to identify with certainty which components of the criteria 
for SARS assessment would be crucial in identifying genuine cases. In the early stages of 
SARS (or during a new incident), the vital diagnostic features will emerge only with time, 
and the criteria for separating cases from non-cases will initially be imprecise. 
Continuous vigilance by healthcare professionals and public services will provide the 
basis for identifying possible cases. From a public health point of view, in order to 
prevent the medical services from becoming overwhelmed, a first-line filter is needed to 
separate suspect cases from not-suspect cases before referring patients for further 
assessment. The first-line filter will be based on broad clinical and epidemiological 
criteria (e.g., history of contact and travel exposure) and will be refined gradually as 
knowledge concerning this disease becomes available. 
Education of health professionals in the use of case definitions is needed before the 
event. Risk assessment and case classification should be done by individuals with 
experience in working with SARS case definitions. This could be achieved within a 
centralised surveillance and assessment system by an expert team with clinical and 
public health expertise (i.e., knowledge of the epidemiological features of the disease and 
the availability of necessary additional resources).2" This expert team, with both the 
necessary experience and the authority to confirm the suspicion, should be available at all 
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times Centralised assessment is appropriate as long as there are only imported cases, or 
local transmission remains at a low level This approach might have limitations for 
countries in which a delay in isolating patients could occur because of large distances 
between hospitals This is undesirable because shortening the period between the onset 
of symptoms and isolation, and proper management of contacts, have proven to be 
effective in containing SARS The risk of secondary transmission has been shown to 
decrease significantly when cases are isolated within 3 days of the onset of symptoms 2bl 
Telephone or online consultation with the expert team is a useful option 
In the coming years, and particularly during the seasonal increase in respiratory disease 
in autumn, the burden of managing non-SARS cases will be high, and public anxiety 
should not be increased unnecessarily by the use of a case definition that is overly non-
specific for a country at low risk A possible disadvantage of using too narrow a case 
definition is that missed cases could prove to be super-spreaders This risk will come 
from unrecognised cases, however, sub-clinical infections seldom occur, and significant 
virus shedding with secondary transmission has been documented mainly in the second 
week after the onset of disease282'' 
Individual situations vary, and no single set of assessment criteria can be applied to all 
settings Some of the dilemmas encountered with SARS will reappear when worldwide 
threats provided by pandemic influenza, (re)emerging pathogens or bioterronsm occur 
Compared with other infectious diseases, SARS has an estimated low RO (basic 
reproduction number)26, and transmission is confined mostly to spread from overt clinical 
cases The extent of transmission of influenza by sub-clinical cases during a pandemic is 
difficult to predict, and in such a situation, timely preparedness and proper allocation of 
resources to manage both suspect cases and non-cases, and their contacts, are important 
The danger of over-reporting cases should be taken into account when estimating and 
planning epidemic control resources before an outbreak occurs The costs of managing 
non-cases should not be underestimated, as they require thorough assessment and the 
instigation of public health measures, thereby increasing existing workloads 
Both within the process of scientific advice and the preparation of outbreak plans, the 
consequences of the various case definitions should be considered, in addition to the 
training of professionals in applying case definitions to their patients A first-line filter for 
separating non-cases from suspect cases should be followed by consultation with a centre 
of expertise, bearing in mind that the balance between the need to classify and manage 
cases correctly and the need to allay public anxiety quickly could be delicate 
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Abstract 
On July 10, 2008, Marburg hemorrhagic fever was confirmed in a Dutch patient who had 
vacationed recently in Uganda. Exposure most likely occurred in the Python Cave 
(Maramagambo Forest), which harbors bat species that elsewhere in Africa have been 
found positive for Marburg virus. A multidisciplinary response team was convened to 
perform a structured risk assessment, perform risk classification of contacts, issue 
guidelines for follow-up, provide information, and monitor the crisis response. In total, 
130 contacts were identified (64 classified as high risk and 66 as low risk) and monitored 
for 21 days after their last possible exposure. The case raised questions specific to 
international travel, postexposure prophylaxis for Marburg virus, and laboratory testing 
of contacts with fever. We present lessons learned and results of the follow-up serosurvey 
of contacts and focus on factors that prevented overreaction during an event with a high 
public health impact. 
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Introduction 
In Western countries, Marburg hemorrhagic fever (MHF) is an imported disease with a 
low risk of occurrence, but it has a high profile in the public mind1 because it can be 
transmitted from person to person, the course is fatal in up to 80% of cases, and the 
reservoir is uncertain21. The infection is caused by the Marburg virus (MARV), an 
enveloped, nonsegmented, negative-stranded RNA virus belonging, with the Ebola virus, 
to the family Filoviridae. Although the main transmission route is direct contact with 
blood or other infected body fluids, transmission by droplets and aerosols cannot be 
ruled out and has been demonstrated in animal models4. 
MARV was identified in 1967 in Marburg, Germany, during a laboratory outbreak 
caused by handling tissues of African green monkeys56. From 1975 through 1987, 
sporadic cases occurred in South Africa (1975, when the index case, a person exposed in 
Zimbabwe, was diagnosed in South Africa)7 and in Kenya (1980, 1987)8 "'. Outbreaks 
were reported from the Democratic Republic of Congo in 1998-2000" n, Angola in 2004-
20052 and Uganda in 2007n. Nonhuman primates and bats are suspected as sources of 
infection, but their role in the natural reservoir for MARV and transmission to humans is 
unclear14. 
In July 2008, an imported case of MHF was diagnosed in the Netherlands. We describe 
the public health response involving the management of 130 contacts at risk of acquiring 
the disease. 
The case 
On July 5, 2008, a 41-year-old woman was referred by her general practitioner to the 
Elkerliek Hospital because of fever (390C) and chills of 3 days' duration after returning 
from a June 5-28 holiday in Uganda. She was placed in a hospital room with 3 other 
patients. Malaria was ruled out by 3 negative blood films. Routine bacteriologie tests 
were performed, and empiric treatment with ceftriaxone, 2 g/day, was started. On July 7, 
hemorrhagic fever was included among other infectious causes in the differential 
diagnosis because of rapid clinical deterioration and impending liver failure. An 
ambulance stripped of all unnecessary devices and equipped in accordance with strict 
isolation protocols transferred the patient to a single room with negative air pressure 
ventilation and anteroom in the Leiden University Medical Centre (LUMC). 
After admission, rash, conjunctivitis, diarrhea, liver and kidney failure, and finally, 
hemorrhaging developed in the patient. Extensive bacteriologie and virologie analyses 
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were conducted, and plasma samples were sent to Dutch national laboratories and to the 
Bernhard-Nocht-Institute for Tropical Medicine (BNI) in Hamburg, Germany, for testing 
to detect antibodies to and RNA from filoviruses Initial laboratory results from the 
Dutch national reference laboratory were ambiguous for hemorrhagic fever On July 10, 
BNI reported a positive reverse transcnption-PCR result for MARV (15), which was 
confirmed by sequence analysis of the polymerase gene The strain was related to, but 
distinct from, known isolates MARV was confirmed by PCR by the Department of 
Virology at Erasmus Medical College (Rotterdam, the Netherlands) On July 11, the 
patient died of consequences of cerebral edema 
Travel history and hypotheses for the source of infection 
The patient's travel group consisted of 7 Dutch tourists and 2 guides Three of the 
tourists, including the patient, and 1 guide visited an empty cave on June 16 in Fort 
Portal and the Python Cave in the Maramagambo Forest on June 19 The patient's partner 
recalled bats flying around in the latter cave, bumping against the visitors, and large 
amounts of droppings on the ground She incurred no bite wounds, and no preexisting 
wounds were exposed to bats On July 23, the travel group came within 5 m of gorillas in 
the wild and visited a village inhabited by pygmies, where they saw an elderly sick 
woman lying under a blanket 
We postulated that the most probable source of MARV infection was the visit to the 
Python Cave, known for its colony of Egyptian fruit-eating bats (Roui>ettu<; aegyphacus) 
The party had photographed these bats, and this species of bat has been shown to carry 
filoviruses, including MARV'61" in other sub-Saharan locations We estimated the 
incubation period of the infection to be 13 days 
Organization of public health response 
On July 8, the attending physician at the LUMC notified the Dutch public health 
authorities about the case A national outbreak response team was formed of clinicians, 
medical microbiologists and virologists, public health specialists, staff members from the 
national response unit, and a press officer This team convened a nearly daily 
teleconference to 1) to perform a structured assessment of the public health risks in the 2 
hospitals and in the community, 2) perform risk classification of contacts, 3) issue 
guidelines for follow-up, 4) provide information to professionals and media, and 5) 
monitor progression of crisis response 
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Immediately after the diagnosis was confirmed, on July 10, a press conference was held. 
Various press statements emphasizing the control measures designed to prevent 
secondary transmission followed the press conference. The World Health Organization 
was notified according to the International Health Regulations by the National Focal 
Point, and international warnings were issued through the Early Warning and Response 
System and through ProMED. 
Management of contacts 
Although MARV infectivity is highest in the last stage of the disease, when severe 
bleeding coincides with high viral load, we considered the onset of fever (July 2) as the 
starting point for contact monitoring. Follow-up measures tailored to the risk group were 
undertaken during the 21 days after last possible exposure14181''. The high-risk group 
comprised anyone with unprotected exposure of skin or mucosa to blood or other body 
fluids of the index patient. It included the other 3 patients in the patient's room at 
Elkerliek and personnel who handled her specimens without protection. The low-risk 
contacts were LUMC and ambulance personnel who had employed the appropriate 
personal protective measures while caring for the patient or diagnostic samples. Persons 
who had been near the patient during her holiday, the return flight, and stay in the 
Netherlands until Elkerliek admission but who were not exposed to her body fluids 
during her febrile illness and personnel from reference laboratories who worked under 
BioSafety Level 3 conditions were categorized as casual contacts. 
A total of 130 at-risk contacts were identified, 64 at high risk and 66 at low risk (Table). 
High-risk contacts were required to record their temperature 2x/day, report to the local 
health authorities lx/day, and postpone any travel abroad. The low-risk contacts were 
asked to record their temperature 2x/day and to report to local health authorities if it was 
>380C. No limits were imposed on the casual contacts. 
Because asymptomatic MARV infection is rare2021 and thus unlikely to play a role in 
spreading the infection, we restricted further clinical and laboratory evaluation to 
persons with a temperature >380C, measured at 2 points 12 hours apart. Every case of 
fever was to be assessed on an individual basis by the response team. Three academic 
hospitals provided stand-by isolation facilities for admission of contacts. 
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Table. Control measures targeting contacts with risk for exposure to Marburg virus, the 
Netherlands, 2008* 
Type of contact 
Household/family contacts 
Persons exposed in hospital 
ward 
GP of the index case-patient 
Healthcare workers, Elkerhek 
Hospital 
Local laboratory workers 
Ambulance staff 






























































*GP, general practitioner, LUMC, Leiden University Medical Centre 
On August 1, the temperature monitoring of contacts ended. Fever of at least 12 hours' 
duration or clinical signs of MHF did not develop in any of the contacts. Fever within 21 
days did not develop in any of the travel companions and local guide who joined the 
patient in the bat cave. Because sustained fever did not develop in any of the high-risk or 
low-risk contacts during the surveillance period, no clinical or laboratory follow-up for 
MARV was needed. The online Technical Appendix (available from www.cdc.gov/EID/ 
content/15/8/1171-Techapp.pdf) summarizes other findings during the monitoring 
period, dilemmas encountered with respect to travel restrictions, postexposure options in 
case of a high-risk accident, and laboratory diagnosis in the early stage of infection. The 
online Technical Appendix also describes laboratory procedures used. 
Serologic follow-up 
To identify asymptomatic seroconversion, a sero survey was undertaken of 85/130 (65%) 
contact persons who participated in the study. They represented 78% (50/64) of high-risk 
contacts and 53% (35/66) of low-risk contacts and included the Dutch visitors to the bat 
cave. Blood samples were collected from December 2008 through February 2009, 5-7 
months after possible exposure. The laboratory testing was performed at the BNI in 
Hamburg by using an immunofluorescent antibody (IFA) assay. 
The IFA slides were prepared using the MARV strain of the index patient. Details 
about the laboratory testing are given in the online Technical Appendix. In 2 initial 
evaluations, all but 2 samples were negative for antibodies against MARV. Additional 
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screening found that all serum samples tested negative for immunoglobulin (Ig) G and 
IgM to MARV. 
Discussion 
We have described the public health response to the case of MHF in a Dutch woman 
returning from travel abroad, who was most likely exposed to MARV by visiting a bat 
cave. Outbreaks caused by filoviruses constitute a serious public health threat in sub-
Saharan countries and have disruptive consequences at the individual and societal level. 
In countries in which these viruses are not endemic, imported cases occur only 
sporadically and are associated with little or no secondary transmission22. Our patient 
represents a rare case of MARV infection imported to a Western country, and her case is 
unusual in that her only likely exposure was visiting a bat cave while traveling in 
Uganda. Insectivorous bats may have been the source of sporadic cases in Zimbabwe in 
1975" and Kenya in 1980 and 198789. Furthermore, epidemiologic evidence linked a large 
outbreak of MHF in Durba (Democratic Republic of Congo) to a mine containing a large 
population of fruit-eating bats24. Although the source of infection in our case is not 
certain, circumstantial evidence points to transmission in the Python Cave. Ecological 
surveys to assess the presence of infected bats in that cave are ongoing (P. Rollin, pers. 
comm.). 
Our case shows that unnoticed exposure to an unknown reservoir in a country with no 
apparent cases of MHF can lead to infection. In countries with previous cases of MHF, 
entry into bat caves should certainly be avoided until we know the role of bats as 
reservoir for MARV. The importance of MHF for western countries may be increasing, 
with more persons traveling to high-risk regions and incurring exposure by intrusion 
into unaccustomed ecological niches. Hospital staff in low-risk countries must be alert to 
this possibility. In most travelers returning from tropical destinations, fevers are caused 
by common pathogens or by malaria. However, fever together with rapid clinical 
deterioration and hemorrhaging in a patient returned from a suspect region should 
suggest viral hemorrhagic fevers, especially if exposure to a possible reservoir could have 
occurred. 
Inclusion of MHF in the differential diagnosis of a patient triggers an immediate public 
health response. This response aims primarily at reducing the chance of secondary 
transmission by identifying contact persons at risk. Person-to-person transmission occurs 
in countries to which MARV is endemic22 but only once has been reported elsewhere23. In 
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this case we identified 130 contacts with possible risk. Two hospitals, 2 public health 
departments, and 3 laboratories were involved. We decided to trace all people who were 
in contact with the index patient after her fever developed and to assess their risk for 
exposure on a case-by-case basis. All contacts complied with temperature monitoring and 
daily reporting. All but 2 high-risk contacts postponed further travel until the theoretical 
incubation period of 21 days had elapsed. 
In the Netherlands, statutory power to prevent a healthy person from traveling abroad 
is limited, but the Public Health Law is being revised, and emergency legal provisions are 
being considered. Despite various recommendations1418"-27, no evidence-based, widely 
accepted international protocol is available to guide contact classification and monitoring 
in the case of MHF. Legislation on containment of dangerous pathogens' and measures 
applied to contacts differ among countries, sometimes with extreme consequences. These 
differences, together with privacy issues, make international exchange of information 
difficult. 
The serosurvey of the contacts of this patient confirm that no secondary transmission 
took place between her and any contact who provided a blood sample. Our results are 
consistent with those of Borchert et al.21, who found no serologic evidence for 
asymptomatic or mild MARV infection in a serosurvey of household contacts. 
The present case was an exceptional situation in which visiting a tourist attraction led 
to MHF, a disease with a high potential for overreaction. Given this potential, a rational 
response must be built on a thorough and evidence-based risk assessment1. The response 
in the Netherlands was low profile and did not lead to overreacting or public alarm. Its 
key factors were a coordinated risk assessment and contact monitoring, together with 
factual updates for health professionals and the public. MHF may be more often 
encountered in industrialized countries in the future due to adventure travel to regions 
endemic for MHF. 
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Technical Appendix 
Clinical findings and dilemmas during contact monitoring 
Clinical findings 
In 1 high-risk contact, the body temperature once exceeded 38°C, but 12 hours later, the 
temperature had normalized. Another high-risk contact who shared the patient's room at 
Elkerliek Hospital was readmitted to that hospital because of heart failure, pulmonary 
congestion, and subfebrile temperature. His first admission had ended days before his 
readmission; his condition did not differ between stays and could be attributed to the 
underlying end-stage heart disease. Several other contacts showed nonspecific symptoms 
such as nausea and headache, but without fever, and specific follow-up was deemed 
unnecessary. 
The monitoring period led to emotional problems, mostly in high-risk contacts, due 
mainly to the restrictive measures on daily life and the relatively long period of 
uncertainty about their prognosis and possible transmission to family members. 
Psychological support was made available on a case-by-case basis by the occupational 
health department of the 2 hospitals. 
Dilemmas in the management of contacts 
Problems arose regarding international travel, testing of contacts, and postexposure 
prophylaxis. By the time Marburg hemorrhagic fever was diagnosed in the index patient, 
2 contacts had left for holidays in Italy and the United States, respectively, where they 
remained for most of the monitoring period. The national authorities of both countries 
were contacted, and the protocols for temperature monitoring were conveyed with 
follow-up information on the health status of the 2 persons. 
A third contact departed for Poland 3 days before completing the monitoring, after 
being instructed to carry on the monitoring and stay in daily contact with the Dutch 
authorities. The Polish authorities were informed because there were doubts about his 
compliance. Another person left for Morocco 1 day before the end of the monitoring 
period, but he kept in touch with the Dutch authorities. 
To anticipate possible needlestick accidents or gross breaches of isolation measures by 
healthcare workers, use of experimental vaccines were assessed in a teleconference with 
international experts. They favored the vaccine in which attenuated recombinant 
vesicular stomatitis virus vector expresses the Marburg virus (MARV) glycoprotein1"1 and 
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developed protocols for its use, including regulatory aspects and measures to contain 
environmental shedding of VSV. 
Laboratory diagnosis in the early stage of infection 
TRANSPORTATION AND PROCESSING OF SAMPLES 
Transport of samples must be organized before sample collection to avoid bottlenecks. 
We therefore arranged for certified couriers to link hospitals quarantine facilities to 
laboratories, including the nearest reference laboratory in Germany. 
Protocols were designed to encompass essential laboratory testing of severely ill 
patients, including chemical and bacteriologie diagnostic techniques, biosafety 
considerations, and methods for decontamination of equipment. No existing 
preparedness protocols included these considerations. We decided that diagnostic work-
ups would be limited to contacts in whom fever developed. In that case, essential 
equipment for blood chemistry analyses would be placed inside the Intensive Care 
isolation facility. 
LABORATORY ASSESSMENT OF FEBRILE CONTACTS: DIFFERENTIAL DIAGNOSIS 
Protocols were developed for diagnosis of the most probable causes of illness, given the 
seasonal patters, in which prodromal symptoms resemble those seen in patients with a 
filovirus infection. These include fever, myalgia, and diarrhoea. Data from physician-
based studies of respiratory diseases and gastroenteritis were used as a reference^. 
Contacts with such symptoms would be tested for a range of pathogens to provide an 
alternative diagnosis. However, their removal from isolation would not be based solely 
on this testing because common pathogens are often detected in healthy controls. 
Filovirus evaluation in contact monitoring 
Acute viremia develops in persons infected with Ebola virus, and viral antigens and RNA 
are detectable in serum, plasma, saliva, and occasionally other secreta b'. In early stages 
of infection, results of PCR-based assays have been positive 24-48 earlier than antigen-
capture assays, making the PCR the method of choice. Although viral loads in severely ill 
patients are high, in the early course of illness, viral loads may be barely detectable\ 
Therefore, proper evaluation of PCR-based methods, with particular emphasis on 
detection limits, is crucial for reliance on these diagnostics during monitoring. The 
filovirus diagnostics would therefore be conducted simultaneously in at least 2 
laboratories. The Bernhard-Nocht-Institute for Tropical Medicine (BNI) in Hamburg, 
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Germany, provided protocols for PCR-based detection of MARVs. They had been 
validated in a joint study between P4 laboratories, using all MARV isolates available in 
these laboratories as reference material8. 
Sequence analysis of the patient's MARV strain showed it was most closely related to 
the first-identified Marburg virus isolate from Uganda, the Popp strain. Therefore, we 
assumed that detection limits reported for the Popp strain would apply to this strain as 
well. Reagent kits based on the Panning protocol were assembled at our request and 
kindly provided within a few days (Thomas Laue; QIAGEN, Hamburg, Germany). 
Evaluation of this kit, using extracts from patient serum and other possible sample types 
(throat swab, plasma, serum, feces), provided reliable results. Additionally, strain specific 
Taqman PCR was designed at the Department of Virology at the Erasmus University 
Hospital, with detection limits similar to those of the Panning protocol. 
Laboratory procedures used in the follow-up survey 
After inactivation and fixation on immunofluorescent antibody assay slides, the samples 
were stored at -20oC outside the high-containment laboratory, and further investigations 
using the inactivated virus were performed under BioSafety Level 2 conditions. Testing 
was performed using 1:10 and 1:40 dilutions in 1* phosphate-buffered saline of the 
contact sera, with positive (mouse monoclonal antibody against MARV) and negative 
(MARV-negative mouse sera) controls on every slide. In the initial screening, the 
presence of immunoglobulin (Ig) G and IgM was investigated by using IgM and anti-IgG 
secondary antibodies conjugated with fluorescein isothiocyanate (FITC). 
After inconclusive results in the first screening, procedures were repeated using 
dilutions 1:20, 1:40, 1:80, 1:160, and 1:320 (plus negative and positive control) to enable 
identification of a potentially higher antibody titer. Inconclusive samples were double-
stained with mouse monoclonal antibody and antibodies from the contact sera. The 
double fluorescence was detected by using 2 differently conjugated secondary antibodies: 
anti-mouse IgG-rhodamine and anti-human IgG-FITC to differentiate staining between 
virus particles. 
In the initial evaluation of the slides, performed by 2 of the authors (P.E., S.D.), 2 
samples could not clearly be identified as negative because they lacked the characteristic 
round virus inclusions in the cells. However, when virus particles in the infected cells 
were visualized using monoclonal antibody and overlaying it with the fluorescence of the 
human antibodies, all activity could be attributed to nonspecific background binding. No 
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overlapping fluorescence of human antibody and mouse monoclonal antibody against 
Marburg hemorrhagic fever could be observed. Therefore, all tested sera were considered 
negative for IgG and IgM antibodies to MARV. 
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Abstract 
To assess the response to the reemergence of lymphogranuloma venereum, we conducted 
a cross-sectional survey by administering a structured questionnaire to representatives 
from 26 European countries. Responses were received from 18 countries. The ability to 
respond quickly and the measures used for outbreak detection and control varied. 
Evidence-based criteria were not consistently used to develop recommendations. We did 
not develop criteria to determine the effectiveness of the recommendations. The degree of 
preparedness for an unexpected outbreak, as well as the ability of countries to respond 
quickly to alerts, varied, which indicates weaknesses in the ability to control an outbreak. 
More guidance is needed to implement and evaluate control measures used during 
international outbreaks. 
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Introduction 
Responding effectively to international communicable disease emergencies is a complex 
process that involves national and international cooperation Efforts should be aimed at 
managing patient care and containing the disease by interrupting the chain of 
transmission '2 The severe acute respiratory syndrome outbreak has shown the need for 
being prepared and being able to deal with international emergencies in a consistent way, 
all countries need to be prepared and able to respond to an outbreak Countries 
throughout Europe have developed preparedness plans to face a possible pandemic 
caused by a new influenza virus But even with a well-acknowledged threat like an 
influenza pandemic, differences in preparedness between countries exist3A The 
differences might be even greater when timely control measures are needed for outbreaks 
that remain unnoticed for a long time 
Systems for surveillance and outbreak management among European countries differ, 
as do their health policies and guidelines We wondered whether these differences could 
lead to different outbreak control measures and therefore to differences in the 
effectiveness of these control measures We studied the quality and timeliness of public 
health actions during the reemergence of lymphogranuloma venereum (LGV) among 
men who have sex with men (MSM) in Europe from January 2004 to February 2006 In 
January 2004, the European Surveillance of Sexually Transmitted Infections Network 
(ESSTI) issued an international alert This action was considered a trigger for countries to 
identify possible cases, défi ne, inform, and investigate the population at risk, and to 
implement control measures The resurgence of LGV in Europe contained many features 
similar to an infectious disease emergency it occurred unexpectedly, there was delay in 
the recognition of cases, which allowed the disease to spread within the risk group, and 
there was no preconceived outbreak control plan Moreover, in many countries, LGV is 
not reportable and surveillance is voluntary 
Our study of the response to this LGV outbreak demonstrates the need for a unified 
response to new, unexpected, infectious diseases We assessed the similarities and 
differences in how various countries managed the LGV outbreak to identify common 
practices and to formulate criteria for improving the response to international outbreaks 
Participants and methods 
A cross-sectional survey was conducted from October 2005 through February 2006 
among the countries participating in ESSTI and in Switzerland The ESSTI then consisted 
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of 22 member states of the European Union plus Iceland, Norway, and Turkey. Scotland 
was included as an individual respondent and participated in the network as such. In 
collaboration with the ESSTI steering group, we developed a structured questionnaire 
and sent it to each country's representative (surveillance leads and reference 
microbiologists). 
The items on the questionnaire were based on a framework derived from the literature 
about outbreak management.1-3-5 In addition, to assess the quality of the development and 
implementation of key recommendations for controlling the outbreak, we used parts of 
the international AGREE instrument (www.agreecollaboration.org) for appraising 
guidelines and guideline development programs. 
The questionnaire was divided into 4 sections. The first section was dedicated to the 
alert and initial response to LGV and included 8 questions about actions taken after the 
ESSTI alert, risk assessment, and occurrence of cases. The second section included 8 
questions about the development of outbreak control measures and gathered information 
about how evidence was collected and analyzed, how measures were formulated, when 
experts were consulted, and how recommendations were updated. The third section 
included 9 questions about the content of outbreak control measures (i.e., case 
identification, case definitions, laboratory confirmation, treatment, reporting, and 
interventions for health professionals and the groups at risk). The fourth section 
addressed implementing outbreak control measures (i.e., strategies, dissemination of 
information, targets for monitoring effectiveness, and additional resources). 
Questionnaires were completed electronically or on paper, and data were analyzed by 
SPSS 12.0 (Chicago, IL, USA). LGV is a sexually transmitted infection (STI) caused by 
Chlamydia trachomatis serovars LI, L2, and L3. Contrary to infection with other serovars, 
infections with C. trachomatis Ll-3 are not limited to the mucosa but rather are often 
invasive and can spread to the lymph nodes, which results in a more severe clinical 
outlook. In industrialized countries, cases are incidentally imported from tropical and 
subtropical areas where the disease is endemic.6 Public health measures are usually 
restricted to contact tracing and adequate management of sex partners in individual 
cases; outbreak management is not needed. By the end of 2003, 13 cases had been 
reported to the public health authorities in the Netherlands, followed by a substantial 
increase in cases in subsequent months. The cases were seen among MSM. Clinical signs 
were mostly gastrointestinal and included proctitis, purulent or mucous anal discharge, 
and constipation.7 In the early days of the outbreak, the potential for international spread 
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was recognized because patients reported having had sexual contacts in other countries 
such as Belgium, the United Kingdom, and France.8 
To create awareness, a message was sent through the Early Warning and Reporting 
System of the European Union and through the ESSTI. Since then, LGV cases have been 
identified in several European countries, the United States9, and Canada10. Most patients 
were HIV positive", and some were hepatitis C positive12. 
Results 
The questionnaire was sent to 26 countries; 11 of these countries had reported outbreaks 
of LGV in the past. Completed questionnaires were received from 18 countries (Austria, 
Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, 
Portugal, Scotland, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, and Turkey). 
Of the 18 questionnaires, 12 were completed by medical doctors, 4 by medical 
epidemiologists, and 2 by researchers/microbiologists. In 5 countries (Belgium, Ireland, 
Portugal, Slovenia, and Sweden), the questionnaire was filled in by 2 or more experts 
from different areas of expertise. The 8 countries that did not respond to either the 
questionnaire or the electronic reminders (Slovak Republic, Poland, Malta, Latvia, 
Iceland, Cyprus, Estonia, and Greece) were excluded from the analysis. A complete 
overview of the activities reported for controlling LGV and their development and 
implementation is given in the Tables 1 and 2. 
Initial alert and response 
After the ESSTI alert in January 2004, timely national alert and response systems were set 
up by 11 of the 18 responding countries. These systems included provisional control 
guidelines (9 countries), voluntary reporting (9 countries), and tools for disseminating 
information to health professionals (11 countries). Of the 11 countries who undertook 
early alert and response activities, 9 also reported cases. The main objectives of the alert 
were active case finding (11 countries), assessing the size and nature of the outbreak (10 
countries), and providing appropriate clinical care (9 countries). In 4 countries, the initial 
alert and response were undertaken by professionals from the STI surveillance system in 
collaboration with specialists in outbreak control. In the other 7 countries, only 
surveillance specialists were involved. 
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Table 1. Control measures used by 18 European countries during an LGV outbreak* 
Category All countries (n=18) Countries with cases (n=11) 
Initial alert and response 












Development of control measures 
Outbreak management team (advisory team) 
Initial risk assessment performed 
Methods to collect evidence 
Hand search literature 
Search electronic databases 
Search patient entry data 
Search unpublished data 






Methods to formulate measures 
Subjective review 
Informal expert consensus 
Formal expert consensus 
Evidence based 
Procedure for updating key recommendations 
National LGV guideline 



















Content of control measures 
Active case finding 
Contact tracing 
Partner notification 
Screening risk group 
Activities targeting risk groups 
Alerting general public 
Alerting general practitioners 
Alerting STI clinics 
Alerting public health physicians 
Alerting microbiologists 
Alerting hospitals 
Alerting GUM and gastroenterologists 
Alerting HIV specialists 
LGV notifiablet 
















'Data gathered through a survey LGV, lymphogranuloma venereum, STI sexually transmitted infection 
GUM genitourinary specialists tData were missing for 3 countries for this category 
Development of outbreak control measures 
Five countries had a national outbreak management team or advisory committee that 
provided scientific advice on surveillance and outbreak management The 
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multidisciplinary outbreak management teams always included epidemiologists and 
microbiologists; less frequently included were molecular biologists, 
dermatovenereologists, genitourinary specialists, and communicable disease control 
specialists. In 1 country, communication experts and social scientists also participated in 
the outbreak management teams. No general practitioners, nurses, patients, or 
policymakers were involved in outbreak management teams. Of the 18 countries, control 
measures were aimed primarily at identifying new cases (8 countries) and promoting 
awareness among the risk group (10 countries) and STI clinics (11 countries). A risk 
assessment was performed by 8 countries. 
When developing recommendations for outbreak control, criteria varied with the 18 
countries (Tables 1 and 2). Evidence was systematically collected by literature (11 
countries) and electronic database searches (10 countries). Informal consensus procedures 
were mostly used to formulate recommendations (10 countries) based on experience-
based analysis of evidence (8 countries). Procedures for updating control measures were 
available in 11 countries. A total of 4 countries developed national, multidisciplinary 
guidelines for LGV control, 2 of which issued authorization procedures for the 
guidelines. 
Table 2. Implementation of control measures used by 18 European countries during an LGV 
outbreak* 
Implementation measure All countries Countries with 
(n=18) cases (n=11) 
Disseminating educational materials 




Changes in medical records systems 
Changes in facilities and equipment 
Additional finances 
Strategy for media communication 
Involvement of MSM society in dissemination of information 
Targets to monitor effectiveness 
"Data gathered through a survey LGV, lymphogranuloma venereum, MSM, men who have sex with men 
Content of outbreak control measures 
Active case finding was initiated by 9 countries and contact tracing by 7. Five countries 
implemented both. Information activities for the group at risk were performed by 10 
countries and 11 countries alerted their STI clinics. An overview of all the control 
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Norway, Sweden, Spain, United Kingdom, Scotland, Austria, the Netherlands, Ireland, 
and Belgium) used an identical case definition for confirmed cases: MSM or sexual 
contacts of patients with LGV, who had anorectal or inguinal syndrome and positive 
nucleic acid amplification tests (NAAT) for Chlamydia trachomatis genotype LI, L2, or L3. 
From these 8 countries, case definitions were also issued for probable and possible cases 
and differed widely according to laboratory criteria. 
Laboratory diagnosis of C. trachomatis was performed by NAAT on the following 
samples: rectal swabs (12 countries), biopsy material from lesions (8 countries), urethral 
swabs (5 countries), and urine (2 countries). Genotyping to confirm the presence of 
serovars L1-L3 was also available from 11 countries. Supplementary testing of patients 
for concurrent STIs was recommended as follows: HIV (8 countries), syphilis (5 
countries), hepatitis C (3 countries), hepatitis Β (3 countries), and Neisseria gonorrhoeae 
(2 countries). 
With respect to antimicrobial therapy, various regimens and different doses were 
used. For 9 countries doxycycline (100 mg 2x/day for 21 days) was the first choice of 
treatment. Alternatives mentioned were tetracycline (2 g/day), minocycline (300 mg 
loading dose followed by 200 mg 2x/day), and erythromycin (500 mg 4x/day). Clinical 
and laboratory follow-up of the patients was performed by 10 countries. 
Implementation of outbreak control measures 
The control measures were implemented by disseminating educational materials in 9 
countries, disseminating national bulletins in 5, and holding meetings and conferences 
for professionals in 3 countries. Most countries (11/18) had the risk group help 
disseminate information. Targets to monitor the effectiveness of recommendations were 
not formulated by any country. 
Discussion 
This outbreak of LGV had special features with high clinical and public health 
significance. First, recognition of cases was difficult due to the unusual clinical 
presentation that mimics inflammatory bowel disease. Second, the diagnosis of LGV 
involved invasive procedures for collecting samples and required NAAT, which were not 
licensed for rectal specimens. Furthermore, patients mostly belonged to sex networks of 
MSM in large cities with numerous anonymous partners from different countries11 and 
where (international) contact tracing was difficult. In most European countries, LGV is 
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not notifiable by law so cases are likely to be dealt with outside the public health domain. 
The potential of unnoticed further spread and the risk for simultaneous transmission of 
other infections, such as HIV and syphilis, increased the public health importance of this 
outbreak. 
Differences were seen between countries with respect to ability to rapidly respond and 
implement measures that are needed to detect or to control a possible outbreak. 
Countries that reported cases of LGV were more likely to recommend control measures 
although measures were also needed to detect possible cases. To identify and diagnose 
cases, clinical specialists and public health physicians, as well as the risk group, must be 
aware of the outbreak, particularly for an LGV outbreak. LGV is a rare disease in Europe, 
and often healthcare workers are not aware of the clinical features of the disease. 
Outbreak control measures require collaboration between persons in multiple 
specialties, such as specialists in surveillance, communicable disease control, health 
promotion, and physicians involved in the direct patient care venereologists, 
genitourinary medicine specialists, gastroenterologists, microbiologists, that do not 
necessarily work together in other circumstances. In this outbreak, information from the 
surveillance systems was as important for health providers as for policymakers; this 
information had to lead to immediate recognition of a public health threat and direct 
action. 
However, in the management of LGV patients, differences were seen between 
countries with respect to case definitions, laboratory testing, and antimicrobial drug 
treatment. With most patients belonging to international sex networks, uniform 
diagnostic procedures and treatment protocols would have been helpful for ensuring a 
uniform approach to outbreak control. Furthermore, control measures were impaired 
because in many countries LGV is not a notifiable disease; therefore, there is no legal 
basis for disclosing names of sexual contacts to facilitate contact tracing and prevent 
further spread. Contact tracing was made even more difficult because of the numerous 
anonymous sexual contacts in various European cities. 
Criteria for evidence-based development of recommendations were not always 
consistently used to extract and analyze evidence for best practices during the LGV 
outbreak, which led to differences in outbreak management. Specific targets for 
monitoring the effectiveness of recommendations were not formulated by any country. 
One strong point was the acknowledgment by many countries of the importance of 
having the risk group, MSM, disseminate alerts and advocate awareness. 
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Until now, the reemergence of LGV has affected MSM in 11 European countries. The 
ESSTI alert prompted these countries to take action to identify cases early, improve the 
management of cases, and assess the size of the outbreak. Of the 18 respondents, 7 stated 
that they had not taken any action at this stage for various reasons: they did not receive 
the alert (Turkey, Slovenia) or they did not participate in the ESSTI (Switzerland). 
Coordination at the European level should encourage and monitor the response of all 
countries to alerts. 
Our study has some limitations. We assumed that all countries that were participating 
in the ESSTI network in 2005 had also been informed about the LGV outbreak. Later, it 
became clear that the countries that had joined the European Union on May 1, 2004, did 
not receive the ESSTI alert. Because only 1 of these new European Union member 
countries completed the questionnaire, it was also impossible to assess how outbreak 
control measures were developed and implemented. Another limitation inherent to the 
method used was that not all key persons involved in the control of LGV were able to fill 
out the questionnaire. As the questionnaire was sent to the country representatives in the 
ESSTI, it is possible that not all relevant information was available on the control 
measures and activities that had taken place at regional or local levels. Furthermore, the 
quality of the outbreak management process and the development of outbreak measures 
could only be assessed indirectly on the basis of the answers to the questionnaire because 
only a few countries provided more detailed documents like guidelines or articles. The 
LGV outbreak is still ongoing in Europe, and since the completion of this study more 
countries may have undertaken measures to identify and treat cases and to prevent 
further transmission. 
Our findings are helpful for understanding the responses to unexpected disease 
outbreaks. However, we do acknowledge that LGV is an STI (rather than a 
quickspreading communicable, airborne disease) and therefore, affects a minority of 
sexually active citizens (MSM) in the country. 
Communicable diseases differ from other health threats or crises because they spread 
from person to person. Therefore, problems are often not restricted to 1 country. Various 
specific interventions are therefore justified by the difference in local systems, cultures, 
and situations. However, the principles of outbreak response are general, and countries 
can learn from each other. This study shows that countries have varying degrees of 
ability to respond quickly to an unexpected outbreak; these findings expose weaknesses 
in the outbreak control capacity in Europe. Although important steps have been taken for 
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improvement'*, the quality of LGV outbreak control m Europe could benefit from 
uniform approaches in controlling other infectious diseases with potential for 
international spread and from exchanging information between countries 
The challenge for the future will be to coordinate outbreak management in various 
countries for which continuity and coherence are essential This study shows that 
coordination should at least aim to provide guidance as to when and how alerts should 
be implemented by various countries as well as to establish uniform case definitions and 
ensure the availability of optimal diagnostic facilities We also show a lack of common 
strategies and that these should be developed with respect to treatment algorithms and 
contact tracing Furthermore, quality systems following the whole chain of outbreak 
management (alert, outbreak control measures, implementation, and evaluation) are 
needed These systems should be based on standard approaches to outbreak 
management followed by external review of implemented measures More international 
collaboration is needed to improve response and to ensure high standards of practice in 
managing international outbreaks and threats caused by emerging or reemerging STIs 
Crisis situations increase the chance of overlooking essential steps in outbreak 
management because of time constraints, uncertainty, and the lack of substantial 
evidence in effective approaches to controlling new diseases Furthermore, during 
outbreaks, key recommendations involve quick decision-making by professionals who 
often have no time for réévaluation Although this need for quick decisions has been 
acknowledged for other threats like avian flu, SARS, or bioterronsm, little experience has 
been acquired with managing outbreaks of STIs Our systematic approach could be 
helpful in preparing for or assessing the response to all kinds of public health 
emergencies 
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Abstract 
Concerns about the threats due to outbreaks of communicable diseases -new and old 
ones- are general, presenting immediate challenges to outbreak management. 
Evaluations show repeatedly that there is room for improving the response capacity. By 
integrating evidence with practice-based experiences, knowledge can be generated for a 
better understanding of outbreak management, providing a knowledge base for 
improving it. We performed a systematic search of strategies to improve outbreak 
management and of the experiences of those involved in outbreaks. This review describes 
the lessons that can be drawn from such research and practical experience for public 
health professionals and policy makers. 
Eight papers explored the effectiveness of education to improve outbreak 
management, showing mixed results. Most studies used uncontrolled designs, making it 
difficult to draw conclusions on effectiveness. Simulation might be more effective than 
web based education on outbreak management. Well designed studies comparing the 
pros and the cons of both types of educational strategies are needed. 
Nineteen papers provided a long list of experienced obstacles, facilitators and lessons 
learned while performing outbreak management. From these experiences we drew up 
lessons regarding the measures to stop transmission (17 lessons), the infrastructure (7 
lessons); the professionals involved (12 lessons) and regarding the resources (6 lessons) 
for outbreak management. Taking these lessons into account when managing a future 
outbreak should significantly facilitate and improve this process. 
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Introduction 
Outbreaks and threats from emerging and re-emerging14 diseases have put, at least for 
the moment, an end to the premature assumption expressed by the middle of the 20lh 
century, that infectious diseases would quickly belong to the past.^6 In the current world, 
infectious diseases represent the second cause of death worldwide1 and concerns about 
the threat from the emergence of new diseases or re-emergence of old ones are general. In 
order to meet the optimistic target of "winning the war against infectious diseases" in the 
future, factors that influence emergence -e.g. continuous microbial adaptation, 
(inaccurate) use of antimicrobials on a large scale, increased globalization and 
international travel, intensive farming, the growing skeptical attitude to vaccination 
together with a growing concern about safety and alleged side effects- need to be 
understood properly and opposed by innovative research and strategies. 
As it is unlikely, however, that the importance of outbreaks and threats due to 
communicable diseases will decrease in the near decades, it is also important to focus on 
the immediate challenges in outbreak control by strengthening the response capacity. The 
current target for the public health services is to manage an outbreak by applying 
credible and proportional outbreak control measures aiming to stop further transmission, 
and to protect the vulnerable persons. To do so, countries need to have a solid public 
health infrastructure in place, consisting of organizations that are capable to assess the 
magnitude of the risks correctly and to react timely. The professionals, who are at the 
very core of outbreak control, have to be well trained and confident in their ability to 
recognize threats and react properly in a multidisciplinary context. In addition, sufficient 
resources have to be available to guarantee the application of the necessary control 
measures. 
Yet, evaluations show repeatedly that crises find health systems often unprepared and 
that there is room for improving the control capacity.7 Research and practical experience 
can provide valuable lessons from the past for public health professionals and policy 
makers. By integrating evidence with practice-based experiences, knowledge can be 
generated for a better understanding of outbreak management, providing a knowledge 
base for improving outbreak management. With that aim, we undertook a systematic 
review of strategies to improve outbreak management and of the experiences of those 
involved in past outbreaks. 
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Methods 
We searched the Medline database from January 1996 to April 30 2007 inclusive to find 
papers about effective approaches to outbreak management from research and practical 
experience. Initially, we searched Medline using the gold standard search strategy of the 
Cochrane Effective Practice and Organisation of Care Group to identify quality 
improvement studies (epoc.cochrane.org/specialised-register) and combined this search 
strategy with keywords (MeSH) on outbreaks of infectious diseases (Table 1). Two 
authors (MH and AT) assessed each potentially eligible paper. We included papers that 
(1) described the effectiveness of approaches to improve outbreak management or 
described practical experiences with outbreak management; (2) were written in English, 
French or German and (3) had a public health scope. Papers describing ICT or 
mathematical models of transmission and geographic information systems m infectious 
disease control were excluded. In addition, papers that described innovative control 
measures not providing information on their effectiveness (e.g. the role of an advanced 
practice public health nurse, triage management tools, robotics, mobile devices, 
automated detection) were excluded as were papers dealing with clinical management of 
individual patients. We then reviewed the reference lists of the included papers to 
identify any additional papers. 
Table 1. Search strategy 
EPOC gold standard search strategy for quality improvement studies 
AND 
(explode "Communicable-Diseases"/ all subheadings) or (explode "Commumcable-Diseases-Emerging"/ 
all subheadings) or (explode "Disease-Outbreaks"/ all subheadings) or (explode "Disease-Transmission-
Honzontal"/ all subheadings) or (explode "Disease-Transmission-Vertical"/ all subheadings) or (crisis in 
ti.ab) AND (explode "Risk-Assessment"/ all subheadings) or (explode "Contact-Tracing"/ all subheadings) 
or (explode "Disease-Notification"/ all subheadings) or (explode "Infection-Control"/ all subheadings) or 
(explode "Mandatory-Testing"/ all subheadings) or (explode "Universal-Precautions"/ all subheadings) or 
(explode "Population-Surveillance"/ all subheadings) or (explode "Immunization"/ all subheadings) or 
(quality management in ti) 
OR 
(explode "Bioterrorism'V all subheadings or (explode "Severe-Acute-Respiratory-Syndrome"/ all 
subheadings and (SH = "PREVENTION-AND-CONTROL")) 
AND 
((LA = "ENGLISH") or (LA = "German") or (LA = "French")) 
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All papers meeting our inclusion criteria were reviewed and two authors (MH and 
AT) independently extracted data on study characteristics (authors, publication year), 
characteristics regarding effectiveness (study design, study population, chosen strategy 
and results following this strategy) and information on experiences. We categorised the 
various experiences using the previously described four essential features of outbreak 
management as a template: issues related to the chosen measures to stop transmission, to 
the infrastructure; the professionals involved and issues related to resources. 
Disagreements were resolved by consensus. 
Results 
Table 2 shows the flow of papers through the review. Altogether, 429 abstracts were 
identified. The 1996-2007 search for studies resulted in 27 eligible papers. All papers 
were published after 2002. 
Table 2. Selection process for studies included in the review 
Potentially relevant articles identified and screened for 
retrieval 
Articles excluded after abstract review did not fulfill 
inclusion criteria or were duplicates 
Retrieved for more detailed evaluation 
Excluded after full text search based on inclusion and 
exclusion criteria 
Additional articles identified from reference list search 
Articles included 
Articles on strategies to improve outbreak management 
(with or without evaluation, prospective studies) 
Articles on lessons learned during past outbreaks (with or 
without evaluation, retrospective studies) 
Original search of Medline, January 1996 to 
April 30 2007 to find papers about effective 
approaches to outbreak management from 
research and practical experience 
π = 429 
η = 376 
η = 52 
π = 26 
π= 1 
π = 27 
π = 8 
π=19 
We found 8 papers representing 7 studies that tested the effectiveness of strategies to 
improve outbreak management following an act of bioterrorismh '̂  4 of them (50%) were 
published in 2006. An additional 19 papers described experiences with outbreak 
management. Most of these papers (n=14) described experiences following the SARS 
outbreak1621'; two papers described experiences following, respectively, a mumps and a 
pertussis outbreak.1"11 Three papers focused on bioterrorism.12^ About half of the papers 
were published in 2003 and 2004. 
We report separately about these two sets of papers providing lessons for practice: 
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(1) the effectiveness of strategies to improve outbreak management (Table 3), and 
(2) the experiences with outbreak management in practice (Table 4) 
Strategies to improve outbreak management (8 papers, 7 studies) 
LESSONS WITH REGARD TO EFFECTIVENESS 
Four studies (five papers) described the effectiveness of online, web based education on 
the knowledge of professionals regarding bioterronsm Systematic review of these 
studies showed mixed results one study showed a statistically significant improved 
diagnosis test score and management test score after intervention (uncontrolled before 
after study)10, one study described a strategy that was partly effective both on knowledge 
and confidence in information finding (controlled 'after intervention' study)8, one did not 
show significant improvements, not at post-test nor on follow-up (randomized clinical 
trial)9, and in one study it was unclear whether the strategy was effective11 It remains, 
therefore, impossible to draw conclusions on the effectiveness of web based education 
One study tested the effectiveness of performing a drill in emergency departments 
(EDs) an actor-patient was send in, simulating a febrile patient with lower respiratory 
complaints l2 Average results of 'prednll' and 'postdnll' tests of medical knowledge and 
knowledge of anthrax response protocols were not statistically different 54,5% and 59 3% 
respectively The authors concluded "Sentinel drills themselves do not appear to 
improve the knowledge of emergency physicians They do probably have a role, 
however, in keeping hospitals, and especially EDs, at a high alert level " 
Two studies tested the effects of a four, respectively, one day course including 
simulation Both courses were effective in improving capability assessments13 and 
knowledge test scores 14 
Table 3. Included papers describing strategies to improve outbreak management 
Study 
reference, year 





Terndrup et al., 
2005 
(development 
and pilot test)15 
Chung et al., 
20049 
Strategy 
Online continuing medical education 
(CME) course on bioterrorism A 
screensaver was developed to attract 
attention of providers using ED desktop 
computers in order to increase 
awareness of bioterrorism issues and a 
Web site was developed with detailed 
content related to bioterrorism 
(summary and comprehensive 
information on smallpox and anthrax, a 
syndromics table for category A 
diseases) providing both a continuing 
education section with remediation 
(pop-up boxes for feedback and 
remediation on practice examinations) 
and a formal continuing education site 
where participants submitted answers 
to case-scenario questions for CME 
credit 
Lecture on bioterrorism & continuous 
access to an educational web site for 
educating physicians about bioterrorism 
with weekly exposure to case scenarios 
of diseases due to biological agents 
The site contained published articles on 
specific biological agents, textbooks on 
bioterrorism, clinical practice guidelines 
for suspected respiratory and 
cutaneous illness due to biological 
warfare, links to related bioterrorism 
web sites, and a decision support tool 










US physicians of 
any specialty with 
one or more other 
online CME 
























(control CME training 
on chronic disease 
management) 
Questionnaire 







trial in 5 hospitals with 
measurements at 0, 1 
and 6 months 









Effectiveness of the 
strategy 
Compared to the 
comparison group, 
the online CME group 
more frequently 
diagnosed/treated 2 
out 5 cases correctly 
(P=0 01) 
The CME group was 
more confident about 
finding information to 
guide a diagnosis 
related to terrorism (3 
items, P<0 05) but not 
in addressing mental 
health issues related 
to terrorism (1 item) 
Scores did not 
significantly differ 
between groups at 
pre-test (ι = 45%, e = 
44%), post-test (ι = 
48%, e = 45%), and 
six-month follow up (ι 
= 51%, c = 47%) 
Within each group, 
there was no 
significant change 
from baseline at the 
one-month post-test 
Lessons for practice 
There were no 
differences between 
intervention and 
comparison groups in 
the recognition of 
anthrax among 
physicians who had 
practiced 20 years or 
less However, among 
those in practice more 
than 20 years, 
intervention physicians 
accurately diagnosed 
a patient with anthrax 
more frequently than 
comparison physicians 
94% vs 78% 
The majority of all 
study participants 
reported that their 
primary source of 
information was the 
media (pre-test 64%, 
post-test 64%, follow 




Cosgrove et al., 
2005 10 
Filoromo et al., 
2003 " 
Strategy 
biological disease based on the 
physician's input of symptoms or a real 
or hypothetical patient 
Online case-based didactic module on 
bioterrorism Multiple answer choices 
were provided, requesting the learner to 
select a diagnosis or make an initial 
decision on medical management (no 
time limitations) To educate learners 
on diagnosis and treatment of patients 
presenting with infection from a 
bioterrorism agent, additional cases 
with didactic text were written, including 
the differential diagnosis, important 
clues to the diagnosis, and principles of 
treatment Learners were informed if 
their answer choice was correct and, if 
incorrect, which answer choice was 
correct 
An interactive screensaver was placed 
at the emergency department 
computers as the vehicle to increase 
awareness of and, thus, facilitate 
subsequent participation in the linked 
Web-based education on bioterrorism 
The screen savers, which rotate images 
and text, have striking visuals that 
serve as a billboard to persons working 
at or near the computer or merely 
passing by the monitor The Web site 






Physicians at 30 
internal medicine 
residency 


















cases, 16 multiple 
choice questions) 
Intervention group 
N=631 physicians who 








After intervention group 




Diagnosis of diseases 
due to bioterrorism 
agents improved from 
average pre-test 
score 46 8% to 
average post-test 
score 79 0% 
(increase of 32 2%, 
P<0 001) 
Management of 




score 25 4% to 
average post-test 
score 79 1 % 
(increase of 53 7%, 
PO001) 
Before installation of 
the programme pre 
ED rotation scores 
increased from 38 8% 
52,4% post ED 
rotation 
After installation of the 
programme pre ED 
rotation scores 
increased from 59 1% 
to 75 8% post ED 
rotation 
Lessons for practice 
Average attending 
physician scores were 
higher than resident 
scores (50,0% vs 
36 9%, P< 001) 
Study 
reference, year 
Leiba et al., 
2006 12 
Pryor et al., 
2006 13 
Strategy 
format on CDC category A agents, 
including photographs of patients, 
microbiological slides, radiographs, a 
differential-diagnosis table, background 
information on agents, treatments, case 
stimulations with multiple choice 
responses and pop-ups text boxes for 
remediation 
Drills were performed an actor-patient 
was sent in, simulating a febrile patient 
with lower respiratory complaints 
Radiographs and laboratory results 
consistent with anthrax were planted in 
the system 
A four-day functional exercise, 
competency-based course for 
administrative decision-making in 
response to weapons of mass 
destruction (WMD) for healthcare 
professionals Course entitled 
'Healthcare Leadership and 
Administrative Decision-Making in 
Response to WMD Incidents' Each 
course included three modified tabletop 
and/or real-time, functional exercises 





All 23 emergency 
departments of the 
23 general 









participating in one 
of 8 course 
offerings (N=414) 










questions) on medical 
knowledge and 
knowledge of anthrax 
response protocols 
Before Intervention 
group N=29 physicians 







Paired evaluation data 
of 339 participants 
Effectiveness of the 
strategy 
NB The huge 
difference in pre ED 
rotation scores in both 
groups might be 
influenced by the 
events of 9/11, which 
happened just before 
the pre measurement 
of the intervention 
group 
Average results of 
prednll and postdnll 
tests were not 
statistically different 
54,5% and 59 3% 
respectively 
For all 21 items, post-
course ratings were 
significantly higher 
than pre-course 
ratings (P<0 0001) 
Total scale scores for 




increase in mean 
ratings (all P<0 001) 
Lessons for practice 
"One of the unique 
design elements of the 
course was the 
interaction between a 
mix of professions 
Anecdotal reports 
suggest that this 
opportunity to 
experience the 
response to mock 
WMD incidents from 
the perspectives of 
Study 
reference, year 
Subbarao et al., 
2006 14 
Strategy 
current, prototypical, small community 
hospital in the US and provided a 
realistic environment for the live 
exercises 
One day, simulation-based CBRNE 
(chemical, biological, radiological, 
nuclear, and explosive) course directed 
at the recognition, triage, and 
resuscitation of contaminated victims by 
first responders/receivers in the acute 
management of contaminated patients 
including recognition, triage, and 
resuscitation Course used high fidelity, 
mannequin-based (HFMB) simulation 
(simulator stations designed for an 











participating in the 
course (N=·?) 











the 12 video clinical 
vignettes as scenarios 
for the test questions) 
Before Intervention 
group N=67 
After intervention group 
N=54 
Paired evaluation data 
of 54 participants 
Effectiveness of the 
strategy 
Pre-course test 
(n=67) mean value 
was 53 5 ± 12,7%, 
post-course test 
(n=54) mean value 
was 78 3 ±10 9% 
A total of 54 
participants 
completed both pre-
and post-course tests 
The change in score 
achieved statistical 
significance at all 
levels of learner 
Lessons for practice 
outside and inside the 
hospital provided 
participants with new 
insight into the 





"Overall, it appeared 




similar to each other in 
baseline knowledge 
The nurses, medical 
students and 
paramedics also were 
similar to each other in 
baseline knowledge 
The advantage is to 
gam a practical, 
'hands-on' 
competence in the 
skills of dirty 
resuscitation Another 
important practical use 
is the exposure of 
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Other lessons 
Three studies looked at differences in baseline knowledge and knowledge improvement 
of their various participants 81"u Casebeer et alH concluded that there were no differences 
between intervention and comparison groups in the recognition of anthrax among 
physicians who had practiced 20 years or less However, among those in practice more 
than 20 years, intervention physicians accurately diagnosed a patient with anthrax more 
frequently than comparison physicians (94% vs 78%) Cosgrove et al '" showed that 
average attending physician baseline scores were higher than resident scores (50 0% vs 
36 9%, P< 001) while Subbarao et al l 4 concluded "Overall, it appeared that the 
emergency medicine attending and resident physicians were similar to each other in 
baseline knowledge The nurses, medical students and paramedics also were similar to 
each other in baseline knowledge " So, although the conclusions vary slightly, they all 
point at the potential importance of adapting education to the educational needs of the 
various participant subgroups 
Chung et al ^ explored the primary source of information of all study participants The 
majority reported that their primary source of information was the media rather than 
medical sources This points at the importance of engaging the media in educating 
professionals 
Both studies on the courses including simulation pointed at the positive side effects of 
simulation Pryor et al " underscore that "this opportunity to experience the response to 
mock weapons of mass destruction incidents from the perspectives of outside and inside 
the hospital, provided participants with new insight into the importance of effective 
collaboration and communication between stakeholders " Subbarao et al 14 mentions as 
an advantage of simulation the gaining of practical, 'hands-on' competence in skills and 
the exposure of weaknesses in the currently proposed management of victims 
The experiences with outbreak management (19 papers) 
Two authors (MH and AT) independently extracted information on experiences from the 
19 papers and grouped it into the four essential features of outbreak management This 
exploration of the literature resulted in a long list of experienced obstacles, facilitators 
and lessons learned while performing outbreak management (Appendix) 
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Table 4. Included papers describing experiences with outbreak management 
Study reference, year 
Abrahamson et al., 2006 
16 
Affonsoetal.,20041' 
Bergeron et al., 2006 " 
Burkle, 2003 " 
Chin et al., 2004" 
Digiovanni et al., 2004 M 
Hamilton-West, 2006 Jü 
Kerby et al., 2005 JJ 
Lateef et al., 2004 " 
Lateef, 2004 " 
Pang et al., 2003 " 
Parker and Golsman, 
2006 24 
Porten et al., 2006 " 
Thompson et al., 2004 a 
Walz et al., 2003 " 
Wheeler et al., 2004 J1 
Wilder-Smith and Guek 
Hong Low, 2005 27 = 
Wu et al., 2004 " 
























The paper describes a simulation exercise to teach health care 
workers how to safely handle a cardiac arrest m a SARS patient 
A descriptive report on the SARS outbreak in Toronto describing 
paradoxes and strategies to improve control measures 
This study describes the experiences of nurses during the SARS 
outbreak in Canada 
The paper discusses MOE's -measures of effectiveness for the 
management of a bioterrorism response 
A report on the pharmacist's role in the handling of SARS during 
the outbreak in Toronto Description of strategies that could be 
applied in future with similar events 
A report on a survey done to measure the impact and 
effectiveness of quarantine during the Toronto outbreak 
A survey was held among students after a campaign to be 
vaccinated with the MMR vaccination after a mumps outbreak 
This paper explores how to evaluate public health workers' 
competence for preparedness by means of self-assessment 
A description of the specific guidelines that were implemented 
among ambulance staff during the SARS outbreak in Singapore 
A descriptive paper about the changes in an emergency 
department to handle the SARS crisis 
A description of measures taken to contain the out-break of SARS 
in Beijing with an evaluation of their effectiveness 
A study measuring emergency department staffs perception of 
which infection control measures are effective against SARS 
A survey was conducted to measure how the local health 
departments Germany implemented quarantine measures during 
the SARS outbreak m Germany 
This paper describes the SARS epidemic from the view of 
nursing and how nurses experienced the handling of the 
epidemic 
A proposal to tram paramedics to give vaccinations during a mass 
disaster e g flu pandemic 
A retrospective study identifying barriers for the implementing of 
guidelines to manage a pertussis outbreak 
This is a descriptive paper about precautions that should be taken 
by health care workers during respiratory illnesses and their 
connection to SARS 
This paper describe the management of an outbreak of SARS in 
a hospital by hand of a standard operation procedure 
A retrospective view of the handling of the SARS crisis using a 
quality management tool This tool was already in place and in 
use at the BC centre of disease control during the SARS crisis 
In a second step, the authors (MH and AT) compressed, in consensus, the original data 
abstracted -by removing overlap among the various authors- and elaborated a list of 
lessons learned from practical experience. From the 19 papers, 42 lessons could be drawn 
regarding the measures to stop transmission (17 lessons), the infrastructure (7 lessons); 
the professionals involved (12 lessons) and regarding the resources (6 lessons) for 
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outbreak management. Taking these lessons into account when managing a future 
outbreak should significantly facilitate and improve this process. 
Lessons learned regarding the measures to stop transmission (17 lessons) 
Regarding the outbreak measures (Box 1), five lessons recommend how to improve the 
crisis advice itself to better guide practice. For example, recommendations and guidelines 
have to be consistent, clear and unambiguous and have to be developed by and for all 
professional target groups involved in performing the measures. In addition, experience 
shows (five lessons) the importance of early formulating specific control measures (e.g. 
dedicated areas, techniques to deal with vague symptoms) while also taking into account 
various aspects (effectiveness, privacy etc.) of these measures. Five lessons prescribe how 
to improve the information to the public regarding, among others, the measures 
themselves and the progression of the outbreak. Two lessons advice how to improve 
uptake of quarantine and mass vaccination by the public. 
Box 1. Lessons learned regarding the measures to stop transmission 
The crisis advice 
1 Recommendations should be clear, consistent and unambiguous with respect to 
- case definitions 
- sources and routes of transmission 
- appropriate professional performance 
- use of PPE 
2 Recommendations should be flexible to allow modifications based on new or evolving scientific insights 
and practical experiences All staff should be timely informed of these modifications 
3 Guidelines from various organizations (CDC, WHO, ECDC, national organizations) should be consistent 
4 The guideline development group should include all professional target groups involved in performing 
the measures (also including paramedics, pharmacists, nurses) 
5 The guideline should address the role of all potential professional target groups involved in outbreak 
management 
Control measures 
6 Organize dedicated areas (high risk zones) for the transportation, assessment and management of 
suspected or confirmed patients In these high risk zones, patients must be controlled by a series of 
protocols that delineate appropriate professional performance and facilitate precise screening and triage 
decisions 
7 Define stringent techniques to deal proactively with vague symptoms such as fever, fatigue and coughs 
8 Ascertain accuracy of the diagnostic test Ideally, some definitive testing procedures would be available 
9 Define quarantine requirements to manage the risks in exposed health care workers 
10 When selecting measures (quarantine of contacts, closing public places, fever checks at airport, tram 
stations and roads), balance effectiveness, privacy aspects, legislation in various jurisdictions, costs of 
measures and the need to increase confidence of the community that proactive steps are being made 
towards controlling the outbreak 
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Providing information to the public 
11 The message to the public should be clear, consistent and unambiguous with respect to 
- the content of control measures 
- the mandatory character of quarantine measures 
- the role of preventive measures for reducing the risk of infection 
12 Provide information on progression of the outbreak expressed by the changes in the number of new 
cases Report the known burden of disease and not the accumulated total or suspicious interests 
13 Build an advisory public relations coalition of local, regional and national disease control professionals 
for integrating information and effectively communicating to the public 
14 Tie the surveillance system to a health information system using a variety of media channels to alert 
and inform the population 
15 Make prior arrangements with the media and public relations officers with community involved, pre-
scnpted disease-related messages and responses to 'frequently asked questions' to avoid unnecessary 
and improper use of healthcare facilities 
Uptake of the control measures by the public: quarantine and mass vaccination 
16 To ensure compliance with quarantine 
- explain the rationale of quarantine and monitor compliance 
- address financial issues (for instance lost income) 
- ensure the provision of daily supplies and services 
- ensure psychological support 
17 To ensure compliance with mass vaccination 
- take into account individual attitudes/beliefs and perceptions of the risks/benefits of immunization 
which might influence the level of trust in the safety/efficacy and uptake of the vaccine Tailor 
information to the various needs of the various risk groups 
- address the influencing factors in the social context (peer pressure) and the organizational context 
(barriers to uptake) of carrying out a mass vaccination campaign 
Lessons learned regarding the infrastructure to manage outbreaks (7 lessons) 
Experience underscores (Box 2) the importance of one direct, transparent and accountable 
network for the control and containment of outbreaks (one lesson). The disease tracking 
system should not only be able to collect data, but should also be able to provide instant 
feedback to any healthcare professional (two lessons). Two lessons point at the value of 
monitoring and, if necessary, instantly improving the performance of all outbreak 
measures. Two additional lessons recommend how to adapt leadership to adequately 
manage outbreaks. 
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Box 2. Lessons learned regarding the infrastructure to manage outbreaks 
Communication between organizations 
1 Create a direct, transparent and accountable system-wide communication network (from the macro to 
the micro level of the individual healthcare providers) for the control and containment of outbreaks 
Disease tracking and data collection system 
2 Set up a comprehensive, real time disease-tracking and data collection system, put under a central 
command, to collect and process data of suspect cases, probable and confirmed cases both from the 
community and healthcare settings This system should be based on existing surveillance of routine or 
more common illnesses, but should be flexible enough to timely include unforeseen pathogens 
3 Provide instant feedback from the central system (for example through a hotline) to any healthcare 
professional 
System for monitoring and evaluation 
4 Perform regular audits to monitor performance of all measures to stop transmission as advised 
5 Involve emergency planners to consider fallout 
Leadership 
6 Flatten the organizational structure and put a formal command and control structure in place, making 
clear who is in charge of the final decisions This person should act as a "general in a battlefield"2e and 
be able to take decisions in situations when there is no time for consultation 
7 Organize a daily forum to allow for full review and collective support for action planning 
Lessons learned regarding the professionals who perform the measures (12 
lessons) 
Experience shows (4 lessons) that is important to facilitate improved professional 
adherence to personal protection measures (Box 3). It is also important (three lessons) to 
explore professionals' perceptions regarding effectiveness of the proposed measures and 
other barriers, including financial considerations, that influence adherence or not. Based 
on this information, facilitating activities should be provided, to stimulate adherence by 
professionals. It is also crucial to provide professionals with psychological support (one 
lesson) during an outbreak. Education on control measures (two lessons) should be 
provided to all potential professional target groups involved in outbreak management, 
both as part of their curricula and during an outbreak. Preferably, simulation is used to 
educate health professionals, but also to prepare precise protocols and to train teamwork. 
The latter (2 lessons) is very important in effective outbreak management (2 lessons). 
Box 3. Lessons learned regarding the professionals who perform the measures 
Personal protection of health care workers 
1 Tram health care workers to use PPE appropriately to dimmish the risk of improper use and self 
contamination due to ergonomie limitations (like claustrophobia, inability to balance when removing 
equipment) 
2 Provide health care workers with consistent instruction and tools to improve proper use of PPE and 
avoid making errors ("easy to follow poster of degownmg", "instructions to remove the outer pair of 
gloves without contaminating the inner pair") 
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3 Set up system-wide safety processes that are capable of assigning priorities to potentially different 
interests (whose safety gets priority patients or caregivers'?)" 7 and address safety concerns and 
feelings of vulnerability of health care workers and provide them with various options (for example offer 
staff the option not to work with infectious patients and, for doing so, danger money and other 
incentives) 
4 Avoid long hour shifts as mistakes were merely made by workers when they were tired 
Adherence to advice 
5 Provide clear information on the effectiveness of the measures and the circumstances in which they 
should be applied to prevent misperceptions of the effectiveness of the various measures by staff 
These misperceptions can vary between different categories of staff (for instance nurses, trainees, 
doctors) and thus require tailored information 
6 Explore the barriers of health care professionals and oppose them by targeted activities to overcome 
these obstacles (for instance some healthcare providers were reported to be somewhat reluctant to 
identify a case because of treatment and isolation issues some physicians declined to prescribe 
antibiotic prophylaxis because of concern for "saving the antibiotic")31 
7 Ensure financial compensation to prevent adjustment of the measures (for instance shortening the 
duration of quarantine) due to concerns of the health care professional for the financial consequences 
for the patients 
Psychological impact 
8 Provide an integrative support network for health-care workers to discuss the physical and emotional 
demands of outbreaks (feeling isolated, fear of contracting the disease, exhaustion, concern, 
demoralizing negative comments, stress etc) 
Education 
9 Educate all professional target groups involved in performing the measures (also including nurses, 
paramedics, pharmacists, laboratory workers and trainees) on proper protection, observance of strict 
infection control measures, vaccination procedures, patient education and record keeping Education 
activities should be both included in the training curricula (including continuing education) and provided 
during crises, using a variety of teaching methods The activities should take into account individual 
differences between health care workers Their effectiveness should be assessed 
10 Use simulation, as it is effective in educating health professionals, important to prepare precise 
protocols and to tram teamwork Simulation is, however, resource intense 
Teamwork 
11 Stimulate team work Outbreak management demands team work between all professional target 
groups involved in performing the measures (also including nurses, paramedics, pharmacists, 
microbiologists, laboratory workers and trainees) 
12 Use real-time communication to keep staff well informed, accomplish tasks in an efficient and timely 
manner and to provide a forum to address questions and concerns 
Lessons learned regarding the planning and availability of resources (6 lessons) 
Six lessons describe the optimal planning, availability and funding of resources 
pertaining to specimens and their transport, laboratory resources and manpower to 
manage the outbreak. Planning and distribution should be equitable, fair, measurable 
and be monitored carefully. 
What can we learn from research and practical experience' 79 
Box 4. Lessons learned regarding the planning and availability of resources 
Planning and availability of resources 
1 Ensure trained staff to collect specimens for microbiological testing 
2 Adequate specimen transport is required and be organized before the crisis 
3 Availability of resources for laboratory diagnosis should be adequate including reagents, media, 
capacity for determination and antimicrobial sensitivity testing, laboratory personnel and equipment 
4 Organize a rapid response involving adequately trained and competent staff to supplement existing 
manpower (for instance when shortage occurs due to quarantine of large segments of the work force) 
tailored to the specific needs of specific wards or areas with variable urbanization levels "It seems 
reasonable to have trained non-public health technicians in reserve, much like the armed forces are 
backed up by reserves (31) 
5 Government and local authorities should give commitment and provide resources for staff and other 
expenses to allow for the full execution of outbreak management 
6 Resource planning and distribution should be equitable, fair, and measurable and monitored carefully 
to allow for re-allocation of resources Any deviation for clinical and epidemic control purposes must 
be transparent to the population to ensure accountability 
Discussion 
Our literature review shows that there are many opportunities to improve outbreak 
management. As the outbreaks in the various explored settings and countries pose 
similar problems in terms of response capacity, this review contributes to strengthening 
the current knowledge on how to provide a solid basis for the control measures, how to 
ensure an optimal infrastructure and resources for the execution of the measures, and 
how to implement them in practice taking into account factors related to health 
professionals. The need to improve outbreak management is urgent. Any effort to do so 
should be based on experienced problems and approaches tested, to provide the best 
chance of success Our systematic review of the effectiveness of improvement strategies 
and of the experiences of those involved in past outbreaks reveals a wealth of lessons 
learned. Improving the measures to stop transmission (17 lessons), the outbreak 
management infrastructure (7 lessons), the professionals involved (12 lessons) and the 
necessary resources (6 lessons) as suggested, should significantly facilitate and improve 
future outbreak management. 
Although a thorough improvement of outbreak management would imply 
systematically addressing the whole variety of lessons, we focus on a number of lessons 
that require immediate attention. Firstly, the crisis control measures should be based on 
clear and consistent guidelines, but at the same time, flexible enough to accommodate 
changes derived from new scientific insight or knowledge gained during the crisis. The 
required flexibility extends to the organizations in charge of outbreak control that have to 
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be able to timely communicate relevant policy changes and provide the support for 
implementation for the frontline health care professionals. 
Secondly, communication with health professionals and information of the public are 
crucial. To meet the formidable challenge of providing timely, consistent, comprehensive 
and up-to-date information a broad "advisory public relations coalition of local, regional 
and national disease control professionals" should be built for integrating information 
and effectively communicating to the public.17 Communication should address the 
content of and the rationale for the (preventive) measures, the developments with respect 
to the progression of the outbreak (based on the occurrence of new cases) and the 
answers to "frequently asked questions". 
Thirdly, there is the issue of the adherence to the measures by the health care 
professionals and the need to provide adequate protection to prevent infection. 
Education on appropriate control measures and training on how to use personal 
protective measures have been mentioned by various authors who used a variety of 
strategies such as web based education, simulations and drills. I 6 2 · , 2 f '1 , Combining the 
lessons regarding the effectiveness of education with the lessons learned from experience 
regarding education, simulation might be a more effective method to prepare 
professionals for optimal outbreak management than a more innovative web based 
educational program. Well designed studies comparing the pros and the cons of both 
types of educational strategies have yet to show whether the latter assumption is true. A 
more general conclusion was the need to adapt the activities to the educational needs of 
the professionals. Given the prominent role of education among the experiences with 
outbreak management and the limited evidence of effectiveness of educational strategies, 
more research is needed to design proper strategies targeting various groups of 
professionals and assess their performance in practice. 
Finally, another major lesson of past outbreaks and crises is the emphasis on the 
importance of a proper infrastructure for outbreak management, with clear rules for 
command and control and strong leadership, equipped for taking final decisions under 
time pressure and capable of planning and allocating resources in an equitable and 
transparent manner. 
There are limitations that should be considered in interpreting the results of this 
review. Our literature review was comprehensive but not exhaustive, and it may be 
possible that we have missed relevant papers. The experiences and lessons could have 
been misclassified, although our abstraction process showed good inter-rater reliability. 
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In this review, we have not discussed patients' views with regard to crisis control 
measures. Systematically addressing this issue requires a comprehensive approach in 
which also cultural, behavioral and societal factors should be involved and was 
considered too extensive to fit the scope of this paper 
Despite these limitations, this paper represents the first systematic review of 
improvement strategies and experiences providing numerous lessons for improved 
outbreak management. 
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Appendix 1 : Practical experiences with outbreak management 
Practical experiences with outbreak management: measures to stop transmission 
The crisis advice 
• Government and health officials in Toronto offered differing, and at times conflicting, messages about sources and 
routes of transmission 
• Little or no consistency in the use of PPE and in the delineation of what constituted appropriate staff behaviours 17 
• Canadian guidelines for respiratory protection were different from those recommended by the US Centers for 
Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) The respirators used in the Toronto hospitals, although compliant with 
Canadian public health recommendations, were not NIOSH approved Furthermore, 'fit testing' (the rigorous 
testing of equipment amongst a wide-range of body types) was not recommended as a national standard in 
Canada 17 
• Clear and consistent strategies are required to create safe places ι e quarantine (with hospitals becoming sources 
of SARS transmission and a potential danger to health) " 
• A source of confusion was inconsistency in the definitions of 'probable cases', 'suspect cases', and 'cases under 
investigation' employed by public health officials and the WHO 2 0 
• Recommendations must be unambiguous in order to assure a standardized strategy and clarity, but also flexible 
enough to allow modifications needed for the individual to assure better compliance Compliance with the 
recommendations by local health departments must be assessed in order to either modify the recommendations or 
to improve propagation of the recommendations 2 5 
• Make sure guideline or operation procedure is kept flexible to grow and modify to meet demands instantly if 
necessary as time goes b y 2 e 
• Create a system-wide hospital infrastructure specifically for the control and containment of biological threats 
consisting of consistent policies and procedures providing patient care, maintaining patient and workforce safety, 
monitoring both patients' and workers' movements and recommending disease containment/control priorities 17 
• The CDC guidelines should be straightforward for paramedics participating in a vaccination program ^ 
• Information about whether to wear masks provides an illustration The department of Health continued to state that 
masks were only necessary for those people with respiratory infections or caring for sick people whereas other 
health professionals stated that masks should be worn by everyone at all times 2 6 
• New policies and procedures were developed to deal with drug delivery, decontamination of unit-dose cars, drug 
returns, and drug transfers to meet more stringent infection control precautions Pharmacists assumed 
responsibility for developing guidelines regarding preparation and administration of intravenous and oral ribavirin, 
dosage adjustment in patients with renal impairment, and monitoring This was achieved by performing extensive 
literature searches, communicating directly with the drug manufacturer, and obtaining unpublished 
pharmacokinetic data from the manufacturer In addition, the pharmacists collaborated and shared information with 
pharmacy colleagues at other institutions who were also managing patients with SARS Strategies for pharmacists 
in crisis management situations of communicable disease Develop or revise policies and procedures pertaining to 
the drug delivery system Collaborate to develop emergency preparedness for pharmacy services for potential 
future outbreaks of communicable disease Perform comprehensive literature searches and evaluations on drugs 
that are being used Communicate with drug manufacturers to obtain unpublished information on file Ensure that 
appropriate drug administration and dosing guidelines are available to guide medical, nursing and pharmacy staff 
Prepare a kit containing the necessary information, such as management algorithms, drug dosing and 
administration guidelines, and pharmacist contact numbers, make this kit available in relevant patient care units, 
such as emergency departments and intensive care units 19 
• All staff must be kept apprised of any new or evolving information on policies and procedures pertaining to drug 
delivery, drug guidelines, and protocols Timelines in dissemination of information is crucial, and it is useful to have 
information available both electronically and in print format1 9 
• Build an advisory public relations coalition of local, regional, and national disease control professionals, consisting 
of disease control advisory board to design action plans 17 
• Changing directives isolation protocols, and organizational support are all areas that were identified as 
significantly influenced by the quality of communication Attention to the development of sound and effective 
communication practices -especially in community nursing, where practice is often decentralized-offers promise 
as a fundamental component of emergency planning 1β 
• Nurses must play a crucial role in the prevention, detection and containment of SARS They will need to implement 
and ensure strict adherence to infection control measures and, in some circumstances, isolation and quarantine 
may be warranted Attention to the psychological state of patients and family members should not be overlooked 
Paramount is education of patients, families and members of the public at large 2 6 
What can we leam from research and practical experience7 85 
• Keeping family members informed of both the health status of their relatives and the SARS situation is critical to its 
containment Increasing public awareness of hospital policies (e g visitor restrictions) will help prevent the flow of 
contacts from going beyond caring places into community spaces 17 
Control measures: Designated areas 
• The Standard Operation Procedure (SOP) included 28 
o containment of SARS patients on a special floor and evacuation of the patients from the infected and 
near-around floors,28 
o sorting of the hospital into areas and floors to avoid cross contact of people,28 
o triage of patients into groups according to risks,28 
o closure of the emergency room and outpatient clinics,28 
o set up of an outdoor fever screening station and emergency service 28 
• One of the public hospitals was addressed as the SARS hospital All suspected and probable cases were sent and 
managed there During this period, security at all hospital entrances was stepped up to ensure no lapses in patient 
screening and entry into health care institutions 21 
• A separate dedicated SARS ambulance was set up to transport all non-emergency suspected and probable cases 
the 'SARS hospital' This was a free service with a simple single access number (to reduce the likelihood of cross-
mfection)22 
• All suspected and confirmed cases of SARS were transported to a central hospital22 
• Special areas were designated to for the consultation of cases suspected of SARS 22 
• 123 fever clinics set up in all secondary and tertiairy hospitals 23 
• The management of clinical care needs to be improved In need of redesign are '7 
- initial points of care in receiving patients patient care in these high risk zones must be controlled by a series of 
protocols that delineate appropriate staff behaviours and facilitate precise screening and triage decisions,17 
• Grouping of patients with SARS in the hospital 23 
• The institution of improved triage, limitation of visitors and designated SARS wards likely led to a decrease in in 
hospital exposures 3 
• Designated hospitals had the advantage of ensuring proper infection control practices unidirectional airflow rooms 
and proper patient triage and flow23 
• Health care workers were advised to stay in the hospital staff quarters in order to prevent infecting 
family/community26 
• Doctors and nurses require quarantine when off duty and should therefore be organized and structured in groups 
in advance28 
Control measures: Other 
• The management of clinical care needs to be improved In need of redesign are " 
- stringent techniques are needed to deal proactively with vague symptoms such as fever, fatigue and coughs 
More generally, these techniques include keeping health care providers fully informed of the status of SARS in 
their workplace and in the community,17 
• Diagnosis was impaired by the accuracy of the diagnostic test Ideally, some definitive testing procedures would be 
available 31 
• Some interventions, in retrospect, such as quarantine of low-risk contacts, closing public places fever checks at 
airport, tram stations and roads seemed to have less direct impact in curbing the outbreak 23 
o Screening at points of transportation identified very few cases 23 
o Closing of public schools for more than a months likely had a minimal effect on prevention 23 
• The screening at points of transportation required a large amount of human and financial resources to maintain 
but identified very few cases of SARS Such measures, however, might have prevented SARS cases indirectly by 
persuading symptomatic people to stay home Moreover, these checkpoints assured the local as well as 
international community that proactive steps were being made toward controlling the outbreak23 
• There also has been a reaffirmation of the importance of health promotion that highlights the importance of the 
partnership between nurses, health policy makers and public health personnel26 
Providing information to the public 
• Reporting cumulative cases of SARS rather than changes in the number of new cases gave the appearance that 
the outbreak was spiralling higher when in fact it was ebbing 20 
• A major problem involved the government's use of the term 'voluntary quarantine', because it suggested that 
compliance was at the discretion of each person 20 
• The challenge was in knowing what information was credible enough to provide to the media for public 
consumption given the number of uncertainties at the time The unknown nature of SARS made it necessary to 
differentiate among the numbers of 'suspect' and 'probable' cases This communication strategy seemed to focus 
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on the larger numbers before actually reporting definitive cases There was general concern that the reporting of 
such numbers served to frighten people and would need to be communicated more effectively next time It was 
agreed that the focus should be the known burden of disease and not the accumulated total or suspicious 
interests 2 9 
• Public anxiety about assuring the highest level of safety must be weighed against the individual's right for privacy 
and liberty, which is particularly relevant when it comes to administering quarantine measures but also holds true 
for questions of collecting and forwarding personnel for surveillance purposes 2 5 
• The complexity of having to deal not only with clients but also with the community in general points to the need for 
the education of health professionals and the public alike Concern about public compliance and uncertainty about 
risk management must be met with vigorous enforcement of emergency protocols Health-sector personnel and 
the public must work together to minimize risk 1β 
• Build an advisory public relations coalition of local, regional, and national disease control professionals 
Consisting of public relations unit responsible for integrating information and effectively communicating such 
information to the public 17 
• Any surveillance system must be inextricably tied to a health information system (HIS) that alerts and informs the 
population over radio television, internet websites, and volunteer services for those handicapped or lacking in 
access to available public alert and education systems In fact, experience has shown that the earlier the HIS is 
mobilized, the less chaos and panic will occur Prior arrangements with the media and well-trained public health-
oriented public relations experts with pre-scnpted disease-related messages and prepared responses to a 
'frequently asked questions' library are critical to averting unnecessary use and abuse of healthcare facilities 3 2 
• A weakness in the stakeholder relationships was at the complexity of the federal provincial and local authorities 
clamoring for the most effective attention to the potential new SARS cases arriving in the province from SARS 
infected areas around the world A more integrated approach will be the topic of an aftermath review of the event 
29 
• Systematic strategic planning for outbreaks to include systematic state communications plans for health care31 
• Multiple jurisdictions and levels of government created a plethora of messages, styles, and approaches, despite 
the Provincial Operations Center having lead responsibility for communication, different agencies issued their own 
guidelines for quarantine This led to confusion and some consternation in the public2 0 
• Guidelines for management of an epidemic existed and were used, but strategic community involvement to 
accomplish the guidelines was hampered in some cases3 1 
Uptake of the control measures by the public: quarantine and mass vaccination 
• To improve compliance with quarantine 2 0 
Address concerns about lost income during the period of quarantine 2 0 
Deliver credible and coherent messages to the affected Explaining what quarantine is and convincing people 
of its need are what will influence compliance Viewing quarantine less as a risk communications issue and 
more from the broader perspective of public education may be useful2 0 
Provide supplies and services of daily living 2 0 
Provide psychosocial support, because boredom and stigma could easily undermine compliance 2 0 
• Effective quarantine planning entails a number of vexing issues that require interagency cooperation with a 
jurisdiction 2 0 
variety of quarantine authorities from jurisdiction to jurisdiction and the relationships between federal and 
local quarantine laws2 0 
enforcement20 
maintain critical staffing levels when large segments of the workforce are in quarantine20 
balance in duration of quarantine (safely vs cost and social disruption)20 
monitoring compliance is important for credibility of quarantine20 
• Individual attitude items were highly interrelated, indicating that people who expressed negative attitudes 
regarding safety/efficacy of the vaccine also tended to rate public attitudes as negative, distrust information from 
official sources, anticipate regret following negative outcomes, and perceive significant barriers to uptake of the 
vaccine Therefore it is likely that alterations in individual attitudes/beliefs will have an impact on other 
attitudes/beliefs relating on the MMR vaccine3 0 
• Perceptions of the risks/benefits of immunisation also varied considerably The results suggest that if the MMR 
jab is to be routinely offered in university settings, it may first be necessary to ensure that students are aware of 
the risks/benefits of immunisation Until now, the public health information relating to the MMR jab has been 
mainly aimed at parents of young children University students may not therefore have received sufficient 
information relating to the MMR vaccine 3 0 
• Uptake of the MMR jab was not associated with previous receipt of the vaccine but was associated with 
attitudes/beliefs relating to the vaccine and with perceived individual benefit of the vaccine 3 0 
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• Items relating to benefits of the MMR jab, peer uptake, and barriers to uptake emerged as the most important 
predictors of immunisation decisions 0 
• Public health campaigns are likely to be more effective if they target the psychological factors underpinning 
immunisation decisions Future research utilising health psychology models and adopting prospective longitudinal 
designs would be beneficial3 0 
Practical experiences with outbreak management: infrastructure 
Communication between organizations 
• Create a system-wide hospital infrastructure specifically for the control and containment of biological threats, 
consisting of a direct, transparent and accountable flow of communication amongst disease control officials across 
hospitals and government organizations 17 
• When there were uncertainties about the history, especially of a possible SARS contact, or which hospital to send 
the patient to, paramedics could clarify with the personnel at the control center in SCDF or the emergency 
physician at the receiving hospital Checks were also made with the SARS hotline set up by the Ministry of Health 
through the control room, which had access to patients who were on home quarantine orders (HQO)2 1 
• an emphasis on transparent communication in order to erode the culture of blame and shame To facilitate this, a 
multilevel communications network is essential for dealing with biological threats This includes communication 
from organizations at the macro world level (e g WHO) to the micro-level of individual health care providers 17 
• Strategies for pharmacists in crisis management situations of communicable disease19 Collaborate in sharing 
information with pharmacists at other institutions who are experiencing the same crises Use pharmacists net work 
groups to keep colleagues at other institutions abreast of new information, guidelines and issues 
Disease tracking and data collection system 
• Create a system-wide hospital infrastructure specifically for the control and containment of biological threats 
consisting of a comprehensive disease-tracking and data collection system to collect process data during a 
quarantine assessment phase of suspect cases and to identify possible conversion points to probable cases Such 
a system must include real time processing to clinical sites for data input and analyses These data would 
subsequently be linked to a larger database in central command sites 17 
• Lack of reliable and early detection of bioagents remains the primary weakness in outcome performance The 
MOE most essential for the future remains a measurable, rapid, and sensitive sensor easily deployed and linked to 
a universal surveillance system managed by a central database and monitoring agency that provides instant 
feedback to any clinician 2 
• We found discrepancies between local and national surveillance figures, home quarantine was frequently not 
applied as recommended and the burden on urban health departments was disproportionally higher Flexibility of 
the national surveillance system and surge capacity for the prevention of future epidemics need improvement, 
particularly in urban health departments 
• There is anecdotal evidence that cases were discarded before reporting them to the next level by LHDs, as well as 
by state health departments, although they should have kept the status of a suspect SARS case had the case 
definition been followed correctly Reporting completeness may also have been reduced by the fact that the legal 
framework for including SARS or any other new pathogen in the national surveillance system was unclear, which is 
an experience also shared by other countries There's a need to further improve the capacity and flexibility of the 
electronic reporting system of such unforeseen events2 5 
• Improved surveillance programs in hospitals m response to SARS outbreak should not only be in place in 
previously SARS affected countries but extended worldwide 27 
• Hospital surveillance should be expanded to all respiratory diseases to facilitated early detection of nosocomial 
outbreaks, and this should also include surveillance of all HCW 27 
• Mechanisms were geared more towards monitoring and reporting on the routine emergence of more familiar 
illnesses such as tuberculosis and hepatitis 2 9 
System for monitoring and evaluation 
• SARS or any other respiratory infection may arise at places least expected Regular auditing on wards would 
ensure that infection control practices are maintained 27 
• Create a system-wide hospital infrastructure specifically for the control and containment of biological threats 
consisting of an independent auditing or 'tiger' teams to ensure proper functioning of biological threat processes 
and procedures and to evaluate the quality of such infrastructure at key moments before, during and after its 
mobilization 17 
• The reported lack of coordination among [he many groups of administrators, managers, and providers illustrates 
the dire need for emergency planners to consider the fallout from uncoordinated efforts and untimely or ineffective 
communication 1θ 
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• The next day, the ADH began sending pertussis newsletters to hospital administrators and chiefs of staff with 
instructions to distribute the newsletter lo all physicians on staff No verification process existed to guarantee the 
delivery of these messages They distributed succinct newsletters and press releases to hospitals, which may or 
may not have been distributed to physicians An e-mail newsletter was sent to the 10% to 20% of licensed 
physicians who had e-mail addresses registered with the ADH Although more physicians are likely to have e-mail 
there was no unified way to communicate with them through their professional societies 3 1 
• Supervision of the operation is essential It should be ascertained that people under quarantine are following the 
rules patients staying in the hospital are cared for according to the triaged groups, and that no cross contact 
occurs among the health workers, patients, and visitors It should also be ascertained that all sub-committees are 
functioning as planned and that new unexpected problems are identified This means that a crisis simulation is 
carefully reviewed in advance2 e 
• Monitoring compliance is important for credibility of quarantine20 
Leadership 
• The SARS experience required a complete 'flattening' of the organizational structure within the centre during the 
management of the crisis The decision by the Executive to 'flatten' the hierarchical management structure within 
the organization initially set the tone for establishing a more of a team culture at the centre (culture creativity, 
improvisation, interdisciplinary, collegiahty, ad hoc, organic leadership)29 
• There was no formal command/control structure in place during the first 6 weeks of managing SARS As the 
epidemic advanced, staff realized the need for more order and structure This resulted in the creation of the 
Emergency Operations Centre (EOC) and the attention to multivariable interests In the chaos of the emerging 
knowledge of the new disease it was critical that a daily forum was provided to allow for full review and collective 
support for action planning 2 9 
• The challenge was to answer the question who was in charge during the SARS crisis' The PHO was responsible 
for protecting the residents from SARS, the role of BCCDC was to advise the PHO The cement that seemed to 
hold the rest of the system together most of the time was the collegia! and collaborative relationships that existed 
among BCCDC clinical, scientific and administrative staff, and their colleagues in the other agencies Key external 
stakeholders were the colleagues and institutions that shared information, effective collaboration The strength of 
the relationships between BCCDC and the outside world was critical to the mutual advancement The high degree 
of collaboration was said to have evolved as a consequence of the culture of BCCDC that existed prior to SARS 29 
• Crisis managerial behaviour is the result of how managers channel and distribute the attention of their crisis 
sense 2 e 
• Strong leadership is the key to successful crisis management The condition is usually like general in a battlefield, 
there is no time for consultation, decisions should be made in minutes 2Θ 
• Evidently the minimum management structure was required in order to make things happen within the team culture 
that evolved 29 
Practical experiences with outbreak management: the professionals involved 
Personal protection of health care workers 
• Ergonomie limitations when wearing PPS claustrophobia, an inability to balance when removing equipment, which 
increased the risk of self contamination, and the need to have an easy-to-follow poster of degowning placed on the 
wall to avoid making errors 16 
• The time to put on the personal protection system was prolonged for a group (3!4 to S'/z minutes) in comparison 
with a single healthcare worker (1Vi minutes) This longer time seemed to be due to HCWs and assistants talking 
at the same time to request equipment, and HCWs reaching across each other for equipment This observation 
resulted in a major change to the initial protocol, namely not requiring the wearing of a PPS for defibrillation 16 
• The theme that needed constant attention was that removing the PPS always posed a great danger of self-
contammation Many seemingly simple actions during removal of the pps were more complicated than expected 
and had been inadequately described An example was the difficulty in removing the contaminated outer pair of 
gloves without contaminating the clean inner pair of gloves Most instructions merely instruct one to 'remove the 
gloves'1 6 
• Preventive measures were taken to reduce the heat load on the crew with their full protective clothing This 
including wearing of T-shirts instead of uniforms and ensuring adequate fluid intake 21 
• The nurses felt organizationally supported when management considered their safety concerns and provided them 
with options if clients or situations made them feel unsafe 1β 
• SARS, and any similar situation then, seems to require a set of system-wide safety processes that are capable of 
assigning priorities to potentially different interests (whose safety gets priority patients or caregivers9) health care 
workers become patients as well as potential sources of transmission to the community Nurses, in particular 
found themselves vulnerable to the disease Many caregivers found themselves in the curious position of weighing 
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their own risk of exposure (and, by implication, that of their families) against the well-being of patients A lack of 
consensus emerged between hospitals, with some offering staff the option not to work with SARS patients and, for 
doing so, danger money and other incentives, whilst others expected nurses to carry on working as usual1 
• In practice guaranteeing workplace safety was not always possible, as many health care providers had difficulty in 
maintaining and enforcing behaviours that were consistent with stringent precautions Typically, mistakes were 
made by workers, which exposed them to infection when they were tired because of working long hours (on the 
most affected wards nurses typically worked 12-hour shifts)1 
Psychological impact 
• The establishment of an integrative support network may help health-care workers to negotiate the physical and 
emotional demands of health emergencies such as SARS Some community nurses reported feeling isolated from 
friends, family, and the public and receiving negative comments stemming from people's fear of contracting 
SARS i a 
• Nurses reported feeling exhausted from working extra shifts and concern because of the apparent lack of progress 
in many of their patients The atmosphere in the clinical area was often demoralizing to nurses as they saw 
colleagues, relatives and friends amongst patients in their care To support staff, hospitals established a 
counselling 'hot-line' and provided intensive training and preceptorship programmes for nurses working in ICU 26 
• Boosting morale and managing stress are essential and the curriculum will be revisited to assess the extent to 
which these might be achieved 26 
• Support to students from staff in terms of professional guidance and an opportunity for sharing views and 
experiences about this health care crisis was crucial26 
Adherence to advice 
• Local Health Departments seemed to apply shorter home quarantine periods than recommended, particularly to 
contacts who had professional work obligations The impression was that many LHDs were hesitant to apply home 
quarantine for extended periods of time to professionally active contacts in order to avoid the provision of financial 
compensation 25 
• The ability to expeditiously respond to such an event depends on the state of preparedness of the ED and its staff 
Their ability to adapt rapidly to the changes in working hours, dressing style, as well as functional and structural 
reorganization in the ED, is sine qua non The close surveillance, extra efforts, and full-hearted compliance with 
protocols by everyone played a crucial role in the control of SARS in Singapore 21 
• ED staff perceived some infection control measures to be more effective than others in protecting against the 
spread of SARS 
Perceived as most effective 
- Using negative pressure isolation rooms 
- Wearing a N-95 mask when examining patients 
- Handwashing 
Perceived as least effective 
- Wearing a mask at all times in the ED 
- Cancelling staff meetings and educational sessions 
- Excluding symptomatic staff 
- Wearing a gown at all times in the ED24 
• Perceptions differ among staff physicians, nurses and trainees 24 
• Discordance was found between perceived risk and reported compliance24 
• Concern of SARS as a public health threat appears to be a more important motivating factor than perceived 
effectiveness of infection control measures in promoting compliance among ED medical staff24 
• Nurses and trainees should be reminded to wash their hands more often, especially as they reported less glove 
use24 
• Eye protection was perceived as only moderately effective in protecting against the spread of SARS, and reported 
compliance was correspondingly poor among ED medical staff24 
• There were some reports by field nurses of health care providers who were reluctant to identify a case because of 
treatment and isolation issues 31 
• A major burden was placed on local physicians Local physicians were in charge of recognition, diagnosis, and 
treatment of people in their communities Some physicians were uncomfortable managing pertussis Others 
wanted to confirm the diagnosis before reporting it to the ADH, delaying outbreak containment Some physicians 
declined to prescribe antibiotic prophylaxis because of concern for "saving the antibiotic" or because of lack of 
symptoms in a contact or "serious" symptoms in a patient31 
• Masks became the symbol of the SARS epidemic and the increasing public acceptance and even expectation that 
masks should be worn should become an impetus to increase the willingness of HCW to wear masks 27 
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• Employee health services should proactively and creatively devise delivery systems that enhance compliance with 
vaccination programs for all health care workers 2 7 
Education 
• Simulation was valuable tool for evaluating a new treatment protocol in a novel and rapidly evolving crisis 16 
• Scenario-based simulation training was effective, but resource intense 1 6 
• Simulation should be used to prepare precise protocols for future serious events 16 
• Simulation was suited to teamwork training for disaster management16 
• Develop a biological threat control-and-contamment simulation laboratory for educating health professionals and 
community members in disease control methods A laboratory would consist of 1 7 
real-time simulations involving physical processes surrounding disease control1 7 
- computerized workstations involving hypothetical or virtual simulations of disease control scenarios 17 
• When simulation occurred in a negative-pressure patient room instead of the teaching area, we discovered 
unexpected infection control problems with furniture as well as our lack of a scripted transport protocol to move the 
patient to the ICU For uncommon events, simulation should be done both in the teaching area and the actual 
patient environment16 
• Revision of the current curriculum for nurses E g it is clear that proper protection and observance of strict 
infection control measures are vital A pre-graduation module to review the topics of infection control and universal 
precaution measures (barrier nursing, infection control universal precaution measures and public health) is 
needed 2 6 
• Paramedics and other EMS (emergency medical services) personnel could be a valuable supplement to the public 
health workforce in a situation in which a large-scale vaccination program is needed However, in order for such a 
project to be successful, early preparation, training, and, in some cases, legislative changes, must be implemented 
in advance of the catastrophe As the potential need for large-scale vaccination programs increases, so too, must 
efforts to mobilize and tram the entire healthcare workforce in vaccination procedures ^ 
• Health care providers require ongoing education on the new protocols and standards of practice 17 
• Education and updated information for pharmacists was crucial1 9 
• People who report a low need for training may be more knowledgeable than other workers3 3 
• What is likely to generalize is the existence of individual differences in general interest in training Program 
managers may need to keep these differences in mind when planning voluntary training programs 33 
• Caution should be exercised in the use of generic goals alone to assess worker competence A better approach 
might be to use the generic goals to develop a local plan, than use this more specific plan for assessment33 
• Use of self-assessment to measure knowledge may have serious drawbacks People tend to be poor judges of 
what they know and need to learn A better approach to evaluation might be to supplement self-assessment with 
objective measures, such as drills, exercises, and tests of knowledge 
• With the SARS outbreak, infection control training had to be stepped up immediately The training sessions were 
carried out using a variety of leaching methods such as small-group classroom teaching, demonstration sessions, 
use of videotapes to highlight techniques (such as the donning of personal protective gear and effective hand 
washing), and hands-on practical sessions for mask fitting Mask-fitting sessions had to be carried out for all staff 
to ascertain the best-sized mask for each Hand hygiene practical sessions were supervised to ensure it was 
performed correctly The infection control officer gave briefings to everyone and all this had to be carried out 
rapidly, over a short period, to ensure all personnel had the necessary skills and knowledge early Those who 
failed to comply were given warnings and counselled accordingly Their conduct and practices were then 
monitored by their supervisor The compliance rate was observed to be high among all staff SARS was also 
highlighted during the continuing education sessions for the paramedics, where the clinical presentations, the 
rapidly changing epidemiology, definitions, and risk factors were discussed 2 2 
• Infection control specialist gave compulsory briefings to everyone to reinforce correct and safe practise 2 1 
• Emphasis on training and guidelines on infection control and use of personal protective equipment23 
• 62363 health care workers received training through in person courses, videotapes, and printed materials in the 
management of patients with SARS, infection control, and the use of PPE 2 3 
• Staff physicians and trainees could benefit from further education regarding the importance of infection control 
measures 2 4 
• Record keeping should be emphasized in a vaccination-training program Μ 
• The preparation and training of paramedics to provide vaccinations should include review of clinical knowledge 
and skills necessary to administer a vaccine, pharmacology of the vaccine(s), patient education, and 
recordkeeping ·" 
• Remediation in administration of intramuscular injection would be appropriate for a vaccination-training program M 
» An area of training emphasis that must be included in any program is information about the vaccine, 
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contraindications, and adverse effects Techniques of patient education also may be included 
• If paramedics are being trained as just a standby resource for response to a disaster or terrorism event rather 
than to participate in an on-going community vaccination program, some means of refresher and update training 
must be instituted This could be included m recertification training required by paramedic licensing agencies or 
EMS continuing education This is critical especially as new vaccines and antidotes are developed ^ 
• Ongoing training on droplet precautions and mask-fitting sessions should not only be offered to those highest at 
risk such as HCW, but also to non-frontline workers 2 7 
• In the case of SARS, doctors and nurses directly involved in patient care are at risk for being infected and 
becoming a source of infection and, thus, should be trained beforehand 2 e 
Collaboration/Communication 
• Pharmacists intervened on orders written for nebulized drugs and collaborated with respiratory care practitioners to 
provide appropriate therapy 19 
• The cross-functional team structure present between laboratory and epidemiology was critical to the evolution of 
the process at BCCDC 2 9 
• Build a 'hotline' or real-time communications services for health care workers 17 
• The critical importance of collaboration and communication was clearly demonstrated 19 
Collaborative teamwork with key stakeholders was important in accomplishing tasks in an efficient and timely 
manner1 9 
The success of pharmacists in fulfilling their various roles was possible only through close collaborative 
working relationships with various players in the hospital Such as the infectious disease consultant, 
microbiologists, anaesthesiologist, cardiac arrest committee, and respiratory care practitioner19 
The pharmacy manager must play a key role in relaying information in a timely manner from the corporate 
level to staff Lines of communication with staff members must be kept open throughout the crisis so that they 
feel reassured and free to as questions or discuss issues or concerns 19 
• Many physicians complained about children sent to them with notes from the ADH requesting medications without 
specifics about the situation Administrators reported some tension between private physicians and the ADH who 
work together on an irregular basis Physicians who were uninformed about the outbreak specifics occasionally 
provided conlradiclory recommendations about isolation 3 1 
• Paramedics are in general well trained for response to a disaster or terrorism event M 
Paramedics and other EMS (emergency medical services) personnel could be a valuable supplement to 
the public health workforce in a situation in which a large-scale vaccination program is needed Μ 
It is important to realize that there is more to a vaccination program than administration of the vaccine 
Patient education, informed consent, and monitoring are equally as important, however, these are areas 
in which EMS providers have limited experience and training ^ 
• Nurses musi play a crucial role in the prevention, detection and containment of SARS They will need to implement 
and ensure strict adherence to infection control measures and, in some circumstances, isolation and quarantine 
may be warranted Attention to the psychological state of patients and family members should not be overlooked 
Paramount is education of patients, families and members of the public at large2 6 
• Nurses stated that they were 'the last to know' about possible SARS exposures in hospitals, indicating that their 
pleas to uphold stringent precautionary measures went unheeded as health officials relaxed strict infection control 
practices in May 2003 " 
• Strategies for pharmacists in crisis management situations of communicable disease'9 Maintain collaborative 
working relationships and communication with the key players, such as the medical microbiologist Keep staff well 
informed through frequent e-mail communications, ad-hoc meetings, and the intranet provide a forum to address 
questions and concerns ensure that pharmacists and physicians know how to access drugs during off-hours, 
secure supply chain of such drugs 
• Key scientific personnel at BCCDC were required lo assume high profile roles of managing a polentially pandemic 
outbreak of an unknown disease as well as dot their research The fact that they were not sure of their 
understanding of the situation on occasions added further tot the complexity of their role as public communicators 
Their responsibilities during the SARS episode required all staff members to have multilevel roles across several 
emergency operations items2 9 
Practical experiences with outbreak management: resources and funding 
Planning and availability of resources 
• Systematic specimen transport is required and should be planned 3 1 
• Equipment would also need to be updated to provide adequate support for the technical reserves as well Providing 
adequale molecular laboratories in all state health departments with common technical support through the CDC or 
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other central laboratory would avoid this obstacle Material support needs to be coordinated as well, since media 
was in short supply for bacterial cultures in this outbreak and one could well imagine shortages of other reagents for 
any testing method 3 1 
Another issue is the determination of antimicrobial sensitivity Bioterronst-released microbes may be engineered to 
be drug resistant If so, central laboratories for testing must be available 3 ' 
Security and development capacity for vaccines and antimicrobial agents 3 1 
The non-specific clinical diagnosis, unreliability of testing methods, excessive number of samples, unavailability of 
reagents, inadequate transport system, laboratory personnel, and equipment all impeded effective diagnosis 3 
Maintain critical staffing levels when large segments of the workforce are in quarantine 2 0 
Create a system-wide hospital infrastructure specifically for the control and containment of biological threats 
consisting of rapid response to supplement existing manpower17 
The already limited number of ICU-trained nurses meant that nurses from general wards had been deployed to work 
in these high-technology units even without ICU training and experience Nurses' deployment created more work for 
the ICU nurses who already had a heavy workload taking care of SARS victims and mentoring these nurses 
However, the deployed nurses, although willing to help out, remained anxious about their competency to work in 
I C U 2 6 
Many rural areas did not have staff trained to collect specimens or the equipment to test for pertussis by culture, 
PCR, or DFA For example, many health workers were not allowed to collect nasopharyngeal specimens by state 
regulation until they received specific training 3 1 
The downside was that key individuals were on duty 15 or more hours a day over a 6-week period These 
conditions resulted in fatigue 29 
Under the stress of large numbers of samples, however, its sensitivity and specificity waned as tired or less trained 
eyes were called on to review these subjective test results 3 1 
During a bioterronst attack, technicians would be taxed with large numbers of clinical samples It seems reasonable 
to have trained non-public health technicians in reserve, much like the armed forces are backed up by reserves31 
Nurses in rural areas were overwhelmed with case identification, follow-up, and the associated paperwork31 
The regular staff of the ACH microbiology laboratory worked overtime and the part-time staff worked full time and 
$14550 in overtime wages was expended 3 1 
A new fluorescent microscope had to be purchased 3 1 
Increase in the number of biohazard disposable bags and bins 2 1 
The cost of the training program was substantial This would include time for the dedicated educators, costs for 
educational materials and costs of the non-reusable equipment In addition we needed to assistants and this project 
monopolized the high-fidelity simulator, excluding its use by others 1δ 
Government and institutional resource allocation must allow for the full execution of emergency planning if we are to 
achieve the goal of a 'seamless public health system' ' e 
Political leaders must give a clear commitment to the local public health service that sufficient resources for staff 
and other expenses will be provided for the prevention and control of such public health emergencies 2 5 
A timeline for management of resources is a necessity to provide order to decisions, especially logistics, before they 
unfold This includes availability of consumable supplies and maintenance of an organizational structure that 
provide functional capability and capacity over time Resources include hospital and outpatient professionals and 
administrative personnel, detection devices, barrier devices, laboratory resources, pharmaceuticals, ventilators, 
emergency department and hospital beds, intensive care unit beds, morgue storage capacity, augmentation 
facilities and personnel, and volunteers A MOE essential to a bioterronsm event would be monitoring and 
measuring the capability and capacity of the management response system to appropriately distribute resources 
across the entire cohort of the vulnerable population 3 2 
Distribution of management resources must be equitable, fair, and measurable Any deviation (variance) for clinical 
and epidemic control purposes must be transparent to the population and appropriately reflected in the health 
information system (HIS)3 2 
Systematic strategic planning for outbreaks to include adequate federal support for diagnosis and testing, 
systematic state communications plans for health care, and municipal providers with backups and reserve staff for 
periods of transition and crisis,31 
Ascertain quantity and quality of material supply, hardware structure, and the human power28 
Because of a national shortage, Arkansas restricted use of the diphtheria and tetanus toxoids with acellular 
pertussis (DTaP) vaccine in children and delayed vaccinations 31 
The need to be most effective in preventing or controlling the public health emergency must be balanced with the 
Part II. Good scientific advice in crises: the perspectives 
of experts and patients 

"Oui ^tiategy had not changed, but wìieiea^ yesterday it had obviously failed, today it seemed tiiuinpliaiit 
Indeed, one\ ünef ιιιιγιespion urns tìiat the ei>ideiiiic had called a retreat aftei leaching all its objective*, 
it had, so to speak, mhieved its pin pose" 
A Camus The Plague 
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Abstract 
Outbreaks of communicable diseases have occurred since the early days of mankind. 
During the past decades, some outbreaks have developed into national or international 
crises and have made news headlines. Because of the complexity and unpredictability 
involved in managing crises, authoritative guidelines on control measures are needed in 
order to support decisions taken by doctors and policymakers. Quality criteria for crisis 
guidelines are lacking. We identified criteria to define crisis situations and to develop 
crisis guidelines through a literature review and validated them within an international 
RAND-modified consensus procedure. 37 Panelists from 21 countries participated in the 
panel.. The 34 consensus criteria provide a systematic tool to describe a crisis and to 
develop scientific guidance on control measures irrespective of the infectious agent and 
the health care system in place, to make sure that no important step has been overlooked. 
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Introduction 
Outbreaks of communicable diseases have occurred since the early days of mankind 
Such outbreaks demand proper handling Within the past decades, crises due to 
communicable disease have often made news headlines Managing public health crises 
like SARS' ', influenza pandemic46 or bioterrorism™ differs considerably from the daily 
practice of communicable disease control and requires timely public health actions by 
healthcare professionals, policymakers and administrators Many uncertainties also have 
to be addressed - adding to the complexity of the situation Such crises are difficult to 
predict, as well as their development over time9 and their impact on public health 
Because of the complexity and unpredictability involved in managing crises, 
authoritative guidance on control measures is needed in order to support decisions taken 
by doctors and policymakers 
Outbreak control measures aim mainly at identifying cases, interrupting transmission 
to contacts (by isolation, immunization and chemoprophylaxis, precautions for contacts) 
and promoting health education To be effective, guidance on control measures must be 
comprehensive and detailed enough to be implemented in practice In reality, however, 
expert committees m charge of scientific guidance are not always directly involved in the 
practical implementation m the field, where the patients are seen and the outbreak needs 
to be dealt with There are no well established, widely accepted criteria that define the 
context of crises m which scientific guidance is needed Equally, there is no consensus on 
the essential components of such scientific guidance As scientific guidance has to be 
provided under high time pressure, systems and instruments must be put in place in 
order to avoid omissions and to prevent disasters Comparing this process to that of the 
development of clinical guidelines, it is clear that different procedures are needed 
Whereas for clinical recommendations comprehensive literature searches and analysis of 
evidence can be performed10, followed by public conferences - a process that might take 
up to 18 months" - in emergencies the best possible outbreak control guidance (that is 
based on scarce knowledge) has to be provided in a very short time and implemented 
immediately and uniformly Quality criteria to ensure optimal development and 
implementation of scientific guidance into action in the field are lacking 
In this paper, we present an international expert consensus on quality criteria for 
guidelines on outbreak control during crises 
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Methods 
From the various instruments developed for clinical guidelines12 u, we selected AGREE, 
an instrument based on a multinational framework of researchers and policymakers, as a 
basis for developing the criteria (www agreecollaboration org) 10 To the 23 generic items 
from AGREE we added crisis specific items The crisis specific items were identified 
through a search in Medline The framework included 77 draft criteria 
Search strategy and selection criteria 
The crisis specific items were identified by searching Medline for relevant articles We 
search the period from January Ί985 to September 2006 using the free terms "crisis" and 
"disease outbreaks" combined with the MeSH terms "disease outbreaks" and 
"organization and administration" We selected articles containing (1) descriptions of 
structures for providing outbreak management guidance, (2) evaluation of outbreak 
control procedures and (3) lessons or experiences with the public health management of 
outbreaks leading to national or international crises The search yielded 92 English 
written articles, of which 15 were included, on the basis of the selection criteria We also 
reviewed the reference lists of the included papers 
The draft criteria were submitted for validation in a 2-round multinational consensus 
procedure based on the RAND/UCLA appropriateness method", carried on between 
October 2006 and March 2007 The consensus panel comprised 37 experts from 21 
countries (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Estonia, Germany, Ireland, Latvia, Malta, the 
Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, UK, Czech 
Republic, Luxembourg, Lithuania, Singapore, China) and one expert from WHO Europe 
Eligibility for the panel was defined by two criteria The first criterion was holding a 
position of authority within national communicable disease control in a European 
country and being the representative of the country to the European Centre for Disease 
Prevention and Control (ECDC) The second criterion was demonstrated experience with 
control measures regarding SARS and avian influenza that had resulted in peer reviewed 
publications The experts were approached and invited to provide their personal expert 
view on the appropriateness of the draft criteria by rating each criterion on a 9-point 
Likert scale, ranging from 1 (completely disagree) to 9 (completely agree) Space was 
available for written remarks Panelists completed two rounds A summary of the 
findings of each round and the final results were fed back to each participant1", together 
with their own scores, the distribution of the scores from other panelists and the median 
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score. Criteria judged face valid and reliable (i.e. median of 8 or 9, without disagreement) 
after the two consensus rounds were included in the final set. (table 1) The concordance 
between panel members was measured for each criterion, by measuring the agreement 
distance (technical appendix). 
Table 1. Measurement of the validity, reliability and concordance of the final criteria 
Criterion 
Validity and reliability Median of 8-9, without disagreements 7). 
Disagreement 1/3 or more scores in the bottom (1-3) or in the top (6-9) tertile (10) 
Concordance Agreement distance, for each median and each number of panellists (technical 
appendix) 
Results 
Characteristics of crisis situations 
Some outbreaks have the potential to develop into crises that can disrupt the functioning 
of the healthcare system and even affect the whole society^. Our panel reflected on the 
criteria that characterize such situations and reached consensus on the most important 
features of crises. According to our consensus panel, crises requiring authoritative 
guidance at international and national level, primarily involve: severe clinical disease 
with high case-fatality rate, emerging pathogens and scarcity of knowledge and 
uncertainty concerning diagnostic algorithms, therapeutic options and prophylaxis. 
Furthermore, threats perceived as serious by professionals which may spread 
internationally and lead to economical loss also require uniform, national guidance. Each 
potential crisis should be assessed in order to decide whether national authoritative 
guidance is needed. Doctors sitting in national expert committees can use these criteria to 
assess the characteristics of a crisis and determine the need for national guidance. The 
overview of the main characteristics of crises is presented in Table 2. 
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Table 2. Characteristics of crises requiring uniform, national scientific guidance. Final validity 
ratings for the context criteria. Criteria with a median of 8 or higher were selected for the 
final set. Concordance classification was based on the agreement distance AD and the 
number of panelists who replied to this item 
Item 
severe disease (high case-fatality rate) 
new or emerging disease (previously unknown) 
new knowledge needed 
sudden, unexpected disease 
high number of cases involved 
uncertainty about the effect of treatment or prophylaxis 
no treatment or prophylaxis available 
uncertainty about laboratory diagnosis 
disease is perceived as serious threat by professionals 
consensus is needed among professionals 
economic implications 




























Essential components of guidelines for outbreak control in crises 
Crisis guidelines need to be developed under extremely high time pressure and taking 
into account numerous uncertainties. Because a variety of health professionals have to 
work according to these guidelines and the risk of omissions is high, crises guidelines 
have to be developed in such a way that they contain all essential information leading to 
a medical decision available at that very moment. 
Our panel reached consensus on 8 essential criteria considered valid and reliable, all 
with moderate to excellent concordance. Scientific guidance should include general 
information on the disease itself, the (public) health problems to be dealt with, the risk 
groups to which measures should apply, including a clear case definition of cases, the 
consequences, health benefits, side effects, risks, and uncertainties of the control 
measures. In addition, the expected effect of the best-case and worst-case scenario 
regarding the measures should be considered. (Table 3) 
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Table 3. Content of scientific guidance: "what should it contain?". Final validity ratings. Criteria 
with a median of 8 or higher were selected for the final set. Concordance classification was 
based on the agreement distance AD and the number of panelists who replied to this item 
Item Median Classification 
concordance 
describe severity and transmissibihty 9 excellent 
describe uncertainties regarding the risk of the occurrence of the disease/threat 9 excellent 
describe the potential impact of the occurrence of the disease (economical, 9 excellent 
political, media) 
describe the public health issues covered (what are the public health risks?) 9 excellent 
describe the patients (risk groups) to whom the measures are meant to apply 9 excellent 
(including the case definition) 
consider the health benefits, side effects and risks of advised control measures 9 excellent 
consider the degree of uncertainty that the measures hold 8 excellent 
consider the effect of the best-case scenario and worst-case scenario and the 8 moderate 
grey area in between 
Quality critera for the guideline development process 
Good scientific guidelines include models (experiences) from other countries with 
comparable threats and a description of the procedure for revision based on the 
anticipation of possible developments during the crisis. The development process is 
transparent to the readers; the criteria for including evidence and linking evidence found 
to the advised measures are described and dissident minority view points reflecting 
conflicting interpretations of the chosen control measures and, thus disagreement 
between the members, are acknowledged in the minutes. The outbreak committee 
providing guidelines should always include public health physicians, clinicians, 
microbiologists and communication specialists. (Table 4) 
Table 4. Development procedure and group composition. Final validity ratings. Criteria with a 
median of 8 or higher were selected for the final set. Concordance classification was based 
on the agreement distance AD and the number of panelists who replied to this item 
Item 
descnbe criteria for selecting (including/excluding) evidence 
include link between measures and supporting evidence 
include models (experiences) from other countries, when available 
describe the procedure for revision based on the anticipation of possible 
developments during the crisis 
include dissident minority view points reflecting disagreement between the 
members (in the minutes) 
separate the scientific committee (team) from the decision committee 
disclose names, disciplines and expertise of the members 
Obligatory include the following competencies 
• public health physicians 
• clinicians and microbiologists 
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Minimal requirements for implementation of the outbreak control guidelines in 
crisis 
Four criteria were selected, one with good and three with poor concordance (Table 5). In 
order to make crisis guidelines work in practice, communication and dissemination 
strategies should be considered by the outbreak committee, together with tools for 
application. The responsibilities of healthcare professionals involved in the outbreak 
control should be clearly defined in the outbreak control guidance. Poor concordance of 
the raters, defined by a large agreement distance, was found for criteria on 
implementation such as strategies for the communication of measures and allocation of 
responsibilities. Elaborating strategies for communicating control measures to the public 
and to professionals is time consuming. Criteria for implementation that require 
preparation and time seem to be considered by some panelists as less important in crisis 
situations when pressure is high and measures are urgently expected. And here lies one 
of the main problems during crises. When optimal and detailed communication to 
professionals and public about the available technical information on the disease and on 
the control measures lacks and responsibilities are not made clear for various 
organizations and agencies involved, frontline physicians and other health professionals 
are likely to be faced with difficulties in providing adequate care. This has been brought 
up recently during the current influenza pandemic. In an editorial on the management of 
the A/H1N1 pandemic in the UK, Anderson19 points out the need to develop more 
detailed guidelines addressing communication, collaboration between organizations, 
logistics, and to monitor effects of and compliance with the measures. 
Table 5: Implementation. Final validity ratings. Criteria with a median of 8 or higher were selected 
for the final set. Concordance classification was based on the agreement distance AD and 
the number of panelists who replied to this item 
Item 
provide support tools for application in practice 
provide strategies to communicate the control measures to the public 
provide strategies to disseminate the control measures to professionals 













We present a set of 34 essential quality criteria for the guidance of outbreak control in 
crises. The need to formalize the procedures of scientific guidance has also been 
recognized by various national and international agencies and organizations and has 
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resulted in (draft) documents regarding requirements for scientific advice issued by, for 
instance, the EMEA, the EFSA2021, and the FDA (www.fda.gov/oc/advisory). They reflect 
the key role that expert committees hold in providing advice to policymakers. 
Nevertheless, none of these documents contains so far a comprehensive overview of all 
domains of scientific guidelines, starting with the analysis of the context of a (public 
health) problem or crisis and ending with the implementation of the advised measures. 
Our set of criteria, built within an international consensus panel of key experts, 
overarches various domains of outbreak management, from the recognition of crises, to 
the identification of measures that work and the criteria for successful implementation, 
within one quality system. 
When the rigour of methodology and group composition are carefully designed, 
consensus procedures have been found useful for studies of quality indicators222^ and are 
structurally used by the National Institutes of Health (NIH), in the Consensus 
Development Program, to provide evidence-based assessments of complex medical 
issues (www.consensus.nih.gov)11. This study has limitations related to the calculation of 
validity and reliability in consensus panels, which has encountered criticism2''2i'27. Others 
argue that these two quantitative concepts should be supplemented by qualitative criteria 
like: credibility, applicability, consistency and confirmability when interpreting results of 
consensus panels28. In our study, credibility and acceptability2930 of the panel and 
applicability of the results to Western countries in general were ensured by 
representatives from many countries throughout Europe, two countries in Asia and from 
the WHO. We decided to include in the final set the criteria which were found both valid 
and reliable (with a median of 8 or higher). These can be considered as essential 
requirements when scientific guidance in crises needs to be issued. In order to improve 
evaluation of reliability, we calculated the AD and quantified the concordance between 
panelists, to allow a better understanding of the judgement and of the rating differences 
within the panel. The calculation of the AD confirmed a high degree of concordance 
between the panelists regarding most items. Nevertheless, we were able to show poor 
concordance in some items which will require extra attention when measuring the 
performance of the instrument during a real crisis in the future. 
We have developed a set of criteria for scientific guidance in outbreak situations, 
which can be applied as a 'template' (checklist), irrespective of the nature of the 
infectious agent. Firstly, the template provides health professionals and policymakers 
with a systematic tool to recognize a crisis. Secondly, it helps expert committees to 
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develop scientific guidance - taking into account epidemiological, laboratory, clinical and 
public health features of a disease Thirdly, it contains criteria for the rigor of 
development and the composition of the guidance committee Finally, it sums up the 
basic requirements for implementation in daily practice For the physicians who act as 
experts in outbreak committees, it provides a systematic quality frame to ensure that no 
important step has been overlooked For the patients to whom the control measures 
apply, it acts as a guarantee that the process of scientific advice is reliable, precise and 
transparent More research is needed to measure the performance of the template as a 
quality instrument to facilitate the development of good scientific guidance to inform 
decision making by doctors and policymakers in crisis situations 
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Technical appendix: Methodology for calculating the agreement distance 
and classifying concordance between raters, for a given median 
The agreement distance was calculated for each median and each number of panelists 
per item, taking into account the dispersion of the ratings. The distance d of all ratings 
of Ρ panelists from their median rating M was calculated by the 
iormula-.d = ^ i JM - rk\ whereby m is the rating of panelist k. Maximum concordance 
is given by a very small distance. If all raters fully agree on a rating, the distance is 
zero. The cumulative distribution Cu(d)for each median M was calculated by 
summing up the relative frequencies of all possible distances. Cu(d)is the probability 
that a rating with an equally good or even smaller distance from the median can be 
obtained if all panelists make random choices. If this value is very small, then there is a 
very small chance of obtaining such a high agreement by chance alone. For practical 
reasons, we have classified the concordance of rating into the categories "excellent", 
"good", "moderate" and "poor". In order to obtain this classification, we randomly 
selected 25 real world ratings which had been rated by at least 33 panelists (i.e. we 
were dealing with slightly different values for P). The agreement of the selected ratings 
was first classified by sorting the statements into four categories. Then, for each 
statement, the median M and the distance d were calculated, and Cu(d) was read from 
the corresponding theoretical cumulative distribution. Comparison between the first 
classification and the obtained Cu(d) values allowed us to define the following cut-off 
points which were later applied to the data set of all real world ratings The technical 
appendix describing the method in details is available from the authors. 
Classification of the concordance 
obtained result 
iog10 (:„(</)<-6 
- 6 <log l 0 <:„(£/)<-3.85 





-1.9 < log,,, C„ (d) poor concordance 

"Wìmt\ natural zs the microbe All the rest-heath, integrity, purity (if you like)-is a pioduct of the human 
will, of a vigilance that mu^t nevei falter The good man, the man who infects hardly anyone, is the man 
who has thcfexpest lapses of attention 
A Camus The Plague 
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Abstract 
Background Communicable disease crises can endanger the health care system and often 
require special guidelines Understanding reasons for nonadherence to crisis guidelines is 
needed to improve crisis management We identified and measured barriers and 
conditions for optimal adherence as perceived by 4 categories of health care 
professionals 
Methodb In-depth interviews were performed (N=26) to develop a questionnaire for a 
cross-sectional survey of microbiologists (100% response), infection preventionists (74% 
response), public health physicians (96% response), and public health nurses (82% 
response) The groups were asked to appraise barriers encountered during 4 outbreaks 
(severe acute respiratory syndrome [SARS], Clostridium difficile nbotype 027, rubella, and 
avian influenza) according to a 5-point Likert scale When at least 33% of the responders 
filled in ' strongly agree , "agree ' or ' rather agree than disagree ', a barrier was defined as 
"often experienced The common ("generic' ) barriers were included in a univariate and 
multivariate model Barriers specific to the various groups were also studied as well 
Resîi/fs Crisis guidelines were found to have 4 generic barriers to adherence (1) lack of 
imperative or precise wording, (2) lack of easily identifiable instructions specific to each 
profession, (3) lack of concrete performance targets, and (4) lack of timely and adequate 
guidance on personal protective equipment and other safety measures The cross-
sectional study also yielded profession-specific sets of often experienced barriers 
Conclusions To improve adherence to crisis guidelines, the generic barriers should be 
addressed when developing guidelines, irrespective of the infectious agent Profession-
specific barriers require profession-specific strategies to change attitudes, ensure 
organizational facilities, and provide an adequate setting for crisis management 
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Introduction 
In outbreak situations that endanger the health care system, outbreak control measures 
must be initiated promptly to prevent further transmission of the pathogen. In such 
situations, authoritative guidance is needed. Countries all over the world have 
established their own structures to disseminate outbreak control guidelines and, if 
necessary, put outbreak control systems in place. In a crisis, health care professionals 
with diverse backgrounds need to work quickly together to identify cases, perform 
laboratory diagnostics, trace contacts, and institute infection prevention and control 
measures as described in the outbreak control guidelines1. Optimal compliance with the 
guidelines, with timely and adequate outbreak control as final outcome, requires good 
adherence by professionals. Unfortunately, however, their adherence is often not 
optimal2 ' due to knowledge, attitudes, and behaviour among professionals67 as well as to 
organizational and other factors. Guidelines are not always clear, and existing facilities 
are not always adequate or adaptable to the sudden intrusion of crisis measures. A 
systematic review conducted by Cabana et al.8, revealed a variety of barriers that hinder 
adherence. The authors provide a generic framework for exploring barriers in various 
settings. According to the authors, barriers to adherence include those related to the 
professionals, with a more cognitive (knowledge, awareness) or affective (attitude, 
motivation) component, those related to the guidelines (their content and target patient 
population), and those related to the environment (organization, social setting).8 Many 
studies have looked at determinants of adherence to guidelines in the routine care of 
infectious disease914, but little is known about determinants of adherence to guidelines in 
crisis situations1516. 
Crisis situations differ significantly from routine communicable disease control, 
because health professionals must respond with prompt decisions, uniformity of action, 
and quick integration of new knowledge and skills. Furthermore, the context of crisis 
situations is complex, requiring optimal communication and co-operation between public 
health services and hospitals. A better understanding of the reasons for non-adherence of 
health care professionals in crises situations is needed to improve crisis management. 
Identification of generic and profession-specific barriers can lead to customized strategies 
designed to make guidelines work. 
In this study, we assessed reasons for non-adherence (barriers) among key 
professionals in outbreak control in crisis situations: consultant microbiologists, infection 
preventionists, public health physicians, and public health nurses. We identified the 
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generic and profession-specific priorities that need to be addressed to improve adherence 
to outbreak control guidelines 
Methods 
This is a cross-sectional study using questionnaires tailored to 4 groups consultant 
microbiologists (M), infection preventiomsts (IP), public health physicians (PHP), and 
public health nurses (PHN) Each group's questionnaire was designed based on in-depth 
interviews with professionals in that group 
Questionnaire development 
In-depth interviews lasting 1-1 5 hours were performed with 26 health care professionals 
(14 men and 12 women M, n=7, IP, n=7, PHP, n=6, PHN, n=6) All had been actively 
involved in one or more of 4 recent crisis situations due to infectious outbreaks in the 
Netherlands severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS), Clostridium difficile nbotype 027, 
rubella, and avian influenza AI/H7N7 172" The participants working experience averaged 
15 ± 4 years for Ms, 14 ± 8 for IPs, 15 ± 5 for PHPs, and 10 ± 3 for PHNs 
For each of the 4 crises, an overview of control measures issued by the national 
outbreak management team (OMT) was provided before our interviews to facilitate recall 
by the professionals They were then asked to identify barriers they had experienced 
during the outbreaks as to case finding, infection prevention and control, laboratory 
testing, and contact tracing Sampling and interviewing continued until saturation was 
reached, that is, no new items were identified 
Conducted from January through March 2007 by three investigators (AT, DV and FW), 
the interviews were audiotaped and transcribed verbatim During the study, data 
collection was validated at intervals by discussion among the interviewers The content of 
the tapes was analyzed by two investigators independently (AT and MH) to construct an 
overview The investigators extracted the barriers and categorized them under 3 main 
headings, according to the validated framework to standardize obstacle reporting of 
Cabana et al8 "knowledge/attitude," "guidelines," and "organization/social setting " 
Interviews elicited a different number of barriers for each profession 37 items for Ms, 25 
items for IPs, 30 items for PHPs, and 38 items for PHNs Details are available on request 
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Cross-sectional study 
Using the barrier overviews, questionnaires were designed for each profession These 
instruments requested response to each listed barrier, using a 5-point asymmetric Likert 
scale (strongly agree, agree, rather agree than disagree, disagree, strongly disagree) The 
questionnaires were administered to the PHPs and PHNs at public health services 
(September-November 2007), IPs at hospitals (January-March 2008), and Ms in various 
settings (February-April 2008) To cover the entire country, we requested that 
questionnaires be returned by at least one PNP and PHN from each of 33 public health 
services and by at least one IP from each of 94 hospitals Because most microbiologists 
work m practices serving more than one hospital and/or public health service, we 
selected a nationwide sample of 30 practices to complete the questionnaire 
Analysis 
Data from questionnaires were analyzed using SPSS version 15 for Windows (SPSS Ine, 
Chicago, IL) For each barrier and for each profession, descriptive statistics were 
obtained For the analysis of questionnaires, the answers given in the 5-point scale were 
dichotomized to enable division between "yes" (barrier experienced) = strongly 
agree/agree/rather agree than disagree with the proposed barrier and "no" (barrier not 
experienced) = disagree/strongly disagree We considered a barrier to be "often 
experienced" when at least 33% of the participants had experienced it These barriers 
were included in the final overviews 
Generic or common barriers were those recognized by at least three categories of 
professionals These barriers were included in univariate and multivariate logistic models 
to assess the differences among the groups and the impact on barriers of selected 
variables, including profession, sex, years of working experience in communicable 
disease control, number of working days/week, and number of crises experienced We 
predicted the probability of whether or not the barrier was experienced in practice in the 
logistic regression model Statistical significance was defined by ρ < 05 
Results 
The questionnaires were returned by 45 PHPs, representing 32 public health services 
(96%), 37 PHNs, representing 27 public health services (82%), 100 IPs representing 70 
hospitals (74%), and all 30 Ms that we approached (100%) Table 1 summarizes the 
characteristics of the participants 
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Generic barriers 
Seven barriers that hamper adherence to outbreak control guidelines were identified by 
at least 3 categories of professionals (Table 2) and were analyzed in univariate and 
multivariate logistic model. Significant differences were found between the professions 
regarding the answers given in the cross-sectional study with respect to three barriers. 
Four of the 7 barriers were rated as equally often experienced. In the view of the 
respondents, adherence to outbreak control guidelines is low when the following factors 
apply: 
1. There are no concrete targets for performance, to measure the effectiveness of the 
measures 
2. Control measures are worded with insufficient urgency or definition; 
3. Crucial instructions within control measures (concerning isolation, diagnostics, and 
treatment) are not clear or easily identifiable for each profession; 
4. Measures regarding the use of personal protection equipment (PPE) are inadequate 
and not timely. 
Table 1. Characteristics of the study participants 
Sex 
Working experience, years 
Number of crises 
experienced 















































































IP infection preventiomsts 
PHP public health physicians 
PHN public health nurses 
Profession, sex, age, number of working days/week, and the number of crises 
experienced did not influence professionals' opinion regarding these barriers. In 
multivariate analysis, however, the number of years of working experience was 
significantly associated with 2 barriers (Table 2). 
Table 2. The rating of common barriers per group of professionals (% answers "strongly agree/agree/rather agree than disagree with the 
proposed barrier") and the results of the multivariate analysis 
Barrier M, % IP, % PHP, % PHN, % 
Attitude 
Control measures are inconvenient to 
apply in hospital or public health setting 82 8 64 2 48.9 56 8 
There are no concrete targets for 
performance of the control measures 82 7 75.7 711 η a. 
Guideline 
Control measures are not sufficiently 
tailored to the patient population 72 4 72 6 28 9 64.8 
Control measures are worded with 
insufficient urgency or definition 58.6 51.0 50 9 64 9 
Crucial instructions within control 
measures concerning isolation, 
diagnostics, and treatment are not clear or 
easily identifiable for each profession 82.7 77 8 77.7 η a 
Control measures regarding the use of 
personal protection equipment (PPE) are 
not timely and adequate 53 5 67 8 77 8 64.8 
Organization 
Responsibilities for diagnosis and infection 
control are not clarified 6 7 76 9 57 8 86.5 
* X^ test 
NA not applicable (barrier not identified by this group) 
Multivariate analysis of the common barriers 
adjusted OR ( 95 % CI) 
P-value' Years of working Sex No. of working Experience 
experience days/week with crises 
0.026 0 7 (0 3-1.4) 0 9 (0 4-2.0) 0.8 (0 5-13) 10 (0 9-1.2) 
0 52 1 5 (0 7-3 4) 1 2 (0 5-3 0) 0 6 (0 4-1 2) 0.9 (0.7-3 4) 
0.0001 10(0 5-2 0) 2 0(0 9^18) 0 9(0 6-1.5) 0.9(0 8-1.1) 
0 42 1 4 (0 7-2 7) 1 3 (0.6-2.8) 0 9 (0.6-1 5) 0 9 (0 8-1 1 ) 
0 84 2 7(11-6 3)* 0.9(0.3-2 7) 17(0 9-3 2) 0 9(07-11) 
0 19 2 1(1.1-4 3)* 0 9(0 4-2.1) 0.9(0 6-15) 10(0 8-12) 
0 0001 14(07-31) 11(04-28) 06(03-10) 10(08-13) 
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Compared with professionals with more working experience, those with less experience 
gave more importance to easily identifiable crucial recommendations on isolation, 
diagnostics, and treatment significantly (odds ratio [OR], 2.68, 95% confidence interval 
[CI], 1.17-6.34) and the need for timely and adequate information on PPE and other safety 
precautions (OR, 2.17; 95% CI, 1.12-4.37). 
Microbiologist-specific barriers 
Of the 37 barriers extracted from in-depth interviews and used in the questionnaire for 
microbiologists, 20 (54%) were experienced by at least 33% of the group. Microbiologists 
reported higher adherence to control measures when they are directly alerted by the 
national OMT (83%) and when they receive a personal copy of the control guidelines 
(86%). For these professionals, the scientific basis for the measures was important (60%). 
They also acknowledged the need for follow-up by the OMT and readjustment of the 
guidelines based on new developments or newly generated evidence during the crisis 
(83%). According to these professionals, setting-related factors that improve adherence to 
control measures include the availability of adequate cohorting and isolation facilities 
(83%), familiarity of hospital clinicians with the outbreak control and diagnostic 
guidelines (73%), and a leading role for microbiologists in the dissemination of guidelines 
to clinicians and IPs (83%) (Table 3). 
IP-specific barriers 
Of the 25 barriers to adherence identified by IPs, 18 (72%) were experienced by at least 
33% of the respondents. Like the microbiologists, the IPs predicted improvement if they 
were alerted directly by the OMT at the beginning of a crisis (70%) and received a 
personal copy of the guidelines (78%). As particular problems, they emphasized lack of 
OMT follow-up during progression of a crisis (70%), lack of concrete targets for 
performance (76%), and perceived delay in OMT communication of risks to local 
hospitals (68%). The IPs requested easily identifiable crucial instructions on infection 
prevention and control that IPs need to follow (78%), timely guidance on appropriate 
PPE (64%), and clear responsibilities regarding diagnosis and infection prevention and 
control (73%) (Table 3). 
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The professional is not directly alerted by the outbreak management 
team during the crisis 
The professional does not receive a personal copy of the outbreak 
control guidance issued by the outbreak management team 
The professional does not have the lead in the dissemination of the 
guidance to clinicians and IP 
There is no centralized information system dedicated to hospital staff 














Control measures are inconvenient or difficult to apply in the hospital 
or public health setting 
There is no formal status of the outbreak control guidance within the 
group of professionals 
There is no follow up of the progress by the outbreak management 
team that issues the guidance 
There are no concrete targets for performance of the control measures 
There are no external audits to assess results, following the acute 
phase of a health care crisis 
The diagnostic guidelines interfere with and disturb the daily routine in 
the laboratory 
Additional testing and data collection for research purposes 
(generating new knowledge) during outbreaks interferes with and 
disturbs commitment to perform patient care 
Sending each sample to the (national) reference laboratory for typing 
by molecular techniques is time-consuming 
The professional perceives a delay in communicating risks due to 
transmission of pathogens in hospitals during international crises 
The professional does not agree with the level of personal protection 
equipment (PPE) advised in the outbreak control guidance 
It is difficult to ensure sustamabihty of the control measures once the 












































Control measures are not evidence-based 
Control measures are not sufficiently tailored to the patient population 
Control measures are worded with insufficient urgency or definition 
Control measures advised by the national outbreak control team 
deviate from the WHO guidance 
Crucial instructions within control measures concerning isolation, 
diagnostics, and treatment are not clearly formulated and not easily 
identifiable for each profession 
Case definitions and screening algorithms are not applicable to crisis/ 
outbreak patients in the hospital situation 
Control measures regarding the use of PPE and safety precautions 
are not timely or adequate 
There are no clear instructions on samples collection for laboratory 



























When guidance is issued, the increased costs related to outbreak 
control measures are not considered 73 
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Barriers M, % IP, % PHP, % PHN, 
yes2 yes yes % yes 
Organization 
There is a restricted budget for laboratory diagnostics due to cost 43 
considerations in hospital care 
There are no sufficient cohortmg and isolation facilities to prevent 
further transmission 83 80 -
There is no familiarity and awareness of other clinicians with the 73 
outbreak control and diagnostic guidelines 
Responsibilities for diagnosis and infection control are not clarified 77 58 86 
Routine clinical commitments do not allow extra time for 70 
implementation of outbreak control guidance 
Providing explanation of control measures, safety precautions and 
reducing anxiety among public and nurses (including information in 
foreign languages) is time-consuming - 78 73 
There are no proper IT tools to generate real time data during crises 
(e g vaccination coverage) - - 71 -
There is no centralized purchase and distribution system for PPE : : 69 70 
There are time constraints to up-date local protocols on outbreak 
control, during crises - - - 81 
Setting 
Round-the-clock availability of front line physicians is not guaranteed - - 71 -
The public health service has no means to monitor compliance of front 
line physicians with the measures - - 80 78 
There is no reimbursement system for outbreak control tasks 
undertaken by front line physicians - 75 -
There are problems in the communication between various groups of 
professionals - - 71 -
There is no clear chain of command and control at regional level - -_ 69 -
There is no clear division of responsibilities between the community 
emergency departments and public health services in crises - - 73 76 
There is no endorsement of outbreak control measures by local policy 
makers - - 69 -
1 barrier experienced by at least 33% of the group 
2 yes = strongly agree/agree/rather agree than disagree with the proposed barrier 
PHP-specific barriers 
Of the 30 barriers identified by PHPs, 17 (56%) were experienced by at least 33% of the 
respondents. The PHPs cited no barriers related to knowledge, but 70% cited an 
awareness item (concrete targets for performance of outbreak control measures) as 
relevant to adherence. Mostly they emphasized external factors. To overcome these 
barriers, they urged easily identifiable, profession-specific instructions on diagnosis, 
infection control, and therapy (78%); timely guidance on the type of PPE and instructions 
on its use (78%); better instructions on sample collection (86%); and increased OMT 
awareness of the cost implications of the advised measures (73%). Organization-related 
factors included the lack of proper information technology systems for real-time 
surveillance of new cases during a crisis (71%) and the lack of a centralized system for 
purchasing and distributing PPE (70%). Barriers related to the social setting included the 
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uncertain availability of round-the-clock front-line physicians during crisis situations 
(71%), uncertain division of responsibilities between community emergency departments 
and public health services (73%), and the need for endorsement of the control measures 
by local policy makers (70%) (Table 3). 
PHN-specific barriers 
Of the 38 barriers identified, 12 (31%) were experienced by at least 33% of the PHNs. For 
nurses, adherence to crisis guidelines is related mostly to practical aspects, such as 
adequate time to perform control measures (73%) and update local protocols on the basis 
of newly issued guidance for crisis (81%) The PHNs also favored clear responsibilities for 
sampling patients, providing PPE, and performing infection prevention and control 
measures (86%); clear mandates for the public health service to monitor compliance of the 
front-line physicians (78%); and a clear division of responsibilities between community 
emergency departments and public health services (76%) (Table 3). 
Discussion 
Four generic barriers were identified and rated as equally important in the cross-sectional 
study, reflecting requirements for improving adherence to crisis guidelines that cross 
professional lines. What can we do to make guidelines in crises work? First, to emphasize 
the degree of urgency, the guidelines should be worded imperatively by the issuing 
committee. Furthermore, they should include crucial instructions that are easily 
identifiable for the various professional groups, and should be accompanied by concrete 
targets for performance. Finally, timely instructions should be provided on the use of 
PPE, together with precautions to optimize personal safety and minimize the risk of 
occupational exposure during patient care and contact tracing. 
When professionals with different backgrounds suddenly need to work together and 
depend on each other, as happens in complex crises, unclear or tentative language can 
sap the strength of guidelines. According to our participants, crucial guidelines should 
use explicit and even imperative language, reflected by the words "must" and "should," 
for example. Guidelines that instead ask professionals to "consider" taking a certain 
action do not sound crucial and are less likely to inspire adherence. 
Which instructions are crucial? Outbreak control guidance consists of comprehensive 
instructions on case finding, contact tracing, diagnostics, surveillance, treatment, 
infection prevention, and health promotion. Under time pressure, those concerning 
120 Chapter 7 
infection prevention (eg, isolation, PPE), diagnostics, and treatment are the ones that 
matter most to the involved professionals, because they are essential to stop further 
transmission and improve patient outcomes. Especially in these areas, instructions must 
be not only definitive and imperative, but also easily identifiable by various professionals 
as to their own particular responsibility areas. Interestingly, Lo et al.,1 found that 
adherence to crucial recommendations in hospital settings during routine infectious 
diseases consultations was significantly higher than adherence to noncrucial 
recommendations, which is consistent with our findings. 
Besides clarity of wording and crucial recommendations for each group of 
professionals, crisis guidelines should contain concrete targets for performance to guide 
successful implementation. For instance, when advising contact tracing and 
chemoprophylaxis, additional criteria should be provided, such as the percentage of 
persons who should be approached and the optimal time frame to do so. These criteria 
are considered important for the professionals who have to implement the measures, 
because they reduce uncertainty about what is expected, and they also could be helpful to 
external assessors who evaluate crisis control. Our participants agreed that such targets 
will increase the internal motivation to adopt the measures and also enable readjustment 
of expectations when necessary. 
Finally, there is the issue of professional safety. More than in other fields of care, 
dealing with outbreaks raises major concerns with respect to personal safety and 
prevention of nosocomial spread. In crises, especially when facing a new pathogen, 
health care professionals expect immediate information on which infection control 
procedures to put in place. Timely, solid guidance for health care professionals on ways 
to minimize their own risk by wearing PPE and complying with safety instructions will 
increase not only their protection but also their confidence and motivation.21-22 Apart from 
motivation, beliefs and attitudes, adherence to individual protective measures also 
depends on organizational factors.162324 According to Gershon et al.24, the safety climate 
characterized by a strong organizational commitment to safety leads to increased 
compliance with the use of PPE. As in our study, approval of the guidelines by coworkers 
and endorsement by the management were reported to facilitate adherence. 
These 4 priorities are, in our opinion, the starting point for improving adherence to 
outbreak control guidelines in crises. They are generic, in that they affect all 4 professions 
we studied. However, we also found that different groups of professionals have different 
expectations and experience different problems with respect to the crisis guidelines. 
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These depend on the context in which they work and the degree to which control 
measures interfere with daily routines, increase workloads, and require new skills and 
equipment Our study confirms earlier results by Grol et al2" indicating that general 
practitioners s adherence decreases when guidelines demand changes to existing routines 
and when they lack pertinent advice on actions and decisions Outbreak committees that 
issue the guidelines must be aware of these factors so they can tailor instructions to the 
specific needs and problems of the diverse professional groups involved 
From the perspective of professionals working in hospitals (i e , microbiologists and 
IPs), improving adherence should aim at increasing crisis awareness in that setting, for 
eample, better alerting systems and more transparency in dissemination of crisis 
measures These professionals emphasized the need to directly involve hospital 
professionals They also urged increased availability of organizational facilities for 
outbreak control, such as the capacity for cohorting and isolating patients Our results are 
consistent with findings of recent studies of preparedness in hospital emergency 
departments In a survey conducted by Rebmann et al26, 15% of IPs reported that their 
hospital had insufficient isolation facilities (eg negative-pressure rooms) for routine 
needs Even when facilities were sufficient, only 47% of the hospitals were equipped to 
accommodate an isolation surge 
The PHPs and PHNs reported barriers related mostly to the organizational and social 
setting For them, commitment and round-the-clock availability of local frontline 
physicians are crucial Moreover, the PHPs and PHNs need ways to monitor and 
encourage the compliance of these physicians with the crisis measures Another 
commonly reported barrier was the need to define responsibilities between public health 
professionals and hospital professionals with respect to sampling patients and 
performing infection prevention and control measures In the social context, 
implementing crisis guidelines and improving outcomes of measures require a clear 
chain of command, with control and endorsement by local policy makers 
This study has several limitations We first explored barriers to adherence through in-
depth interviews, then assessed the frequency of these barriers m the cross-sectional 
study to generate priorities for future strategies In contrast. Barlow et al ' began with the 
cross-sectional part and followed with in-depth interviews However, they studied 
adherence to guidelines in routine care situations and had access to previous publications 
when constructing their framework of barriers Given that no systematic research has 
been published on barriers in times of crisis, we needed in-depth interviews to explore 
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barriers and build the baseline framework. This qualitative approach enabled optimal 
exploration of hidden reasons for nonadherence. We were able to describe patterns of 
barriers that influence adherence, together with more individual specific constraints. 
Because the reported barriers might be different from those observed during outbreaks, 
they should be regarded as a proxy for reality. Nevertheless, they provide a basis for 
formulating priorities to improve adherence to guidelines in crises. We believe that our 
results are applicable to other industrialized countries with similar health care 
organization and professions as the Netherlands. 
Making crisis guidelines truly effective requires a multidisciplinary approach and 
optimal professional knowledge and attitudes, along with organizations capable of crisis 
management in social settings that facilitate adequate preparation and quick response. 
This is the first study to systematically assess the barriers that can obstruct adherence to 
crisis guidelines, from the standpoint of the individual health care professional. To 
improve adherence of these professionals in outbreak crises, priority should be given to 
the 4 generic barriers that we have described, irrespective of the infectious agent 
involved. Furthermore, for each group, profession-specific barriers need to be addressed 
through specific implementation strategies regarding improvement of knowledge, 
changing of attitudes, ensuring organizational facilities (e.g. sufficient capacity for single 
room isolation, surge cohorting capacity and surge laboratory capacity), and providing 
an adequate setting for performing crisis management. 
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Abstract 
Background 
Following notification of an imported case of Marburg hemorrhagic fever (MHF) in the 
Netherlands, restrictive measures to prevent transmission to exposed contacts were 
imposed. The consequences of restrictive measures have not been systematically 
evaluated. 
Methods 
A retrospective cohort study using a structured questionnaire, 5 to 7 months after contact 
with the patient. The 130 contacts were classified as either having high-risk exposure (i.e., 
unprotected contact) or low-risk exposure (i.e., contact under protective measures). We 
studied the variables of understanding, reported compliance with the measures, their 
interference with daily life and psychological impact. 
Results 
A total of 77/130 (60%; 45/64 high-risk and 32/66 low-risk contacts) completed the 
questionnaire. Agreement with 'necessity of twice-daily temperature monitoring and 
reporting' was 87%, and was significantly higher among high-risk than low-risk contacts 
(p< 0.001); compliance with temperature monitoring was 80% in week 1 but decreased to 
66% in the final week. Temperature monitoring was considered 'problematic' by 33%. 
Contacts expressed concern about developing MHF (58%), infecting a family member 
(40%), and fear that a colleague might be unknowingly infected (45%). One third 
experienced some degree of stress. High-risk contacts scored significantly higher on 
psychological impact scales (p< 0.001), both during and after the monitoring period, 
whereas psychological complaints persisted at a low level in both risk groups until 
months after exposure. 
Conclusions 
Being a contact of a patient with MHF is a stressful event and restrictive control measures 
have a significant impact on the daily life of contacts. Outbreak response committees 
need to be aware of the immediate and long term impact that restrictive measures may 
have on the persons involved. 
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Background 
In July 2008, an imported case of Marburg hemorrhagic fever (MHF) with fatal outcome 
was diagnosed in the Netherlands1 following possible exposure in a bat cave in Uganda 
MHF is caused by the Marburg virus which belongs, together with the Ebola virus, to the 
family Filovmdae2^ Since its discovery in 1967, apart from the aforementioned patient, 
MHF has been diagnosed only once outside the African continent The case in question 
was found by retrospective serological and molecular testing of convalescent sera from a 
patient in the US who had visited the same cave as the Dutch patient in January 2008-1 
Because of the high case-fatality rate combined with propensity of further 
transmission, a case of MHF is considered a public health crisis and requires intervention 
to promptly isolate the patient and thus curtail the risk of further person-to-person 
transmission, as well as to trace all contacts and monitor these for early signs of disease 
The main route of transmission is by direct contact with blood or body fluids1 After 
notification of the patient in the Netherlands, persons at risk of contracting MHF because 
of prior or ongoing contact with the patient, were identified through a public health 
investigation The national outbreak response team issued guidelines for the classification 
and management of these contacts Restrictive, partly mandatory control measures were 
formulated and tailored to an individual's risk of exposure into either a high-risk or low-
risk category 
Restrictive measures are crucial in crises such as those of hemorrhagic fevers, for 
which alternative interventions - like vaccination or preventive treatment to avert the 
possible consequences of transmission to contacts - are lacking Imported cases of 
hemorrhagic fever or other severe diseases with a potential to spread among health care 
workers and in the population have a small, yet realistic chance of occurring in the 
Western world, as we have seen in recent decades with cases of Ebola and Lassa fever6 m 
However, we do not know how contacts with a realistic risk of contracting the disease 
respond when confronted with restrictive measures The effectiveness of the restrictive 
measures depends strongly on the compliance of those affected Evidence is needed to 
underpin adequate follow up procedures in persons placed under restrictive measures 
because of exposure to a transmissible and grave infection 
To date, the understanding of and the compliance with the restrictive measures to 
control outbreaks (like travel restriction, postponing holidays, temperature monitoring, 
quarantine) have not been evaluated systematically" Equally, their consequences on 
daily life have not been thoroughly investigated Some aspects of control measures such 
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as compliance, emotional response and psychological impact have been occasionally 
studied in people placed in quarantine, e.g., I1"13 during the SARS outbreak. However, 
these findings are not directly applicable to cases of hemorrhagic fevers or other diseases 
with a very high case fatality rate. 
To evaluate understanding of the rationale of and compliance with containment 
measures, and their interference with daily life during the crisis, a retrospective cohort 
study was undertaken among the 130 contacts of the 2008 Dutch patient. Contacts were 
categorized as high-risk or low-risk based on a history of unprotected exposure or 
exposure under strict isolation measures. Subsequently, the differences between the high-
risk and low-risk contact groups were studied. In addition, serological testing for MHF 
was offered to all contacts to assess possible asymptomatic transmission. As the period of 
monitoring contacts for development of MHF is well defined, i.e., up to 21 days after the 
last contact with the patient and/or the patient's bodily fluids, the question of whether the 
impact of such an event is just temporary or will persist for a longer period of time has to 
be addressed. Thus, we assessed the psychological impact at two points in time and 
found factors that influence the experienced impact. Bearing this in mind, we describe 
criteria to optimize the effect of control measures and provide adequate care to persons 
exposed to a highly transmissible and potentially deadly disease. 
Methods 
Short description of the case 
On July 2, 2008, after returning from a visit to Uganda from June 5 through June 28, 2008, 
a 41-year-old female patient experienced chills and developed high fever. She was 
admitted to hospital A, on July 5. Initially, hemorrhagic fevers were not included in the 
differential diagnosis and she was nursed on a general ward among other patients, 
without specific contact precautions. Because of clinical deterioration with liver failure 
and propensity for hemorrhage, a suspicion of possible hemorrhagic fever arose and she 
was transferred to hospital Β on July 7. Here she was nursed under strict isolation 
measures in a single room with negative air pressure ventilation and anteroom. On July 
10, a diagnosis of MHF was confirmed; the next day, the patient died. A comprehensive 
description of the case, exposure history and public health response was published 
elsewhere1. 
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Description of the control measures 
The Netherlands national outbreak response team formulated the surveillance measures 
for follow-up of the patient's contacts who were at risk of acquiring the infection' The 
measures were based on pre-existing national and international guidelines on 
management and control of hemorrhagic fever caused by filoviruses u ]e To ensure 
optimal implementation, written instructions were provided to the contacts 
In compliance with current international guidelines, the patient was considered as 
potentially infectious to others from the onset of fever until death (i e , July 2 through July 
11, 2008), and the follow-up surveillance (the so-called monitoring period) was set to 3 
weeks after the last contact Possible exposure of contacts to blood and/or body fluids of 
the patient had taken place in healthcare settings (i e, two hospitals and their 
laboratories, and one general practice) or in a home setting The public health service 
traced and followed-up the contacts in the community, whereas attending physicians, 
hospital hygiënist and hospital occupational physician were responsible for in-hospital 
contacts 
Contacts considered to be at high-risk for contracting the disease (i e , those who had 
had unprotected contact with the patient and/or her bodily fluids) were asked to measure 
their temperature twice daily, and report these measurements once a day to the 
municipal health authority, moreover, they were prohibited from leaving the country 
Contacts were asked, in case of a fever (body temperature of >380C, measured twice at 
least 12 hours apart), and/or any abnormal symptoms (e g, vomiting, headache, 
abdominal pam, diarrhoea, jaundice, coughing) to immediately contact the assigned 
health care provider Contacts perceived to have a low-risk of exposure that could lead to 
disease transmission (i e , those handling the patient or bodily fluids while executing 
strict isolation measures including protection against possible aerosols) similarly were 
asked to measure their body temperature twice daily, but only to report a temperature of 
>38°C to the healthcare provider, this group was advised to remain in the Netherlands 
and not travel abroad 
Study population 
A retrospective cohort study involving the 130 contacts was performed by questionnaire 
The high-risk group (n=64) included household contacts, healthcare providers at the 
general practice, and those involved in patient care in hospital A (nurses, physicians and 
laboratory workers), as well as patients sharing the same hospital ward in hospital A, 
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cleaning personnel, etc) The low-risk contacts (n=66) included healthcare and laboratory 
workers in hospital Β who had all executed appropriate personal protective measures 
The data were collected from December 2008 through February 2009, 5-7 months after 
any possible exposure At the same time, serological testing was offered to assess possible 
asymptomatic transmission Laboratory methods are described in detail elsewhere' 
Variables and instruments 
Quesf/onna/re 
A structured questionnaire was made available for completion online We collected 
personal characteristics of the respondents and any symptoms during the monitoring 
period The questionnaire (62 questions) addressed the following variables 
understanding of the control measures (including clarity of the instructions), reported 
compliance with the measures, and perceived interference with daily life (e g, the degree 
to which a measure was problematic for contacts and their household members) To 
develop the questionnaire, we drew from the current literature on the impact of 
restrictive measures and we contacted health experts" 12 We also studied a survey of 
experiences and compliance of persons exposed to the avian influenza virus A/H7N7 
during the 2003 outbreak in the Netherlands'", and parts of the CAHPS Survey, which 
was developed and funded by the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality, 
Rockville, MD (the Dutch version - the CQI instrument, NIVEL)18 Depending on the type 
of the question, response was requested on a five-point Likert scale ranked from 1 to 5 
(categories "completely disagree, disagree, neutral, agree, strongly agree" or "never, 
seldom, sometimes, often, always") 
Impact of event scale (IES-R) 
To evaluate the stress level, we used the Impact of Event Scale (IES-R, Dutch version) a 
22-items international instrument designed to measure situations in life that are 
perceived as stressful19 The instrument is divided into 3 subscale domains intrusion (i e 
recurrent thoughts), avoidance (i e avoiding reminders of the event) and hyper arousal 
(i e concentration and sleeping problems), each containing questions derived from the 
DSM-IV criteria for post traumatic stress disorder20 Items could be scored on a Likert 
scale from 0 to 4 ('not at all, a little bit, quite a bit, extremely'), adding to a maximum 
score of 88 A score of > 20 is considered as an indicator of post traumatic stress disorder 
(PTSD)1112 
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The IES-R questions were asked twice firstly, regarding the recalled impact during the 
period of monitoring (lES-dunng), and secondly, regarding the seven days prior to the 
completion of the questionnaire, to assess persisting stress (IES-after) 5 to 7 months after 
the event 
Analysis 
Data were analyzed using SPSS ν 18 (SPSS Ine, Chicago, IL, USA) Results were 
stratified by type of exposure-risk (i e, high or low risk of disease transmission) The 
household contacts could not, however, be analyzed as separate category versus the 
healthcare workers, due to the small number Descriptive statistics were performed 
Means were calculated for the answers given on the Likert scale Differences in means 
were assessed by Student's t-test. Differences in proportions were assessed by the chi-
squared test. A p-value of < 0.05 was considered significant. 
We composed overall scales for· clarity of instructions (Cronbach's alpha 0 82), 
compliance with measures (Cronbach's alpha 0 71) and interference (Cronbach's alpha 
0.64) The overall scale for understanding of the measures proved invalid (Cronbach's 
alpha 0.48), and was not used in the further analysis 
Linear (for IES-R dependent) regression methods were used to model variables 
associated with IES-R To determine which variables influenced the stress level during 
the monitoring period, we developed a linear regression model using IES-R during the 
monitoring as a dependent variable and personal characteristics (gender, education, age), 
risk level, clarity of the instructions scale, the compliance scale and the interference scale 
as independent variables The same model was constructed using IES-R after the 
monitoring period as dependent variable. 
Results 
Response 
The questionnaire was sent to 130 eligible participants and completed by 78 One case 
had to be deleted due to incorrect and incompatible answers which left 77 respondents 
(60 %) remaining for the statistical analysis. The response was 70% (45/64) and 48% 
(32/66) in the high-risk and low-risk groups, respectively Sixty percent (n=46) of the 
respondents was female, 58% did not have children in the household, and 14% lived as a 
single person. The mean age was 38 in the high-risk and 43 in the low-risk group The 
high-risk group included significantly more women and the educational level was lower 
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The respondents were comparable to non-respondents with respect to gender (i.e., M/F 
was 40/60 versus 42/58, respectively). During the monitoring period, non-specific 
symptoms (such as previously described during a prodromal phase of hemorrhagic fever 
syndromes)2 developed occasionally in some contacts (table 1). 























































































Reported complaints during the monitoring period 






















































* Chi-squared test 
Understanding of the control measures and clarity of instructions 
Of the respondents, 60/77 (78%) were aware of the request to limit travel and not leave 
the country; 54/77 (70%) agreed with the necessity to restrict travel (and significantly 
more so in the high-risk versus low-risk group, p=0.04). All respondents were aware of 
the need to measure temperature twice daily, whereas 67/77 (87 %) agreed with the 
necessity of measuring and reporting temperature. Remarkably, only 58/77 (75%) of the 
respondents correctly identified the rationale of temperature monitoring whereas 3/77 
(3.9%) believed that temperature monitoring was necessary to prevent illness. People in 
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the high-risk group agreed significantly more often than their low-risk counterparts with 
the necessity of daily measuring and reporting temperature (pO.001). 
Of the contacts, 61/77 (80%) received the written instructions with detailed information 
on the control measures. This information was judged as: clear (74%), complete (65%), 
unequivocal (61%), confusing (6.5%), and redundant (3.9%). No significant differences 
were observed between people in the high-risk and the low-risk groups with respect to 
receiving instructions and judging their clarity. 
Compliance with the measures 
Of respondents who were asked to remain in the Netherlands, 17/45 had planned a 
holiday abroad whereas another 12/45 actually cancelled a holiday abroad in the 
surveillance period. Temperature monitoring was carried out correctly, i.e., twice daily, 
by 61/77 (80.5%); 75/77 (97.4%) had a thermometer at their immediate disposal. Daily 
temperature monitoring was carried out throughout the 3 weeks, although strict 
compliance decreased from 80 % (62/77) in week 1 to 66 % (51/77) in week 3. Compliance 
was significantly higher in the high-risk group (table 2). 
Table 2. Compliance with the temperature monitoring and reporting, per risk group 
The answers were given on a 5-point scale ranging from 1 to 5, according to the following 
categories: 'never', 'seldom', 'sometimes', 'often', 'always'. 
Variables 
Temperature monitoring week 1 
Temperature reporting week 1 
Temperature monitoring week 2 
Temperature reporting week 2 
Temperature monitoring week 3 
Temperature reporting week 3 
High-risk group Low-risk group p* 
Mean SD Mean SD 
4 87 0 63 4 25 1 16 0 004 
4 73 101 1.56 137 0 000 
4 87 0 63 3 84 1 30 0 000 
4 73 1 01 1 50 1 34 0 000 
4 82 0 68 3.34 1 54 0 000 
4 71 101 1.50 134 0 000 
* Student's f-test 
Interference of the measures with daily life 
The prohibition to leave the country was experienced as problematic by 18/77 (23%) of 
the respondents; 11/77 (14 %) experienced serious restrictions in their social life, and 
24/77 (31 %) reported to have felt stressed on a regular basis during the monitoring 
weeks. Daily temperature monitoring was felt to be problematic by 25/77 (33%), daily 
temperature reporting by 21/77 (27%). In a quarter of the cases, extra costs were involved 
in order to comply with the measures. During the monitoring period, 13/77 (17%) of the 
healthcare workers intensified personal infection prevention behavior, e.g., compliance 
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with hand washing protocols, (the mean of the intensified prevention behavior in the 
high-risk group was 1.3 sd 0.4 versus 1.03 sd 0.2, in the low-risk group; p=0.006). After 
the monitoring period, 13% reported to have maintained an intensified compliance with 
infection prevention, without significant differences between the risk groups. 
Being a contact of a case, initiated anxiety in the respondents, reflected in the high 
percentage that was afraid of developing MHF themselves 45/77 (58%), who were 
concerned about infecting other family or household members 31/77 (40%), or who were 
afraid that a colleague might become infected unknowingly 35/77 (45.5%). With respect to 
the latter, the high-risk group was significantly more often worried than the low-risk 
group (p =0.030). 
From the participants, 28/77 37% reported that their family members were disturbed 
by the restrictive measures. Furthermore, 31/77 (40%) reported that their family members 
expressed anxiety of becoming infected themselves. Partners and children experienced 
tension and stress due to the restrictive measures in 33 % and 15 %, respectively. The 
results on the overall interference scale were compared, revealing more interference in 
the high-risk group, mean 1.5 sd 0.3 / versus 1.8 sd 0.2; ρ < 0.001 in the low-risk group. 
Impact of event scale IES-R 
The mean score on the IES-R scale both during and 5-7 months after the monitoring 
period was low measuring 2.8 sd 2.6 range = 0.2-10 and 0.9 sd 1.7 range = 0-9.5, 
respectively; p< 0.001), although high individual scores were seen (Fig 1). 
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Figure 1. Distribution of scores on the IES during and after the monitoring period, among 
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Using linear regression methods, a significance model was built (Fc<,9)=14.838, p=0.000) 
that included only the variable interference with dependent variable 'IES-R' during the 
event Another significance model (F(7 69)=7 638, p=0 000) included the variables 'education 
level' and interference with dependent variable 'IES' after the event (Table 3) Thus, 
during the monitoring period, the score on the IES was mostly influenced by the degree 
of interference (disturbance) caused by the restrictive measures on daily life After the 
monitoring period, the remaining psychological impact measured by the IES score was 
influenced, apart from the degree of interference, also by the level of education, with 
people of lower education experiencing more psychological consequences 
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Table 3. Linear regression model using the scores on the IES during and after the monitoring 
period 
Dependent variable 
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Serological testing 
The serological testing was undertaken in 85/130 (65%) contacts; they represented 78% 
(50/64) of high-risk contacts and 53% (35/66) of low-risk contacts. All serum samples 
tested negative for IgG and IgM to Marburg virus in the immunofluorescent antibody 
(IFA) assay.' This finding excluded the possibility that some of the contacts who 
provided a blood sample, had become infected but remained free of symptoms and signs 
of disease. 
Discussion 
This study is the first to investigate the consequences of restrictive control measures that 
were imposed on close contacts of a patient with MHF, an infection that can serve as a 
model for other infectious diseases with a high case-fatality rate. The findings show that 
being at risk for having acquired MHF infection had a measurable impact on the 
respondents, both in the group with a relatively high-risk of transmission because of 
unprotected exposure, and in the low-risk group that had adhered to strict isolation and 
protective measures during contact with the patient or potentially contaminated bodily 
fluids. Moreover, we point out the psychological implications for persons who have to 
obey restrictive measures and for the outbreak response committees in charge of crisis 
guidelines. 
Because fever is considered the first sign in the clinical evaluation of exposed contacts, 
strict temperature monitoring and reporting are the most important public health 
measures aimed at curtailing transmission. Compliance and agreement with the necessity 
of temperature monitoring and reporting were significantly higher in the high-risk 
group, although the majority of people from both groups clearly acknowledged the value 
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of this measure Still, both temperature monitoring and reporting were judged as being 
problematic for fitting in with daily life A report on an imported patient with Lassa 
hemorrhagic fever also revealed the practical problems accompanying temperature 
monitoring1"21 In order to improve compliance with temperature reporting and decrease 
workload for both contacts and health professionals, the frequency of reporting had to be 
reduced in that case to a feasible level of twice per week which meant decreasing the 
ability to respond promptly Another measure with significant personal impact (as the 
disease episode coincided with the summer holiday period) was prohibiting people from 
leaving the country, which was imposed on the high-risk group There were practical 
problems related to this measure, as individuals had already planned and paid for a 
holiday, and needed to cancel it Altogether, a quarter of the participants reported having 
had to spend money to fully comply with the control measures 
We captured the degree to which monitoring interfered with daily life and the anxiety 
caused by the fear of becoming ill and transmitting the infection to other family members 
or colleagues At the same time, family members experienced the burden of the restrictive 
measures and lived with the anxiety of becoming ill themselves Our results are 
consistent with other studies, such as SARS patients placed under quarantine, showing 
increased concern of contacts for developing the disease and/or unknowingly 
transmitting the infection to others"2221 Using the scores on the IES-R we quantified the 
recalled level of stress during the monitoring period and the actual level 5-7 months after 
the event The mean scores on the subscale domains were comparable to the ones of 
persons quarantined due to SARS, reported by Reynolds et al " The level of stress was 
higher in the high-risk group than in the low-risk group Remarkably, we were able to 
show persistence of psychological complaints months after the event had taken place in 
both categories These findings have been confirmed by studies on contacts of patients 
with SARS"122425 McAlonan et al investigated immediate and sustained stress in 
healthcare workers who had been at high risk of exposure to SARS compared to those at 
low risk They showed persistence of stress and psychological complaints one year after 
the event, with higher levels in the high-risk group Although the diseases are different 
with respect to risk of transmission and outcome and the scales used to measure stress 
were different as well, both studies point to the persistence of stress related complaints 
for a longer period, after the event had ended 
We found the score on the interference scale to be the main predictor of the scores on 
IES both during as well as after the event, which suggests that difficulties in applying the 
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measures and the disturbance experienced in daily life of the contacts under monitoring 
and their families, determine the magnitude of the psychological impact. 
To increase applicability and thereby efficacy of control measures, outbreak 
committees in charge of providing crises guidance and performing crisis management, 
need to be aware of the experiences of the persons to whom the measures apply. The first 
lesson of this study is that persons under monitoring will experience constraints and side 
effects of the measures which should be systematically addressed in the crisis guidelines. 
Secondly, to improve compliance, follow-up by the crisis control team is required 
throughout the whole monitoring period as this is likely to decrease after the first week. 
Thirdly, practical constraints related to measuring and reporting temperature at a given 
time of the day should be averted by making use of on-line registration systems and 
modem technologies to contact people. Fourthly, the increased costs that people had to 
make imply that compensation policies should be explained (e.g., insurance) or made 
available in preparedness plans, an issue that has been raised for contact tracing, social 
distancing and quarantine measures in general26. 
Apart from practical barriers that need to be overcome, the psychological impact on 
persons under monitoring and their family members needs proper attention. While the 
care is mostly focused on early identification of somatical complaints, concerns, anxiety 
and stress also play an important role. Guidelines should allow for the need for 
individual support to assess and manage stress and to address questions regarding 
personal risks. Furthermore, as already suggested by McAlonan et al." healthcare 
workers belonging to front-line staff could benefit from stress management as part of 
preparation for future crises, in order to strengthen their stress coping strategy. 
This study has some weaknesses. Despite being sent reminders, the response rate from 
the participants in our study was 60%, of which 78% in the high-risk and 48% in the low-
risk category. This limits interpretation of the results, because the motive for non-
compliance in completing the questionnaire remains unknown. We acknowledge that the 
risk of biased findings is higher in the low-risk group than in the high-risk group. The 
results therefore need to be considered with some caution. As in most retrospective 
studies, we need to acknowledge the chance of recall bias as well, as the study was 
performed 5 to 7 months after the event. Strong points of this study concern the 
systematic evaluation of compliance with and interference of measures on daily life and 
quantifies the psychological impact of the measures, during and after this major event 
that received much attention in the media. 
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The three weeks monitoring period was an intense and distressing time for contacts 
because they had to live with the uncertainty of whether or not they would develop the 
disease Further, they were seen as a potential risk for transmitting the infection to others, 
and had to comply with various requirements in order to early identify and report fever 
and health complaints. We underpin the hypothesis that stress and psychological 
complaints can persist (at a low level) for months. Outbreak response committees need to 
be aware of the immediate and long term effect that restrictive measures can have on 
people being monitored. 
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I. General conclusion: a generic model for crisis guidelines 
We provide a model that aims at making good crisis guidelines truly work in practice 
The model is based on a comprehensive appraisal of several recent crisis situations, 
lessons taken from the literature and findings from surveys with international experts, 
frontline professionals and patients Although every crisis is unique in the sense that its 
development cannot be predicted with precision, some aspects are generic and recurrent, 
irrespective of the disease and the setting These aspects concern the need to integrate 
current scientific knowledge and practical experience into a crisis advice on outbreak 
management, to implement it uniformly and to monitor its progression given the changes 
that might occur in time We captured the generic features of crises from a variety of 
perspectives and designed a model which included the instrument for the development 
of good crisis guidelines, the barriers overview from the professionals' perspective and 
the consequences of the measures for the patients The model is not intended as a 
cookbook, a trend against which warnings have been expressed in the early era of 
guideline development12, but as a framework for a coherent crisis guideline, in which 
medical aspects and contextual characteristics are integrated 
This approach is innovative because it covers the essential criteria for rigorous 
guideline development under time pressure with the requests for optimal 
implementation taken from two points of view, from the professionals who are in charge 
of making the final decisions in the field and from the patients whose (preventive) care is 
affected Ideally, as argued recently by GroP, guidelines in general should be integrated 
with performance measurement and quality improvement strategies, a subject we shall 
return to in the section on future research We believe that systematically addressing the 
generic features would improve the quality and uniformity of crisis control and provide 
more evidence for the refinement of our model (figure 1) in the future 
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Figure LGeneric model for the development and implementation of crisis guidelines 
Development of the crisis guideline 
Assess the 









-discuss and describe the severity and transmissibihty of the disease 
• is the disease life-threatening, with a high case-fatality rate? 
• is the number of cases involved high? 
• is the disease (threat) sudden, unexpected? 
• is the disease or threat new or re-emerging? 
• is the disease perceived as serious by health professionals? 
-discuss and describe uncertainties 
• uncertainty about the effect and availability of treatment 
• uncertainty about laboratory diagnosis 
• lack of consensus among professionals on the effect of treatment or prophylaxis 
• other areas in which new knowledge is needed 
-discuss and describe the potential impact of the disease 
• economical loss 
• political turmoil 
• media frenzy 
• international spread 
-discuss and describe the public health issues covered (what are the public health risks?) 
-describe the patients (risk groups) to whom the measures apply 
-formulate uniform case definitions 
-consider the consequences of the control measures for the patients, regarding 
• health benefits, 
• side effects 
• potential risks 
• legal consequences 
• international consequences 
-consider the degree of uncertainty that the measures hold 
-consider the effect of the best-case scenario and worst-case scenario and the grey area 
in between 
-describe criteria for selecting (including and excluding) evidence 
-include link between measures and supporting evidence 
-include models or experiences from other countries, when available 
-describe the procedure for revision based on the anticipation of possible developments 
during the crisis 
-lay down dissident minority view points reflecting conflicting interpretations between the 
members 
-separate the scientific committee from the decision committee 
-disclose names, disciplines and expertise of the members 
-include at least the following competencies in the scientific committee 
• public health physicians 
• clinicians and microbiologists 
• communication specialists 
Implementation of the crisis guideline 
Facilitate 
adherence 
-use clear, imperative language to emphasize the sense of urgency 
-make crucial instructions within control measures easily identifiable for each profession, 
concerning isolation, diagnostics, and treatment 
-ensure personal protection of the healthcare workers by timely and adequate guidelines 
regarding the use of personal protection equipment (PPE) 
-consider the most appropriate ways to disseminate the control measures to professionals 
-consider the most appropriate ways to communicate the control measures to the patients 
and if needed, the public 
-consider possible profession specific barriers 
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Development of the crisis guideline 
Monitor -address responsibilities for carrying out outbreak control 
development |-formulate concrete targets for performance, to measure effectiveness of the measures 
In the following paragraphs we underline the main research findings along three main 
themes, structural problems encountered during the exploration of crises, design of an 
instrument for optimal crisis advice, and thirdly, the perspective of patients and health 
professionals with respect to crisis guidelines in practice. Subsequently, the implications 
of our findings for professionals and policy makers are discussed. Finally, we put the 
results into a future perspective by pointing out research gaps and priorities for future 
studies. 
Structural problems encountered during crises and priorities for improving 
crisis control 
Departing from the hypothesis that by analyzing the process of outbreak management 
and evaluating the consequences of the control measures, we could point out 
shortcomings of the crisis guidelines that can be addressed in the future, we undertook a 
thorough investigation of the response to a limited number of recent crises (chapters 2-5). 
We identified weak points in the national and international response such as the 
structural lack of attention for the consequences of the measures for frontline health care 
workers and patients and the poor availability and application of the crisis guidelines in 
practice Those problems were seen during the management of the outbreaks of severe 
acute respiratory syndrome (SARS, chapters 2,5) and lymphogranuloma venereum (LGV, 
chapter 4) and to a lesser degree during the management of the public health risks due to 
the importation of Marburg hemorrhagic fever (MHF; chapter 3) The initial emergence 
and spread of SARS in the absence of a known causative agent and specific diagnostic 
tests required physicians and public health authorities worldwide to formulate a set of 
criteria for separating suspected or probable cases from non-cases These case definitions 
allowed for the classification of persons with clinical symptoms and exposure history, 
reporting to health authorities and proper management of cases and their contacts. 
Case definitions represent a basic component of crisis guidelines because they define 
the patient population to whom the measures apply and allow for robust surveillance. 
During the SARS crisis, because the WHO case definitions were not considered fully 
applicable, the Outbreak Management Team of the Netherlands formulated five different 
case definitions, in reaction to the gradually available evidence on the clinical course of 
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the infection, the transmission routes and the changing intensity of transmission 
worldwide 
Although intended to enable professionals at the bedside to make quick decisions on 
how to deal with clinical suspicion, we found that changing case definitions led to 
confusion and misclassification of cases A majority of the persons who approached the 
attending physician was sent in for further assessment, despite the fact that they did not 
meet the criteria for suspected cases, according to the ruling case definition at that time 
Thus they required further reporting, additional testing, control measures to prevent any 
further transmission and in some cases, strict isolation in hospital In a broader 
international perspective, our findings are supported by the experiences of, for instance, 
Tambyah et al and Rainer et al in Singapore and Hong Kong respectively - regions that 
have had a substantial amount of SARS cases with a significant burden on their 
respective healthcare systems43 The authors found the WHO guidelines for classification 
of SARS rather low sensitive or inapplicable in a particular setting, prompting experts to 
develop their own guidelines and prediction rules Also during the LGV outbreak 
(chapter 4) the issue of the case definitions and their proper use in practice as the basis for 
identifying new patients and allowing international outbreak control was confusing We 
showed a large variety of case definitions including various clinical, epidemiological and 
laboratory criteria, which makes international case finding, contact tracing and 
surveillance quite challenging6, and we underlined the need for harmonizing the crisis 
advice 
From a public health point of view, in order to harmonize case finding during an 
outbreak and to prevent medical services from becoming overwhelmed (and with a need 
to accommodate an increased demand for clinical and laboratory evaluation) a first-line 
filter is needed to separate suspect cases from non suspect cases before referring patients 
for further assessment For example, in the situation specific to the Netherlands, the 
Public Health Services could function as such a filter Furthermore, education of health 
professionals in the use of case definitions should be included as part of the training 
curriculum and the crisis preparedness guidelines The final risk assessment and case 
classification should always be done within a centralized surveillance and assessment 
system by an expert team with clinical and public health expertise" 
The proposed solutions with respect to contact tracing and classification proved to 
function well during the Marburg crisis in 2008 (chapter 3) Importation of a case of viral 
hemorrhagic fever can be at the origin of an outbreak and is generally seen as a major 
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crisis with a high potential for overreaction that requires close collaboration between 
regular health care professionals and public health personnel Communication and 
reassurance for health care workers and the public are considered to be major challenges 
in managing such crises8 Confirmation of Marburg hemorrhagic fever in a patient 
returning from a trip to Uganda, without obvious exposure to a known source of 
infection, prompted a coordinated crisis overarching response including the structured 
assessment of the public health risks in the two hospitals involved and in the community, 
the risk classification of contacts, the guidelines for laboratory follow-up, the provision of 
information to professionals and media, and the monitoring of the progression of crisis 
response The crisis committee that comprised health professionals in all hospitals, public 
health services and laboratories as well as national experts, succeeded in keeping a rather 
low profile response and in preventing overreaction and public alarm There were several 
key factors that could account for this First of all, a thorough, centralized evidence-based 
risk assessment was carried out in every individual with potential exposure followed by 
control measures tailored to the risk classification and discussed in the crisis committee 
This prevented misclassification and confusion and guided the attending physicians and 
public health specialists in their tasks Second, detailed guidelines accompanied by 
patient instructions were issued on how to monitor the development of fever and other 
health complaints in contact persons, how to behave in order to prevent further 
transmission and when to consult the assigned healthcare worker Third, the main 
organizational consequences of the measures were anticipated and four hospitals were 
asked to review their strict isolation procedures, train their personnel and make single 
rooms equipped with laboratory facilities for blood testing available Fourth and final, to 
increase confidence, factual updates were provided regularly to the health professionals, 
to media and to international bodies 
Our exploration nevertheless also revealed weak points, which can be extrapolated 
into crises caused by severe and highly rare diseases in general The first weakness is 
related to uncertainties regarding laboratory diagnostics - especially in the early course of 
illness1' or in the absence of an international well accepted protocol, a problem that was 
relevant not only for MHF, but also during the initial phase of the outbreaks of SARS and 
LGV10 n Therefore, proper evaluation of laboratory methods with particular emphasis on 
detection limits is crucial for reliance on these diagnostics during monitoring and should 
ideally take place in the preparation phase, rather than during the event This aspect is a 
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crucial step in the phase of laboratory capacity building for crisis situations in general 
and implies both consultation with a center of expertise and international collaboration 
The second priority is related to the legal basis for control measures that restrict 
individual freedom, such as prohibiting people from leaving the country during the 
period of contact monitoring According to the current Dutch legislation on 
communicable disease, it is possible to enforce restrictive measures in the situation of 
group A communicable diseases In extreme situations, these measures can apply to 
healthy contacts as well However, a very limited number of diseases are categorized as 
such At the time of the Marburg crisis, there was limited statutory power in the 
Netherlands to prevent a healthy person from traveling abroad, so that compliance with 
the measure had to rely solely on voluntary participation without a robust legal 
foundation 
A general conclusion is that, in the absence of an internationally accepted and binding 
protocol, the control measures and the availability and implementation of pertinent laws 
with respect to quarantine and social distancing1416 may differ in various countries and 
for various diseases (chapters 2, 3, 5) The implications of measures in the legal and 
international context should be considered when formulating the crisis advice In chapter 
4 the importance of the international context for crisis control is discussed in detail To 
understand variation in the crisis control, we conducted a cross-sectional survey 
regarding the response to the international outbreak of LGV in the European countries 
We chose to study this outbreak because it concerned an infection with an atypical 
presentation and thus likely to be missed, difficult to diagnose at that time in the absence 
of validated molecular techniques, and spreading within an international sexual network 
of men having sex with men (MSM) in large cities around the world which makes contact 
tracing problematic By analyzing the response to questionnaires from 18 countries, we 
found a large variation in the degree of preparedness for an unexpected outbreak, as well 
as in the ability of countries to respond quickly to alerts, indicating weaknesses in the 
crisis control capacity Furthermore, the content of crisis guidelines varied considerably 
with respect to case definitions, laboratory testing, antimicrobial therapy and other 
activities aimed at implementing the measures and curtailing further transmission We 
conclude that in view of the globalization and increased mobility taking place in a 
borderless Europe, the coordination of outbreak management and the guarantee of 
continuity and coherence are essential 
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Reaching far beyond the events of SARS, MHF or LGV, our exploration shows that 
formulating guidelines and making them available to physicians and public health 
services does not implicitly mean that they would be used properly in crises and have the 
expected outcome. Equally, as we have shown in chapters 2, 3 and 4, in crises due to 
infectious diseases, the components of the control chain are insufficiently interconnected. 
In order to improve crisis control, a "system thinking approach" would be needed to 
guide the response and enforce uniform, high standard procedures for the whole chain of 
outbreak management, linking the main components - recognition and alert, outbreak 
control measures, implementation activities, and evaluation - in one coherent system. 
Our conclusion is sustained by recent developments in the broader public health domain, 
where the importance of a system thinking approach in conducting public health 
interventions has been increasing,7•1',. System thinking has been defined as "a paradigm 
shift away from conventional forms of problem framing, action planning and evaluation 
to a perspective that examines connections between components and their implications"20. 
It involves a multidimensional view allowing interconnection between the various 
components. In an international perspective, the National Institute of Health and the 
CDC are stimulating research that applies system-oriented methods to respond to critical 
public health challenges1719'21, a promising development with possible implications for 
outbreak committees and outbreak management in general. 
Designing an instrument for an optimal crisis guideline 
Although outbreaks have often been subject to research, little is known about the 
prerequisites for good authoritative guidelines by expert committees during crises. Crises 
place the outbreak committee in the spotlight of the society, because they often involve 
large groups of persons at risk and they trigger anxiety. The crisis guidelines need to be 
provided under time pressure, in complex situations, characterized by uncertainties and 
scarcity of evidence. In contrast, guidelines should be detailed enough to enable 
physicians and policy makers to make informed decisions and should be explicit about 
responsibilities (chapter 5). With respect to the content, the measures should be based on 
the best available evidence, judged in a transparent, reproducible procedure. Moreover, 
as we showed in the example concerning the LGV and MHF outbreak (chapters 3, 4), 
there are no well established criteria to characterize crisis situations that require 
comprehensive guidelines at national or international level. This means that that the 
measures undertaken by various countries may vary greatly and eventually lead to 
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unequal access of preventive measures for the persons at risk and consequently 
progression of the disease transmission. In accordance with our conclusion and pleading 
for the need to develop criteria to early recognize crises, Chen et al. attempted to quantify 
the severity of an outbreak as a proxy for the need to take emergency measures. 
Although accurate quantification of severity is very difficult, this approach confirms the 
need for a standardization of the approach to crises22. Departing from the existing 
instrument for clinical guidelines (AGREE)21, we designed a conceptual framework 
combining findings from literature with practical experience, which contains criteria for 
recognizing crisis situations and for the development and implementation of control 
measures. We validated this concept within a multinational consensus procedure with 
experts from 21 countries worldwide. Consensus procedures using expert panels are of 
additional value in situations where other study designs are not feasible, for example, 
when rating agreement is needed. To produce valid outcomes, they require credibility 
conferred by a carefully designed group composition and a rigorous methodology 2A 2\ In 
order to improve evaluation of the reliability of the results, we also calculated the 
"agreement distance score", an original method developed within our research group to 
quantify the concordance between panelists with a higher degree of precision (chapter 6, 
technical appendix). This allows a better understanding of the judgment and of the rating 
differences within the panel and eliminates any risk of agreement by chance alone. 
Our final instrument contains 34 valid and reliable criteria rated as essential in a 
rigorous consensus method by international experts (chapter 6). They are generic in the 
sense that they can be applied in crisis situations, irrespective of the nature of the 
infectious agent and that they overarch all the domains of crisis guidance, starting with 
the analysis of the context of a crisis and ending with the minimal requirements for the 
implementation of the advised measures. The validation process revealed one of the main 
problems during crises: criteria for implementation that require preparation and time 
seem to be considered by some crisis experts as less important when pressure is high and 
measures are urgently expected. Thus some requirements for optimal implementation, 
like the need for developing performance indicators for adherence to the measures, 
considering cost implications, or developing activities to monitor a population's behavior 
in crises did not reach agreement and were not validated by the experts. Nonetheless, 
these were the very requirements from the perspective of the frontline professionals who 
carry out the measures (chapter 7, chapter 5) and the patients (chapter 8), emphasizing 
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the gap between the level where the scientific advice is formulated and the level where 
the crisis control is carried out in practice. 
Within our panel, the concordance of the ratings (reflecting strong agreement between 
panelists) ranged for most of the items between excellent and moderate. However, poor 
concordance of the raters, defined by a large agreement distance, was found again, for 
criteria on implementation such as strategies for the communication of measures and 
allocation of responsibilities. Elaborating strategies for communicating control measures 
to the public and to professionals is time consuming. When optimal and detailed 
communication to professionals and public about the available technical information on 
the disease and on the control measures is lacking and responsibilities have not been 
made clear for various organizations and agencies involved, frontline physicians and 
other health professionals are likely to be faced with difficulties in providing adequate 
care (chapter 5). Of particular importance during crises because immediate and uniform 
action is needed, the issue of implementation has been underlined during the early days 
of the influenza A/H1N1 pandemic. In an editorial on the management of the A/H1N1 
pandemic in the UK, Anderson26 pointed out the need to develop more detailed 
guidelines that address communication, collaboration between organizations, logistics, 
and the need to monitor effects of and compliance with the measures. In a broader 
perspective, previous research by Burgers27 has shown that in general guideline 
developers place more emphasis on the development process rather than on the 
implementation of the guidelines. We conclude that expert committees that formulate 
guidelines cannot simply restrict themselves to the scientific base of their advice, but 
should be aware of the demands from daily practice and should incorporate these into 
the advice on crisis control measures in order to facilitate implementation. This point is 
further addressed in chapters 7 and 8. By applying our instrument, outbreak committees 
can make sure that all important aspects have been systematically addressed using a 
rigorous, transparent methodology and thus reducing the risk of omissions. 
The perspective of patients and health professionals with respect to crisis 
guidelines 
Crisis guidelines are issued by outbreak committees consisting of experts that are often 
not directly involved in the control in the field. The indisputable gap between the level at 
which the crisis control is being generated and the level at which optimal performance is 
expected, needs to be narrowed by understanding the frame of reference of the 
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professionals directly involved in outbreak management in the field. As already shown 
here in the previous chapters, the response in crises is often complex and it is difficult for 
professionals with different backgrounds to work together coherently, to find and 
manage cases, implement preventive measures regarding the contacts and provide 
education that targets the population group at risk. We undertook an in-depth study to 
identify barriers to implementation28 encountered by public health professionals 
(physicians and nurses) and hospital professionals (microbiologists and infection 
preventionists) in a selected number of recent crises in the Netherlands. The frequency of 
the barriers was quantified in a cross-sectional study, resulting in an overview of major 
barriers that impede implementation which we categorized according to the frame of 
Cabana et al.29, the leading model for barrier studies allowing for exploration of generic 
and setting-specific barriers (chapter 7). 
In this study we measured the frequency of a barrier using an asymmetric, five-point 
Likert-scale, without a neutral (mid-point) option, based on the experience of our 
research group and on previous studies regarding barriers of professionals and client 
satisfaction with healthcare. The rationale for this approach is that some respondents find 
it difficult to make a negative choice (in our research to agree to a constraint or barrier 
that hampers their work or to admit that something is a problem) and that they prefer to 
safely choose a neutral category. This is known as the positivity bias theory, which 
suggests that respondents are reluctant to give negative evaluations. Another problem 
encountered with the neutral category is "satisficing"30 which implies that some 
respondents tend to agree to the neutral category, as the first reasonable option, instead 
of carefully considering the entire list, and then make the individual judgment. Besides, 
there is evidence that the social desirability can be decreased by eliminating the mid-
point (neither/nor) category from Likert-scales31, while Alwin showed that the 4-point 
asymmetric scale and the 5-point symmetric scale do not differ significantly with respect 
to reliability32. Thus we may expect our results to be sound and reflect carefully 
considered choices by the respondents. 
The generic barriers in the model represent a set of essential requirements for 
improving the adherence of professionals in the field, and can help to facilitate the 
development and implementation of crisis guidelines. The study on profession-specific 
barriers revealed a finding that we also encountered during the exploration of the crises 
(chapter 2-5): the crucial position of the context from which the professional works. While 
for the professionals working in hospitals (infection preventionists, microbiologists), the 
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main barriers are related to their immediate environment and the local availability of 
healthcare facilities, for public health physicians and nurses, the barriers are mostly 
related to the broader public health setting like the chain of command and control and 
the local political willingness to endorse the measures. This means that professionals 
working closely together to control an outbreak do not necessarily share the same 
conceptions on how to implement the measures and that the professional specific 
paradigms need to be made explicit at the beginning of the outbreak, bearing in mind 
that the patients are entitled to consistent and unequivocal information on the best way 
to avert risks and control the outbreak. Recent process evaluations concerning the control 
of a large Salmonella Ti/phimurium outbreak in 200611 and of the control measures during 
the first year of the Q fever epidemic (2007)Ή in the Netherlands, show a variable degree 
of implementation of the measures and are consistent with our conclusion. They reveal 
that collaboration between the stakeholders was one of the main challenges during 
outbreak control. Furthermore, positions, responsibilities and expectations of health care 
workers and policy makers were also shown to be insufficiently addressed in pandemic 
preparedness plans, as described in a review among European countries by Mounier-Jack 
et aì.^^, implying that this issue is more fundamental and definitely not confined to the 
Netherlands alone. 
The quality of the guideline and the level of adherence by professionals influence for a 
great deal the effectiveness of outbreak management, but without compliance from the 
patients to whom the measures apply, the measures are rendered ineffective. Thus 
finally, for an optimal outcome of the measures, adherence by the patients or persons at 
risk of acquiring infection is essential. In a pilot study, we assessed the understanding of 
the measures, the satisfaction and compliance with them together with their 
consequences on daily life for the 130 contacts at risk following exposure during the 
Marburg crisis. Understanding of the measures and satisfaction with the provided care 
were high. The same applied to the compliance, especially regarding the group with a 
significant risk of exposure. Nevertheless, our findings show that restrictive measures 
have both a direct and a long term psychological effect and that the magnitude and 
persistence of these effects are determined primarily by how the measures interfere with 
daily life. Our study confirms previous research showing that, in general, measures that 
tend to disrupt the daily routine, involve extra costs, and hinder family and social life 
require additional attention from the healthcare and public health authorities174". Prior to 
the enforcement of the control measures, their expected consequences (on the basis of 
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previous outbreaks or literature evidence) should be discussed by the outbreak 
committee and should be included in the crisis guidelines (chapters 5, 7, 8). Thus 
additional resources can be made available to offer support to persons or population 
groups at risk of adverse consequences and to make sure that the impediments are 
overcome. Ideally afterwards, when the outbreak or crisis has been controlled, a 
systematic evaluation of the consequences and a critical appraisal of the feasibility and 
utility of the measures should be carried out, in order to generate new knowledge for 
further crises. 
II. Implications for professionals and policy makers 
During crises, professionals, policy makers, media and public are engaged in a complex, 
but fluid process. At both individual and population levels, the perception of risks, the 
trust in the government and the confidence in personal effectivity can shift permanently. 
Extensive, repetitive media coverage that mainly focuses on the novelty of threats and, 
most recently, unbalanced and biased information exchange through social networking 
sites have been associated with an increase in people's perception of their own 
vulnerability from unknown diseases'" u. 
Although the media are supposed to act as an 'interface between the scientific 
community, government, and the public with a responsibility to strike a careful balance 
between raising awareness of issues of public concern and irrationally alarming the 
public at large'41 they often tend to personalize the threat and to amplify the risks4J. This 
was once again confirmed during the A/H1N1 pandemic, when the people's initial 
response was demonstrated to be sensitive to media reports^. Often reasoning from the 
principle of "zero risk" or "zero tolerance"4648, society expects immediate measures and 
holds the government primarily responsible for the success of these measures. This 
implies a high degree of trust in the government. Interestingly, the trust of the public in 
the government and the public health authorities has been subject to debate for the past 
decades4''. In the United Kingdom for instance, the trust is believed to have reached the 
bottom level during the bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) and foot and mouth 
disease crises^1, when the initial communication message and the early measures did not 
cover the magnitude of the public health threat. Very recently however, Rubin et al. 
showed an encouraging high score for trust in the authorities during the early pandemic 
period in the UK while, at the same time, the media received a high score for over-
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exaggeration of the risks42. Media do not only hold a crucial position in influencing the 
public perception, but they can even be the primary source of information for medical 
professionals rather than medical sources, in some crises like for instance bioterrorism 
(chapter 5). Illustrative for the way modern societies react to present day threats is that, in 
response to the increased perception of risks, health professionals and policy makers are 
sometimes inclined to take excessive measures, not always supported by evidence. This 
seems to have been the case during the swine flu pandemic of 2009 in some Asian 
countries previously affected by SARS, where at the beginning of the pandemic measures 
might have been rather exaggerated^2. The explanation for this is that professionals and 
policy makers applied principles of control derived from SARS, which were not 
justifiable for influenza. Drastic measures were taken by China and Hong Kong like 
quarantining healthy Canadian and Mexican citizens and even sealing off an entire hotel 
when the first suspicion of swine flu arose in one guest53, while Singapore and other 
countries in South-East Asia implemented thermal scanners at the borders, to identify 
febrile travelers^4. 
These examples highlight the difficult position health professionals and policy makers 
are in when advising or deciding on crisis measures, in a context that is decreasingly 
likely to accept risks. Our modern society would benefit from a rigorous debate on how 
to deal with risks and uncertainties and especially on which margins to accept, to balance 
on one hand the possible disruptive consequences of the crisis itself and on the other 
hand, the possible consequences of the measures. To ensure an optimal response in crises, 
a carefully designed, solid and scientifically sound advice developed under high time 
pressure is the first essential condition. A sound foundation is of indisputable importance 
as shortage of time or extreme pressure will probably not provide a sufficient excuse for 
poor methodology or content. In this advice, choices for and the consequences of the 
crisis measures should be fully transparent in order to allow policy makers to make 
informed decisions. Our model provides the basis for this advice. 
The second condition is the formulation of specific implementation strategies so that 
adherence and performance criteria can be optimized in order to monitor the progression 
of the crisis control and to allow immediate re-adjustment of the measures and re-
allocation of the resources. These might involve tailored educational interventions but 
also simulations to gain hands-on competence skills and allow interaction between a mix 
of professions (chapter 5). These aspects proved to be of vital importance in practice, 
during the pandemic of A/H1N1 in Taiwan. Following the decision to implement an in-
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school nation wide vaccination program, 23 clusters of mass psychogenic illness in 
adolescents and the death of a student following vaccination triggered considerable 
media coverage and increased public concerns about the safety of the vaccine. The local 
authorities were unprepared to respond and because of time constraints, there was no 
opportunity for proper education, consultation among professionals and communication 
to the public about the likelihood of adverse events. The coverage of the second 
vaccination round dropped and the impact of the vaccination campaign was 
undermined", showing that well designed measures can fail, when implementation 
strategies are not carefully considered. 
Finally, the third essential condition for optimal outbreak management in crises is a 
well designed evaluation of the response to generate practice based knowledge to 
prepare for the worst, in the future. 
III. Future research 
• Validation on a larger scale, through prospective application in practice by various 
countries, is needed to measure the performance of the components of our model and 
set of criteria in a realistic context during real crises, reveal missing items and provide 
criteria for improvement or refinement. 
• To facilitate implementation of the crisis measures and finally improve the health 
outcome of the people at risk, more research is needed to generate evidence and 
synthesize best practice approaches into the development of valid and reliable process 
and outcome indicators for crisis measures, domains in which until now only limited 
systematic research has been described and which do not currently belong to the 
standard components of crisis guidelines or outbreak reports"6. 
• General practitioners and clinical specialists like: internal medicine physicians, 
pediatricians, and infectious diseases specialists have a crucial role in crisis control'761. 
These factors that both facilitate and impede adherence to guidelines are insufficiently 
explored and require structural attention to optimize preparedness and response to 
future crises. 
• More research is needed to design crisis specific implementation strategies and 
measure their performance in practice. These strategies should consider the crisis 
context and the multidisciplinary character of crisis control. 
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• Finally, systematic evaluation of both the process and the effect of crisis management 
should be part of the public health research agenda. Public health crises are complex 
and final outcomes are difficult to measure by research methods usually applied in 
individual patient care (RCT, cohort studies). This thesis demonstrates the 
interconnection between the various components in crises, allowing the categorization 
of outbreak management as a complex intervention62. Within the field of health service 
delivery, complex interventions are the ones delivered across the primary-secondary 
care interface, in new settings, implying a behavioral dimension and requiring staff to 
perform new behaviors or current behaviors in a new context6365. For crises, all of the 
above criteria apply, plus many more like the scarcity of evidence, time pressure, and a 
fluid context. Complex interventions are difficult to evaluate61. Further research 
comparing innovative methods from other domains of public health and social 
sciences6667 is required to design a more generic approach (framework) to evaluate 
crises and generate evidence to inform professionals and policy makers. 
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In crises due to communicable disease, when time is short and transmission of the 
pathogen progresses quickly, scientific advice is required as a basis for policy decisions to 
protect vulnerable persons and stop further transmission This thesis focuses on the 
quality requirements for the development of scientific advice by expert advisory bodies 
and for the translation into actions in the field The aim was to harmonize crisis 
guidelines and make them work for professionals who use them and patients to whom 
they apply The thesis is divided in two parts in the first part we explore the 
management of crisis situations in The Netherlands and abroad and point out priorities 
for improvement In the second part we describe research leading to the development of 
a model for crisis guidance 
Chapter 1 
Throughout the past decades, crises due to emerging and reemerging infectious diseases 
have acquired a high profile on the scientific and political agendas and have put an end 
to optimistic expectations that man would win the battle against microorganisms in the 
near future In the introductory chapter we focus on the main characteristics of crises 
such as uncertainties, complexity, time pressure, and changing perceptions To be 
successful in controlling the crisis, professionals are engaged in control measures against 
de clock Public health authorities and policy makers are expected to take adequate and 
timely decisions in the context of a society that is less likely to accept risks 
Countries all over the world have put their own systems in place to respond to crises 
by developing and implementing guidelines for outbreak control In the Netherlands, the 
Outbreak Management Team is responsible since 1995 for the scientific guidance in crises 
which is subsequently submitted to the Board of policy makers (BAO), in order to judge 
its feasibility and applicability in practice In spite of the aforementioned efforts to 
harmonize crisis control, past evaluations have revealed variations in the crisis response 
and a lack of uniform implementation in practice 
This thesis summarizes research undertaken with the aim to improve the development 
and implementation of crisis guidance A set of criteria tailored for outbreak management 
in crises, allowing for the development and implementation of good guidelines is lacking 
In order to develop such criteria, scientific knowledge on clinical guidelines needs to be 
integrated with new knowledge generated by crisis specific research questions 
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Chapter 2 
In chapter 2 we analyzed the process of outbreak management and evaluated the 
consequences of the control measures during the crisis due to severe acute respiratory 
syndrome (SARS) We focused on the consequences of deviation from the WHO case 
definition for the assessment of patients with suspected SARS in The Netherlands during 
2003 Between 17 March and 7 July 2003, as a result of dilemmas in balancing sensitivity 
and specificity, five different case definitions were used The patients referred for SARS 
assessment (N=72) were analyzed from a public health perspective None of the patients 
referred had SARS, based on serological and virological criteria Nevertheless, all 72 
patients required thorough assessment and, depending on the results of the assessment, 
institution of appropriate prevention and control measures 
Changing case definitions caused confusion in classifying cases A centralized 
assessment of the reported cases by a team with clinical and public health expertise 
(epidemiological and geographical risk assessment) is a practical solution for addressing 
differences in applying case definitions The burden of managing non-cases is an 
important issue when allocating public health resources, and should be taken into 
account during the preparation phase, rather than during an outbreak This applies not 
only to SARS, but also to other public health threats, such as pandemic influenza or a 
bioterronst episode 
Chapter 3 
On July 10, 2008, Marburg hemorrhagic fever (MHF) was confirmed in a Dutch patient 
who had vacationed recently in Uganda In chapter 3 we explore the organization of the 
response and reveal dilemmas with implications for future crisis guidelines Because of 
the high case-fatality rate combined with propensity of further transmission, a case of 
MHF is considered a public health crisis and requires prompt response from the public 
health authorities, to identify contacts at risk of becoming infected and prevent further 
transmission 
A multidisciplinary response team was convened to perform a structured risk 
assessment, perform risk classification of contacts, issue guidelines for follow-up, provide 
information, and monitor the crisis response In total, 130 contacts were identified (64 
classified as high risk and 66 as low risk) and monitored for 21 days after their last 
possible exposure The serological survey undertaken 5 to 7 months after the possible 
exposure showed that there were no asymptomatic infections in the 85/130 (65%) contacts 
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from who blood samples were obtained. We identified specific dilemmas with respect to 
international travel (such as the difficulties with the international contact tracing), 
insufficient legal provisions for measures that restrict individual freedom and prohibit 
travel, the application of post exposure prophylaxis for Marburg virus, and laboratory 
testing of contacts with fever. We present lessons learned for future crises and focus on 
factors that prevented overreaction during an event with a high public health impact. 
Given this potential, a rational response must be built on a thorough and evidence based 
crisis guidance, as the basis for a coordinated risk assessment and contact monitoring. 
Chapter 4 
Chapter 4 presents the results of a comparative analysis of the response to the 
reemergence of lymphogranuloma venereum (LGV) among European countries. LGV is a 
sexually transmitted infection (STI) caused by Chlamydia trachomatis serovars LI, L2, and 
L3. Contrary to infection with other serovars, infections with C. trachomatis Ll-3 are not 
limited to the mucosa but are often invasive and can spread to the lymph nodes, which 
results in a more severe clinical outlook. In industrialized countries, cases are incidentally 
imported from tropical and subtropical areas where the disease is endemic. 
The international outbreak of LGV started in 2003 -2004 when cases were reported 
among men who have sex with men (MSM) from some countries in Europe. Similarities 
and differences in how various countries managed the LGV outbreak were assessed in 
order to identify common practices and to formulate criteria for improving the response 
to international outbreaks. We conducted a cross-sectional survey by administering a 
structured questionnaire to representatives (surveillance leads and reference 
microbiologists) from 26 European countries, all participants in the ESSTI network 
(European Surveillance of Sexually Transmitted Infections). Responses were received 
from 18 countries. The ability to respond quickly and the measures used for outbreak 
detection and control varied. Only 11 of the 18 countries (61%) had issued early alerts to 
detect LGV, while 5/18 (28%) had convened a national outbreak management team or 
advisory committee to formulate uniform guidance, despite cases of LGV occurring 
among MSM belonging to sex networks in large cities and with numerous anonymous 
partners from different countries. Evidence-based criteria were not consistently used to 
develop recommendations. Τ 
he variable degree of preparedness for this unexpected outbreak, as well as the 
variable ability of countries to respond quickly, indicates weaknesses in the ability to 
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control an outbreak More guidance is needed to implement, coordinate and evaluate 
control measures used during international outbreaks This study shows that 
coordination should at least aim to provide guidance as to when and how alerts should 
be implemented by various countries as well as to establish uniform case definitions and 
ensure the availability of optimal diagnostic facilities We also show a lack of common 
strategies and that these should be developed with respect to treatment algorithms and 
contact tracing Furthermore, quality systems following the whole chain of outbreak 
management (alert, outbreak control measures, implementation, and evaluation) are 
needed In conclusion, our study of the response to this LGV outbreak demonstrates the 
need for a unified response to new, unexpected, infectious diseases 
Chapter 5 
In chapter 5, the question has been raised about the extent to which we can learn from 
research and practical experience on effective approaches to improve outbreak 
management Professionals and policy makers need to make complex decisions in crisis 
situations in which scientific knowledge is scarce, time pressure is high and historical 
experience from which to draw is lacking 
We performed a systematic review of strategies to improve outbreak management and 
of experiences of the professionals involved in past outbreaks in order to summarize 
lessons for public health professionals and policy makers Initially we searched Medline 
using the gold standard search strategy of the Cochrane Effective Practice and 
Organisation of Care Group to identify quality improvement studies 
(epoc Cochrane org/speciahsed-register) and combined this search strategy with 
keywords (MeSH) on outbreaks of infectious diseases We included papers that described 
the effectiveness of approaches to improve outbreak management or described practical 
experiences with outbreak management and had public health scope Of the 429 abstracts 
identified, 27 were considered eligible for the study, after double reading and agreement 
between two researchers 
Eight papers explored the effectiveness of education to improve outbreak 
management, showing mixed results Most studies used uncontrolled designs, making it 
difficult to draw conclusions on effectiveness Simulation might be more effective than 
web based education on outbreak management Well designed studies comparing the 
pros and the cons of both types of educational strategies are needed 
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Nineteen papers provided a long list of experienced obstacles, facilitators and lessons 
learned while performing outbreak management. From these experiences we drew up 
lessons regarding the measures to stop transmission (17 lessons), the infrastructure (7 
lessons); the professionals involved (12 lessons) and regarding the resources (6 lessons) 
for outbreak management. Taking these lessons into account when managing a future 
outbreak should significantly facilitate and improve this process. 
Chapter 6 
During the past decades, some outbreaks have developed into national or international 
crises and have made news headlines. Because of the complexity and unpredictability 
involved in managing crises, authoritative guidelines on control measures are needed in 
order to support decisions taken by doctors and policymakers. Quality criteria for crisis 
guidelines are lacking. 
The aim of the study described in chapter 6 was to identify quality criteria for scientific 
guidance on outbreak control during crises, in order to help health professionals and 
policymakers to make informed decisions in practice. We undertook a multistage 
approach to characterize crises in which customized guidance is needed, and to develop 
draft criteria for good scientific guidance on outbreak control measures. The draft set of 
63 criteria was submitted for assessment of face validity and reliability in a 2-rounds 
multinational consensus procedure on the basis of the RAND/UCLA appropriateness 
method, in which experts (physicians and public health specialists with proven 
experience with outbreak control guidance in crises) from European countries plus 
Singapore and China were invited to participate. Agreement to a criterion was scored by 
the participants using a 9 point Likert scale. Medians were calculated for each item. We 
defined validity and reliability by a median rating of 8-9 and without disagreement. 
Panelists from 21 countries participated in the panel; 37 completed the first round and 
33 the second round. On the basis of the median of individual ratings, 34/63 (44%) criteria 
were both face valid and reliable after two consensus rounds. The final set contains 
generic characteristics of crises requiring control guidance (i.e severe clinical disease with 
a high case fatality rate, unknown pathogens, and scarcity of knowledge on early 
detection and control). Good scientific guidance addresses medical uncertainties, 
expected impact and perceived severity. To be applicable in practice, the choice for the 
control measures should be transparent including dissident minority view points 
reflecting conflicting interpretations. Available information linking measures to the 
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supporting evidence together with experiences from other countries should be provided 
The 34 criteria provide a systematic tool to describe a crisis and to develop scientific 
guidance on control measures irrespective of the infectious agent and the healthcare 
system in place, to make sure that no important step has been overlooked 
Chapter 7 
Communicable disease crises can endanger the healthcare system and often require 
special guidelines To be effective, crisis guidelines need to be immediately and 
uniformly implemented in practice Understanding reasons for non-adherence to crisis 
guidelines is needed to improve crisis management 
In chapter 7 we identified and measured barriers and conditions for optimal adherence 
as perceived by four categories of healthcare professionals consultant microbiologists, 
infection preventiomsts, public health physicians and public health nurses, in The 
Netherlands We first performed in-depth interviews (N=26) to explore barriers to crisis 
guidelines The interviewees were selected on the basis of their involvement with one or 
more of the following outbreaks in the Netherlands SARS, outbreaks due to Clostridium 
difficile nbotype 027, rubella, and the outbreak due to avian influenza A/H7N7 virus On 
the basis of the interviews, a questionnaire was designed for each category of 
professionals The questionnaires comprising the barriers were subsequently submitted 
for agreement to microbiologists (response 100%), infection preventiomsts (response 
74%), public health physicians (response 96%), and public health nurses (response 82%) 
The groups were asked to appraise barriers according to a 5-point Likert scale When at 
least 33% of the responders filled in strongly agree, agree or rather agree than disagree , 
a barrier was defined as "often experienced" The common ("generic") barriers were 
included in a univariate and multivariate model Barriers specific to the various groups 
were also studied 
Crisis guidelines were found to have four generic barriers to adherence (1) lack of 
imperative or precise wording, (2) lack of easily identifiable instructions specific to each 
profession, (3) lack of concrete performance targets, and (4) lack of timely and adequate 
guidance on personal protective equipment and other safety measures Additionally, the 
cross-sectional study yielded profession specific sets of often experienced barriers Our 
findings show that some barriers apply to most professionals They should be addressed 
with priority when improving outbreak management Others are profession-specific and 
require specific implementation strategies Profession-specific barriers require profession-
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specific strategies to change attitudes, ensure organizational facilities, and provide an 
adequate setting for crisis management. At a more general level, this study underlines the 
inner complexity of crises determined by the necessity to co-operate between many 
disciplines, an aspect crisis committees and policy makers should be aware of when 
advising or deciding on control measures. 
Chapter 8 
Following notification of an imported case of Marburg hemorrhagic fever (MHF) in the 
Netherlands, restrictive measures to prevent transmission to exposed contacts were 
imposed. The impact of restrictive measures has not been systematically evaluated. 
In chapter 8 we studied the impact of restrictive measures. We undertook a 
retrospective cohort study of the 130 contacts with risk of exposure using a structured 
questionnaire. The contacts were classified as either having high-risk exposure (i.e., 
unprotected) or low-risk exposure (i.e., under protective measures). We studied 
understanding, reported compliance with the measures, their interference with daily life 
and psychological impact. Of the 130, 77 (60%; 45/64 high-risk and 32/66 low-risk 
contacts) completed the questionnaire. 
Agreement with 'necessity of twice-daily temperature monitoring and reporting' was 
87%, and was significantly higher among high-risk than low-risk contacts (p< 0.001); 
compliance with temperature monitoring was 80% in week 1 but decreased to 66% in the 
final week. Temperature monitoring was considered 'problematic' by 33%. Contacts 
expressed concern of developing MHF (58%), of infecting a family member (40%), and 
fear that a colleague might be unknowingly infected (45%) and thus further spread the 
virus. One third experienced some degree of stress. High-risk contacts scored 
significantly higher on psychological impact scales (p< 0.001), both during as after the 
monitoring period, whereas psychological complaints persisted at a low level in both risk 
groups, months after exposure. 
Being a contact of a patient with MHF is a stressful event and restrictive control 
measures have a significant impact on the daily life of contacts and their families. 
Outbreak response committees need to be aware of the immediate and long term impact 
that restrictive measures may have on the persons involved. 
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Chapter 9 
In the final chapter, we discuss the main results of our studies and point out their 
implications for the current practice of crisis control and for the future Our exploratory 
studies of the SARS, MHF, and LGV crises and our literature review show that 
formulating guidelines and making them available to physicians and public health 
services does not implicitly mean that they would be used properly in crises and have the 
expected outcome. Equally we show that the generic components of the control chain are 
insufficiently interconnected. 
In order to improve crisis control a "system thinking approach" would be needed to 
guide the response and enforce uniform, high standard procedures for the whole chain of 
outbreak management, linking the generic components - recognition and alert, outbreak 
control measures, implementation activities, and evaluation - in one coherent system We 
believe that systematically addressing the generic features would improve the quality 
and uniformity of crisis control We captured the generic features of crises from a variety 
of perspectives and designed a model which consists of. the instrument for the 
development of good crisis guidelines, the barriers overview from the professionals' 
perspective and the consequences of the measures for the patients 
To ensure an optimal response in crises, in the future, a carefully designed, solid and 
scientifically sound advice developed under high time pressure is the first essential 
condition, which could be accomplished by using our model The second condition 
would be to design crisis specific implementation strategies to optimize adherence and 
develop performance criteria in order to monitor the progression of the crisis control and 
to allow immediate re-adjustment of the measures and re-allocation of the resources To 
achieve this condition and to fulfill the third one- an evaluation framework to capture the 





In infectieziektecrises worden er, onder grote tijdsdruk, crisisadviezen uitgebracht die 
aan de basis staan van de beleidsbeslissingen over de bestrijdingsmaatregelen. We 
behandelen in dit proefschrift de kwaliteitseisen voor het ontwikkelen van het 
crisisadvies door outbreakmanagementteams of expertgroepen en voor de implementatie 
daarvan in de praktijk. Hiermee beogen wij een verdere uniformering van de 
crisisrichtlijnen en een verbetering van hun gebruik door professionals en patiënten. Het 
proefschrift bestaat uit twee delen: in het eerste deel wordt de bestrijding van enkele 
crises in Nederland en in het buitenland geanalyseerd en worden er prioriteiten voor 
verbetering geformuleerd. Het tweede omvat studies die geleid hebben tot de 
ontwikkeling van een model voor crisisadvisering. 
Hoofdstuk 1 
Als gevolg van een ongekende vooruitgang in de geneeskunde en in de medische 
technologie, ontstond er, halverwege de tweede helft van de vorige eeuw, een kentering 
in de perceptie van het belang van infectieziekten door de medische wereld. 
Infectieziekten zouden spoedig worden overwonnen en de dreiging daarvan zou op 
korte termijn tot het verleden behoren. In de afgelopen decennia hebben uitbraken en 
crises, veroorzaakt door opduikende en heropduikende pathogenen, een einde gemaakt 
aan het optimisme over een toekomst zonder grote dreigingen door infectieziekten. Voor 
wetenschappers en bestuurders is het langzamerhand steeds duidelijker geworden dat de 
mens de strijd tegen de micro-organismen niet zal winnen op korte termijn. 
Na een korte geschiedenis van de belangrijkste ontwikkelingen in de crisisbestrijding, 
worden in de inleiding de kenmerken van crisis situaties zoals: grote mate van 
onzekerheid, complexiteit, tijdsdruk en veranderende percepties nader toegelicht. 
Professionals en beleidsmakers worden verondersteld om uitbraken en crises te stoppen 
door tijdig de juiste beslissingen te nemen in de context van een afgenomen 
risicoacceptatie door de moderne samenleving. 
Wereldwijd hebben verschillende landen hun eigen organisaties opgericht om 
crisisadviezen te ontwikkelen, implementeren en om uitbraken effectief te bestrijden. In 
crisissituaties in Nederland brengt sinds 1995 het Outbreak Management Team (OMT), 
een professioneel advies over de noodzakelijke bestrijdingsmaatregelen uit aan het 
Bestuurlijk Afstemmingsoverleg (BAO), dat namens de minister van VWS het besluit 
neemt over de geadviseerde maatregelen. Evaluaties van recente crisissituaties hebben 
een aanzienlijke variatie laten zien in de lokale implementatie van de crisisadviezen en 
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dus in de aanpak van de bestrijding Er is behoefte aan een set van criteria voor de 
ontwikkeling en implementatie van goede crisisnchtlijnen De studies uit dit proefschrift 
zijn erop gericht de cnsisbestrijding te verbeteren door de integratie van 
wetenschappelijke kennis over nchtlijnenontwikkeling met nieuwe kennis over 
cnsisspecifieke problematiek 
Hoofdstuk 2 
In hoofdstuk 2 wordt het outbreakmanagementproces geanalyseerd en worden de 
gevolgen van de bestrijdingsmaatregelen tijdens de uitbraak van 'severe acute 
respiratory syndrome' (SARS) geëvalueerd Centraal hierin staan de consequenties van 
het afwijken van de WHO- casusdefinitie voor de klinische beoordeling van patiënten 
met verdenking van SARS in Nederland, in 2003 Vanwege grote dilemma's in het 
afwegen van het belang van specificiteit en sensitiviteit, zijn er in Nederland vijf 
opeenvolgende casusdefinities gebruikt, tussen 17 maart en 7 juli 2003 
De patiënten die verwezen waren voor de beoordeling van het risico van een 
besmetting met het SARS-coronavirus (N=72), zijn retrospectief geanalyseerd Op basis 
van serologische en virologische criteria werd bij geen van de verwezen patiënten 
daadwerkelijk een infectie met dit virus vastgesteld Desalniettemin, zijn al deze 72 
patiënten individueel beoordeeld, en werden er, afhankelijk van de risico-inschatting, 
verdere infectiepreventiemaatregelen getroffen Het veranderen van de casusdefinities 
veroorzaakte verwarring en variatie in de beoordeling en het management van de 
patiënten 
Om verwarring te voorkomen en variatie te reduceren is een gecentraliseerde 
beoordeling van verdachte gevallen nodig, door een team dat beschikt over zowel 
klinische als public health expertise De extra belasting op de GGD'en en op de 
huisartsenpraktijken door de noodzaak om gevallen die niet voldoen aan de 
casusdefinitie adequaat te beoordelen is een belangrijk aspect van de preparatie op 
grootschalige gebeurtenissen Dit geldt niet alleen voor SARS, maar is ook van toepassing 




Op 10 juli 2010 werd Marburg hemorrhagische koorts vastgesteld bij een Nederlandse 
patiënte, na terugkomst van een vakantie in Oeganda. Hoofdstuk 3 analyseert de 
organisatie van de respons op deze melding en bespreekt dilemma's met gevolgen voor 
toekomstige crises. Het vaststellen van één of meer gevallen van Marburg 
hemorrhagische koorts wordt beschouwd als een public health-crisis vanwege (1) de 
ernst van het klinische beeld dat gepaard gaat met een hoge kans op een fatale afloop en 
(2) het risico van verdere verspreiding van het Marburgvirus naar directe contacten. De 
public health-maatregelen zijn gericht op het nemen van infectiepreventiemaatregelen 
rondom de patiënt en de snelle opsporing van alle contacten met risico op infectie. 
Direct na de melding van de verdenking van deze infectie, werd een multidisciplinair 
responsteam samengesteld met als taken: (1) het beoordelen van het individuele risico 
van de contacten, (2) het classificeren van de contacten in de hoog of laagrisicogroep, (3) 
het formuleren van de crisisrichtlijnen voor het monitoren van gezondheid van de 
contacten gedifferentieerd naar risicogroep, (4) het geven van informatie aan 
professionals, beleidsmakers, pers en publiek en (5) het opvolgen van het effect van de 
maatregelen. Er werden 130 contacten geïdentificeerd, waarvan 64 ingedeeld in de 
hoogrisicogroep en 66 in de laagrisicogroep. Allen werden geplaatst onder monitoring 
van koorts en gezondheidsklachten gedurende 21 dagen na het laatste moment van 
mogelijke blootstelling aan de patiënte en/of haar lichaamsvloeistoffen. Ook werd hen 
dringend gevraagd om Nederland niet te verlaten en om dagelijks in contact te treden 
met de GGD of de bedrijfsarts. Geen van de contacten ontwikkelde klachten passend bij 
Marburg hemorrhagische koorts. Een seroprevalentiestudie uitgevoerd 5 tot 7 maanden 
na de monitoring toonde geen tekenen van een asymptomatische infectie bij de 85 van de 
130 contacten (65%) van wie een bloedmonster werd afgenomen. 
Wij beschrijven de dilemma's met betrekking tot de internationale contactopsporing, 
de juridische (on)mogelijkheden om maatregelen te treffen die de vrijheid van het 
individu beperken (zoals het verbod op reizen), het gebrek aan adequate middelen voor 
postexpositieprofylaxe en de beperkingen van laboratoriumdiagnostiek bij contacten met 
koorts, ter uitsluiting van de diagnose Marburg hemorrhagische koorts en het aantonen 
van een alternatieve verwekker. Tevens bespreken we de lessen voor toekomstige crises 
waaronder de meest geschikte aanpak om een paniekreactie te voorkomen, ondanks de 
hoge impact van een dergelijke melding. Juist vanwege de grote impact, is een rationele, 
gecoördineerde en evidence-based aanpak nodig. 
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Hoofdstuk 4 
Hoofdstuk 4 presenteert een vergelijkende studie van de respons op de uitbraak van 
lymphogranuloma venereum (LGV) in de Europese landen LGV is een seksueel 
overdraagbare aandoening (soa) veroorzaakt door Chlamydia trachomatis (CT) serotype 
LI, L2 en L3 die gepaard kan gaan met ernstige anorectale klachten Tot 2003 werd LGV 
slechts incidenteel gezien, als importgevallen uit LGV-endemisch landen Na 2003 
kwamen de eerste signalen van uitbraken van LGV onder mannen die seks hebben met 
mannen (MSM) in meerdere landen m Europa Wij voerden een dwarsdoorsnedestudie 
d m v een gestructureerde vragenlijst De vragenlijst werd verstuurd naar 
vertegenwoordigers (hoofden afdeling epidemiologie en referentielaboratoria voor 
microbiologie) van 26 landen, de toenmalige deelnemers aan het ESSTI-netwerk 
(European Surveillance of Sexually Transmitted Infections) Van 18 landen ontvingen wij 
de ingevulde vragenlijsten terug 
De capaciteit om snel maatregelen te treffen en de inhoud van de maatregelen gericht 
op het opsporen en behandelen van patiënten varieerden aanzienlijk tussen de 
verschillende landen Slechts 11/18 (61%) landen maakten gebruik van de 
vroegsignalenng en alertenng en 5/18 (28%) stelden een outbreakmanagementteam 
samen om een deskundig advies te formuleren over de gewenste maatregelen, dit terwijl 
in meerdere landen aanwijzingen waren voor gevallen van LGV opgetreden binnen 
internationale seksuele netwerken van MSM We vonden een wisselende mate van 
voorbereiding op deze onverwachte uitbraak Meer aansturing is nodig om maatregelen 
te implementeren, coördineren en evalueren tijdens internationale uitbraken of 
dreigingen 
Uit deze studie blijkt dat coördinatie nodig is m b t de vroegsignalenng en alertenng, 
uniformering van de casusdefinities en beschikbaarheid van laboratoriumdiagnostiek 
Ook illustreert deze studie het gebrek aan uniformiteit tussen landen wat betreft 
behandelstrategieen en contactopsponng Deze studie onderbouwt de noodzaak van een 
kwaliteitssysteem voor de hele keten van outbreakmanagement (alertenng, 
bestrijdingsmaatregelen, implementatie en evaluatie) ter voorbereiding op de respons op 
nieuwe, onverwachte dreigingen in de toekomst 
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Hoofdstuk 5 
Professionals en beleidsmakers nemen complexe besluiten in crisissituaties waarin de 
wetenschappelijke evidentie beperkt is en er weinig tijd is voor uitvoerige consultatie van 
derden In hoofdstuk 5 presenteren wij een systematisch literatuuronderzoek naar 
bewezen effectieve strategieën om outbreakmanagement te verbeteren en naar 
ervaringen met de bestrijding van eerdere uitbraken of crises 
Het doel van dit onderzoek was om een breed overzicht te genereren van bruikbare 
lessen voor professionals en beleidsmakers We zochten m Medline m b ν de 'Cochrane 
Effective Practice and Organisation of Care Group' zoekstrategie (epoc Cochrane org/ 
specialised-register), de gouden standaard voor studies gericht op kwaliteitsverbetering 
in de zorg Deze zoekopdracht combineerden wij met sleutelwoorden (MeSH) over 
uitbraken We hebben artikelen gezocht die geschreven waren vanuit een public health 
perspectief en die beschreven (1) de effectiviteit van interventies of (2) praktische 
ervaringen met outbreakmanagement Van de 429 gevonden artikelen, zijn er 27 
gemcludeerd in deze studie, na afzonderlijke beoordeling door twee onderzoekers en 
consensusvorming bij verschillen 
Acht artikelen behandelden de effectiviteit van educatieve interventies gericht op 
professionals Omdat de meeste daarvan ongecontroleerde studies betroffen, was het heel 
moeilijk om hun effectiviteit daadwerkelijk te onderbouwen Simulatieoefeningen lijken 
meer effectief dan web based educatieve interventies Goed opgezette studies, die de 
voor- en nadelen van beide typen educatieve interventies vergelijken, zijn noodzakelijk 
om een definitieve conclusie te kunnen trekken 
Uit de overige negentien artikelen kon een groot overzicht worden gegenereerd van 
belemmerende en bevorderende factoren en lessen voor outbreak management voor de 
toekomst Wij identificeerden 17 lessen betreffende de maatregelen om verdere 
verspreiding te voorkomen, 7 om een adequate infrastructuur te creëren voor de 
implementatie van de maatregelen, 12 betreffende de professionals die de maatregelen 
moeten uitvoeren, en 6 betreffende de noodzakelijke middelen en faciliteiten Het proces 
van outbreakmanagement kan worden verbeterd door, in toekomstige crises, consequent 
rekening te houden met deze lessen uit de literatuur 
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Hoofdstuk 6 
In de afgelopen jaren hebben sommige uitbraken geleid tot landelijke of internationale 
crisissituaties die uitvoerige aandacht kregen in de media. Vanwege de complexiteit en 
de onvoorspelbaarheid van crisissituaties, hebben professionals en beleidsmakers 
inhoudelijke, sturende crisisadviezen nodig om de beslissingen in de behandelkamer of 
op een hoger beleidsniveau te ondersteunen. Er zijn geen kwaliteitscriteria beschreven 
waaraan een crisisadvies of richtlijn zou moeten voldoen. 
Het doel van de studie beschreven in hoofdstuk 6 was om een set van kwaliteitscriteria 
voor crisisadviezen samen te stellen, om professionals en beleidsmakers te helpen 
beslissen in onzekerheid. In een het eerste deel van de studie hebben we een gefaseerde 
aanpak ondernomen om de kenmerken van crises te identificeren en een set van 
kwaliteitscriteria samen te stellen op basis van bevindingen uit de literatuur en op basis 
van meningen van experts. Dit was de basis voor ons conceptinstrument, bestaande uit 
63 criteria. Het conceptinstrument werd vervolgens voorgelegd ter beoordeling van de 
validiteit en betrouwbaarheid aan een internationaal expertpanel, in het kader van een 
RAND/UCLA-consensusmethode. 
De experts waren artsen en onderzoekers met bewezen ervaring met 
crisismanagement (zoals SARS of aviaire influenza) afkomstig van Europese landen, 
Singapore en China. De overeenstemming met een criterium werd door iedere deelnemer 
aangegeven op een 9-punts Likertschaal. Het mediaan werd berekend voor ieder 
criterium. Criteria met een mediaan van 8 of 9 werden beschouwd als valide en 
betrouwbaar. Panelleden afkomstig uit 21 landen participeerden in de 
consensusprocedure (37 in de eerste ronde, 33 in beide ronden). Op basis van 
mediaanwaarde, werden 34/63 (44%) criteria als valide en betrouwbaar beoordeeld, na de 
tweede ronde. Deze werden geïncludeerd in het definitieve instrument. 
Dit instrument bevat de generieke kenmerken van crises (zoals de ernst van het 
klinisch beeld, de hoge case-fatality rate, de onzekerheden over het micro-organisme, en 
de beperkte kennis over de bestrijding) en de kwaliteitseisen voor een goed crisisadvies. 
Een goed crisisadvies houdt rekening met de medisch-inhoudelijke onzekerheden, de te 
verwachten impact van de aandoening en de veranderende percepties. Om de 
maatregelen optimaal te kunnen toepassen in de praktijk, dient de keuze voor de 
maatregelen te worden onderbouwd en dienen de gemaakte afwegingen volledig 
transparant te zijn. Eventuele dissidente meningen binnen de expertgroep 
verantwoordelijk voor het crisisadvies zouden moeten worden geëxpliciteerd. De link 
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tussen de maatregelen en het bewijs van hun effectiviteit en eventuele ervaringen van 
andere landen met soortgelijke situaties zouden vaste onderdelen moeten worden van 
het crisisadvies. Dit instrument kan worden gebruikt als een checklist om de kenmerken 
van een crisissituatie systematisch te beschrijven en het crisisadvies op te stellen, 
onafhankelijk van het infectieuze agens en de inrichting van het 
gezondheidszorgsysteem. Hiermee kan worden voorkomen dat essentiële componenten 
van het crisisadvies over het hoofd worden gezien. 
Hoofdstuk 7 
Crisissituaties kunnen het hele gezondheidszorgsysteem ontwrichten en vereisen 
specifieke crisisadviezen en richtlijnen. Om de bestrijding effectief te laten verlopen is het 
noodzakelijk dat de richtlijnen direct en uniform worden geïmplementeerd in de praktijk. 
Inzicht krijgen in de redenen voor het niet opvolgen van crisisrichtlijnen is essentieel om 
de bestrijding te verbeteren. 
Hoofdstuk 7 beschrijft een studie waarin de belemmerende factoren (barrières) voor 
optimale opvolgingen van de maatregelen werden onderzocht bij vier categorieën van 
professionals in Nederland: artsen-microbioloog, ziekenhuishygiënisten, artsen 
infectieziektebestrijding en sociaal verpleegkundigen. De eerste stap was een exploratie 
van de barrières d.m.v. diepte-interviews (N=26), gehouden met professionals die 
ervaring hadden opgedaan met de bestrijding van een of meer van de volgende crises: 
SARS, uitbraken van Clostridium difficile ribotype 027, rubella en aviaire influenza 
(A/H7N7). De bevindingen uit de interviews vormden de basis voor een questionnaire 
voor iedere categorie van professionals. De questionnaires werden verstuurd naar: 
ziekenhuishygiënisten (respons 74%), artsen-infectieziektebestrijding (96%), sociaal-
verpleegkundigen (respons 82%) en een steekproef van microbiologen (respons 100%). 
Hen werd gevraagd om aan te geven in hoeverre een barrière een probleem vormde in de 
uitvoering van crisisbestrijding op een 5-punts Likertschaal. Een barrière werd in deze 
studie beschouwd als "vaak voorkomend" wanneer tenminste 33% van de respondenten 
een van de volgende categorieën aankruiste: "helemaal eens, eens, meer eens dan 
oneens". De gemeenschappelijke (generieke) barrières werden opgenomen in een 
univariaat en multivariaat model. Groepspecifieke barrières werden apart geanalyseerd. 
Wij vonden vier generieke barrières die de opvolging van crisisadviezen belemmeren: (1) 
de crisismaatregelen zijn onvoldoende helder en dwingend geformuleerd; (2) de 
beroepsgroepspecifieke instructies zijn niet direct te vinden in het crisisadvies; (3) er zijn 
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geen implementatie-indicatoren geformuleerd, en (4) de richtlijnen over het 
infectiepreventiebeleid en de persoonlijke beschermende middelen zijn te laat en niet 
adequaat 
Onze studie laat zien dat sommige barrières gelden voor het merendeel van de 
professionals en zouden met voorrang moeten worden geadresseerd om de 
cnsisbestnjding te verbeteren Andere daarentegen zijn veel meer beroepsgroepspecifiek 
en vereisen gedifferentieerde implementatiestrategieën om attitudes te veranderen, de 
organisatiestructuur te verbeteren en de optimale setting voor de bestrijding te 
garanderen Een algemene conclusie uit onze studie is dat outbreakmanagementteams en 
beleidsmakers rekening moeten houden met de complexiteit van crises waarin 
professionals met verschillende typen expertise samenwerken om de geadviseerde 
bestnjdings-maatregelen te implementeren 
Hoofdstuk 8 
Als gevolg van de melding van een patiente met Marburg hemorrhagische koorts in 
Nederland, werden er aan de directe contacten restrictieve maatregelen opgelegd om 
nieuwe besmettingen tijdig op te sporen en verdere transmissie te voorkomen De impact 
van wettelijke, al dan met dwingende, maatregelen is niet systematisch onderzocht 
Hoofdstuk 8 beschrijft een retrospectief onderzoek d m v een gestructureerde, web 
based vragenlijst, onder de 130 contacten van deze patiente De contacten werden 
onderverdeeld, op basis van het risico, in twee groepen de groep met hoog risico van 
blootstelling (direct contact met de patiente of de lichaamsvloeistoffen, zonder gebruik 
van beschermende middelen) en de groep met laag risico van bloostelhng (direct contact 
met de patiente of de lichaamsvloeistoffen waarbij beschermende middelen werden 
gebruikt) Wij bestudeerden de kennis van en het begrip voor de maatregelen, de 
gerapporteerde naleving, de interferentie van de maatregelen met het dagelijkse leven 
van de contacten en hun gezinnen en de psychologische impact daarvan Wij ontvingen 
77/130 (60%) ingevulde vragenlijsten (45/64 in de hoognsicogroep en 32/66 in de 
laagnsicogroep) 
Van de respondenten had 87% begrip voor de noodzaak van de 
temperatuurmonotonng en melding (het percentage was significant hoger in de 
hoognsicogroep t o ν de laagnsicogroep, p< 0 001) De compliance met de 
temperatuurmomtoring daalde van 80% in week een naar 66% in week drie 33% van de 
contacten ervoer de temperatuurmomtoring als belastend, terwijl 58% bezorgd was over 
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het risico van ontwikkelen van de ziekte. In 40% van de gevallen was men bang om een 
gezinslid te besmetten en 45% was bang dat een collega besmet zou kunnen zijn zonder 
het te weten. Eén derde van de contacten rapporteerde stress. De psychologische impact 
gemeten op basis van de Impact of Event Scale (lES-R), was hoger in de hoogrisicogroep, 
zowel tijdens de periode van monitoring als maanden later. 
Personen geplaatst onder monitoring maken een stressvolle periode door. De 
restrictieve maatregelen hebben een meetbare impact op hun dagelijks leven en dat van 
hun gezinsleden. Outbreakmanagementteams dienen hiermee rekening te houden, zowel 
wat betreft de crisisrichtlijnen als de organisatie van de zorg rondom de personen onder 
monitoring. 
Hoofdstuk 9 
In het laatste hoofdstuk gaan we in op de belangrijkste bevindingen uit onze studies en 
bespreken we hun betekenis in het perspectief van praktijk van de crisisbestrijding, nu 
en in de toekomst. Onze exploraties van de bestrijding van SARS, MHF en LGV en onze 
literatuurstudie laten zien dat het ontoereikend is om adviezen en richtlijnen in 
crisissituaties op te stellen en deze te verspreiden naar artsen en GGD'en. Daarnaast 
laten wij zien dat de verschillende componenten van de bestrijdingsketen onvoldoende 
aan elkaar gelinkt zijn. 
Om de crisisbestrijding daadwerkelijk te verbeteren is een systeembenadering nodig 
(omvattende de: crisisalertering, formulering van de crisismaatregelen, implementatie en 
evaluatie) om de respons in crises te leiden en een uniforme aanpak te garanderen. We 
hebben de generieke componenten van de crisisbestrijding onderzocht vanuit 
verschillende perspectieven en een model samengesteld bestaande uit: het instrument 
voor de ontwikkeling van crisisrichtlijnen, de barrières in de uitvoering gezien vanuit de 
optiek van de professionals en de gevolgen van de maatregelen voor de patiënten. 
De eerste voorwaarde voor een optimale respons in crises is een zorgvuldig opgesteld, 
wetenschappelijk solide crisisadvies, ontwikkeld onder tijdsdruk. Ons model kan hiertoe 
helpen. De tweede voorwaarde is het gebruik van crisisspecifieke strategieën, om de 
opvolging van de maatregelen te bevorderen en voortgang van de bestrijding te 
monitoren, om in staat te zijn de maatregelen, indien nodig, direct aan te passen en de 
middelen te herverdelen in het veld. Voor het vervullen van deze en de derde 
voorwaarde - een evaluatiekader die de complexiteit van een crisis volledig kan 




Een dankwoord schrijven is een leuke opgave. Al vanaf het moment dat ik het 
onderzoeksvoorstel indiende, fantaseerde ik over wat ik zou schrijven en wie ik zou 
noemen. Maar nu het zover is, vraag ik me af waar ik eigenlijk mee zou moeten 
beginnen? Alles wat ik meegemaakt heb en iedereen die ik in de verschillende stadia van 
mijn leven heb ontmoet hebben een invloed gehad op wie ik ben geworden. 
Ik begin dan ook bij mijn leermeesters in de Alma Mater Napocensis, te veel om bij de 
naam te noemen, te belangrijk om er niet bij stil te staan. Mijn passie voor de geneeskunst 
en het begrip voor de maatschappij zijn, voor een groot deel, door hen bepaald. De keuze 
voor infectieziekten was al snel gemaakt, geïntrigeerd door de vaak onvoorspelbare 
interactie tussen micro-organismen en de mens. Studerend in de tijd dat AIDS opkwam 
en de ontdekking van hiv werd bevochten tussen wetenschappers onderling ("niets 
menselijks is onderzoekers vreemd"), leken de colleges microbiologie en 
infectiologie/epidemiologie speurtochten naar de ware verwekker. (Ook House moet vast 
in dezelfde periode opgeleid zijn geweest). Ik wilde dan ook een dokter worden die het 
mysterie van de infectie begreep en de transmissie van bacteriën of virussen kon stoppen. 
Ik kreeg deze kans, later, volop in mijn werk. Het allermooiste was om ook nog aan een 
proefschrift hierover te mogen werken. 
Ik ben mijn promotores, prof. dr. R.P.T.M. Grol (Richard) en prof. dr. J.W.M, van der 
Meer (Jos) dankbaar voor hun scherpte en de breedte van hun interesse die leidden tot 
prikkelende gesprekken. Jammer genoeg waren ze altijd zo kort in mijn beleving. Toen in 
het voorjaar van 2010 het verlossende woord kwam gevolgd door de zin "we laten je nu 
los", voelde dat als een finale afsluiting van een zeer inspirerende tijd. Richard en Jos, 
van mij hadden onze discussies nog jaren mogen doorgaan... 
Mijn co-promotor, dr. M.E.J.L. Hulscher (Marlies), heeft het geduld en de wijsheid 
gehad om mij mijn gang te laten gaan, wetend dat ik haar zou opzoeken als ik haar nodig 
had. Bedankt Marlies, voor jouw gestructureerde en degelijke aanpak. Ik was de 
gezelligheid bijna vergeten, maar daar ik kom nog op terug, als we elkaar weer zien. 
En nu mijn woord tot mijn andere co-promotor, dr. J.E. van Steenbergen. Jim, bedankt 
voor ontelbare dingen. Jij hebt me geholpen bij mijn eerste uitbraak in Delft (scabiës, weet 
je het nog?), waarvoor je bereid was om een heel eind te reizen, in de stromende regen 
met je kunstzinnige brede hoed, die ik zo goed vond bij je passen, maar nooit meer zag 
sindsdien. Bedankt voor de bereidheid om mij op te leiden als arts 
infectieziektebestrijding. Bedankt voor de mooie samenwerking van de afgelopen 10 jaar. 
Bedankt voor de inspiratie en het luisterende oor als ik het niet meer zag zitten, tijdens 
mijn promotietraject. 
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Ik wil ook degenen bedanken die mi] de ruimte boden om onderzoek te doen, bij GGD 
Nederland Rob Beuse (de beste leermeester in management en organisatie, maar dat 
terzijde), Laurent de Vries en Martin de Vries die altijd behulpzaam zijn geweest om het 
ZonMw-project te kunnen uitvoeren Ook hierbij mijn dank aan de externe 
begeleidingscommissie bestaande uit Hans Buijing, Frits Coumans, Sjaak de Gouw, Rob 
van Kessel (taalkundig wonder1) en Jan van Wijngaarden (Jan, nu is het echt klaar, je 
hoeft me niet meer te pesten) Bedankt Roel (Coutinho) voor het begrip dat ik ook nog 
onderzoek moest doen en daarvoor, in het begin, soms afwezig was Ook bedankt voor 
de aanmoediging om het snel af te krijgen ("nietje erdoorheen") Het heeft geholpen' 
Mijn opeenvolgende medeonderzoekers Dieuwke (lieve betrouwbare collega), Olga 
(optimistist en perfectionist, met een groot gevoel voor humor en gedeelde liefde voor 
fudge), Laura (de "zo rustige Laura") en Edwin (stille, geduldige, aimabele 
"boekendokter") zijn onmisbaar geweest in de loop der jaren om dit tot een goed einde te 
brengen Allen bedankt' Onderzoek is alleen maar leuk als je het samen doet Bedankt 
medeauteurs en alle anderen die bijgedragen hebben aan de verschillende studies 
Op een gegeven moment zijn de studies af, zijn de artikelen geschreven en je denkt 
(geheel onterecht, trouwens) dat je er al bijna bent Maar dan begint de nieuwe fase, met 
als resultaat een manuscript en dan een pdf daarvan en dan een gecorrigeerde versie en 
dan kies je een drukker, en het papier, het lettertype, het kaft en dan volgen nog meer 
opties voor het binden of toch brocheren Om dit allemaal te kunnen doorstaan heb ik de 
steun gehad van Jolanda van Haren, nauwkeurig en altijd klaar om te helpen Bedankt 
Jolanda, maar ook Kata, Karin, Klazien, Gonme, Jose en Jenny voor jullie hulp 
Lieve paranimfen, jullie geestige kaarten en de bereidheid om mij bij te staan hebben 
heel veel voor me betekend Mochten jullie ooit hulp nodig hebben bij jullie eigen 
promotie het preparedness draaiboek ligt klaar 
Achteraf bezien, was het een razend drukke tijd voor mij en voor de hele LCI Bedankt 
collega's voor jullie geduld en voor de aarzeling om mijn kamer te betreden als de deur 
dicht was (ik zag en hoorde jullie wel ) Vanaf nu is de "open door policy" weer van 
kracht 
Lieve familie, lieve vrienden het is een feest om dit met jullie te kunnen delen We 
kunnen weer afspreken, we kunnen weer reizen, we kunnen weer gastronomische 
avonden organiseren Ger, in het bijzonder, bedankt voor jouw hulp met de Engelse taal 
in het prille begin van mijn promotietraject 
Andrei (jonger broertje, maar al zo lang "dr") ik wou dat we dichter bij elkaar 
woonden, dat ik vaker even langs kon komen om jullie te vervelen met mijn talloze 
verhalen 
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Het één na laatste woord is voor mijn ouders, als dank voor de uitzonderlijk 
evenwichtige, warme en beschutte jeugd, een start die maar weinigen is gegund en 
allesbepalend is voor de verdere keuzes in het leven. Dit proefschrift is voor jullie: voor 
jou mama, om het vast te houden, door te bladeren en erbij terug te denken aan jouw 
eigen carrière en, tenslotte, voor jou papa, de verstrooide professor, de erudiete 
verhalenverteller, de grote mens. Ik wou dat je dit kon meemaken.' 
Ebo, van jou heb ik geleerd om te 'chilien' en te kiezen voor wat je echt gelukkig maakt. 
Ook begrijp ik nu, eindelijk, dat een kaft geen kaft is, maar een ontwerp met een eigen 
verhaal. Paul, dank voor jouw steun, voor jouw rust als ik ontplof en voor jouw 
relativeringsvermogen. 
Al vanaf het moment dat ik het onderzoeksvoorstel indiende wist ik wat ik wilde gaan 
zeggen tegen jullie allemaal, trouwe lezers die het tot het einde hebben volgehouden. En 
vanaf dat moment ben ik ook de verdediging en het feest gaan plannen, voor jullie en 
voor mij, als een welverdiende afsluiting van een veel te rijke fantasie. 
GAUDEAMUS IGITUR! 
1 Andrei (fratior, si dcmult doctor in stiinta), as vrca sa locuim mai aproape ca sa vin mai des la voi si sa va 
phctisesc cu povcstile mele. 
Aceste randuri sunt pentru parintn mei, pentru copilaria echihbrata, caldura si protectia asigurata de ei. Un 
asemenea start nu e dat decat foarte rar, dar e de o mare importanta pentru toate alcgerile din viata. 
Aceasta teza este pentru voi: pentru tine, marni, sa o tii in maini, s-o rasfoiesti si sa-ti aduca aminte de 
cariera ta; pentru tine, tati, profesorul distrai, marele om, eruditul povestitor. As vrca sa fu cu noi. 
(Roemeense vertaling AT) 
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Stellingen 
behorende bij het proefschrift 
'Outbreak management: towards a model for the next crisis" 
Aura Timen, 15 december 2010 
I. De aan epidemiebestrijding inherente tijdsdruk, complexiteit, onzekerheden en 
snel veranderende percepties van de bevolking, media en politiek maken solide en 
wetenschappelijk onderbouwde crisisrichtlijnen noodzakelijk, (dit proefschrift) 
2 . Ten tijde van een epidemie is het classificeren van patiënten door individuele 
artsen, op basis van de casus definities, cruciaal. Een expertteam moet de 
classificatie toetsen opdat de zorg- en bestrijdingscapaciteit efficiënt wordt ingezet, 
(dit proefschrift) 
3. De berekening van de "agreement distance (AD)" bepaalt de mate van 
overeenstemming van de panelleden met een bepaalde stelling nauwkeurig. Dit 
verhoogt de betrouwbaarheid van de resultaten, (dit proefschrift) 
4. De impact en de gevolgen van de bestrijdingsmaatregelen voor de patiënt dienen 
structureel, door de leden van het Outbreak Management Team (OMT), te worden 
meegenomen in het crisisadvies, (dit proefschrift) 
5. De verschillen in de rollen en paradigma's van de groepen professionals tijdens een 
infectieziektecrisis bemoeilijken de implementatie van de crisismaatregelen, (dit 
proefschrift) 
6. De variatie in de capaciteit van landen om snel te reageren en de variatie in inhoud 
en mate van implementatie van de crisismaatregelen beïnvloeden het succes van de 
bestrijding van een toekomstige epidemie in Europa, (dit proefschrift) 
7. Crises houden zich niet aan vooraf opgestelde draaiboeken. 
8. Laboratoria en media hebben een 'amplificerende' rol: de eerste van de verwekkers, 
de laatste van de angst. 
9. Goede ideeën sturen de wetenschap en niet de gegevensverzameling, (naar: 
J.P. Vandenbroucke) 
10. Het berekenen van de rugdikte van het proefschrift is een belangrijke stap op weg 
naar het boekje en is afhankelijk van evenveel variabelen als de massa-energie 
relatie (E=mc2). 
II. Een stelling is gemakkelijker te weerleggen dan op te stellen. (Aristoteles) 


